Jewish Political Studies Review 16:1-2 (Spring 2004)
The Age-Old Iberian Rivalry and the Jews
Psychiatrists use the term "sibling rivalry" to express the jealous and sometimes resentful feelings between brothers and sisters in the same household and apparently this applies to nations as well as individuals. This rivalry has had the unintended consequence of benefiting the Jews on four major occasions - the temporary refuge offered by Portugal in 1497, the Portuguese twenty-year moratorium on the activities of the Inquisition in the early 1500s, the Spanish policy during World War I of pressuring Germany and Ottoman Turkey to allow the Jews exiled from Jaffa and other settlements in Palestine to return to their homes in 1916-17, and the policy of both countries following the fall of France in 1940 of allowing Jewish refugees to transit their countries. Although Jews have often been used as pawns of the ambitions of rival states, the Iberian case is so persistent and has endured so long - even into the twentieth century when both countries had only miniscule Jewish populations - that it demands a more thorough investigation.
Spanish and Portuguese, while mutually intelligible in their written form by educated people, are still far enough apart in their spoken forms to mask irony and sarcasm. Spanish and Portuguese folk music, church architecture, dance, food, humor, and national character are quite distinct and may even have been cultivated to exaggerate a sense of being different. Newcomers from abroad living in Spain are often surprised at the latent jealousy and even hostility between neighboring Spain and Portugal. To this day, the Portuguese and Brazilians are either mildly amused, sarcastic, or shocked when addressed by foreigners in Spanish.
The popular Portuguese press continues to delight in teasing and taunting the Spanish "Big Brother complex," much like the Scots' attitude towards the English, the Slovaks towards the Czechs, or the Danes towards the Swedes. All these rivalries can be reawakened by the outcome of a football match. Portuguese star Luis Figo received death threats and accusations of being a "traitor" when he signed a contract to play for a Spanish team.
What Makes the Portuguese Different
Why did Portugal become an independent nation whereas other parts of modern-day Spain (Galicia, Catalonia, Aragon, Asturias, Navarre, Valencia, and Andalucia) - which all have their own sense of identity and original vernaculars as distinct from Castillian as Portuguese is - eventually became absorbed into a united Spain? One factor is undoubtedly the very rugged mountainous terrain and low population density that characterise the Spanish-Portuguese border region along the course of swift flowing rivers, but several renowned Portuguese historians and geographers have highlighted human and historical-dynastic factors rather than language or physical-geographic barriers as the reason for Portuguese independence.
Two of Europe's most distinguished historians allow themselves the following remarks when contrasting Spanish and Portuguese national characteristics in their most famous works on the history of Portugal:
Thus, the typical characteristics, which so gracefully distinguish the Portuguese soul from its peninsular neighbors, were able to ripen in the shelter of frontiers which are the oldest in Europe. On one side, a proud and exalted people (the Spaniards), ready for all kinds of sacrifice and for all the violent acts that inspire them to be concerned with their dignity; on the other hand a more melancholy and indecisive people (the Portuguese), more sensitive to the charm of women and children, possessing a real humanity in which one can recognize one of the most precious treasures of the patrimony of our old Europe.1
Oliveira Martins, the dean of Portuguese historians, had this to say:
There is in the Portuguese genius something of the vague and fugitive that contrasts with the Castillian categorical affirmative; there is in the Lusitanian heroism, a nobility that differs from the fury of our neighbors; there is in our writing and our thought a profound or sentimental ironic or meek note.�Always tragic and ardent, Spanish history differs from the Portuguese which is more authentically epic and the differences of history are translated into differences in character.2
Portugal as the "Little Brother"
There is of course, a shared common heritage embracing all the peoples of the Iberian peninsula, but it was the Portuguese who first achieved independence and national unity and then established a far flung colonial empire only to lose out later in large part to Spain resulting in a prolonged feeling towards its neighbor as an upstart and arrogant Big Brother.
It was the great successes of Portugal's explorers, seamen, and mapmakers that made such heroic achievements in the Age of Discovery and cemented the essential feelings of national distinctiveness that made separation from Spain a matter of national pride rather than regional distinctiveness. The Portuguese love to reassert their great imperial past which has outlasted Spain's even though the final remnants eventually disappeared after World War II (Mozambique, Angola, and the Cape Verde islands in Africa; Goa in India; Macao in China; and East Timor in the Pacific).
The Dispute over "Who Discovered America"
Any visitor to Lisbon will have seen the great monuments to the early Portuguese explorers, seaman, and cartographers, but may not have read the monument on the Avenida da Liberdade stating that João Vaz Corte is the real "Discoverer of America." Portuguese resentment of Spanish claims to Columbus' greatness has even encouraged considerable speculation by serious Portuguese scholars that Columbus was a Portuguese spy3 who purposely misled the Spanish throne before his journey, well-aware that the route westward would not lead to a "short-cut" to the Indies but would rather drain Spanish resources.
Portugal had already established itself as the sole European commercial maritime power in the Orient and could only benefit from this tactic. None of Columbus' written work and notes are in Italian (strange if he were born in Genoa), and his Castillian Spanish is full of the type of mistakes a Portuguese speaker would make; also his wife was a Portuguese noblewoman.
Whenever either side feels aggrieved, they both refer to the diplomatic maneuvering which allowed the Portuguese to alter the original line of division granting them possessions in the "New World" from 100 leagues west of the Cape Verde islands (1493) to 270 leagues (1494 Treaty of Tordesillas negotiated with the Pope), thereby enabling them to take control of Brazil while ceding the Canary Islands to Spain. Spain maintains that this was due to deception, while Portugal claims it was due to its more advanced cartographic skills (largely because of Jewish astronomers and cartographers4). This famous division of "undiscovered lands" beyond Christian Europe between the two Iberian nations gave them an unprecedented prestigious status and contributed to the sense of rivalry between them.
According to Barreto, Columbus was a Portuguese nobleman of partly Jewish origin whose real name was Salvador Fernandes Zarco and whose mission was to convince the Spanish "Catholic monarchs" to sign the Treaty of Tordesillas, thereby leading the Spaniards on a wild goose chase. >SUP>5
Columbus - Both Portuguese and Jewish!
There is extensive literature, much of it quite controversial, on the origin of Columbus, but the theory advanced by Mascarenhas Barreto makes the most sense from the standpoint of the Spanish-Portuguese rivalry. The Portuguese kings of the early fourteenth century had the strongest relations with the Jewish community, who enjoyed the most far-reaching royal privileges in Europe. Columbus established friendly relations with the nobility, wealthy men, and high church and court officials immediately upon taking up permanent residence in Spain, which was unthinkable for an immigrant Genoese sailor. Strong Portuguese-Jewish links are hinted at by Columbus setting sail with conversos such as the interpreter Luis de Torres (with a knowledge of both Hebrew and Arabic) and the doctors on the Santa Maria, and several Portuguese seamen, including the pilot of the Niña, Sancho Roiz da Gama, who was related to the Portuguese Admiral Vasco de Gama.
Even more telling is the fact that upon returning from his first voyage to America, Columbus docked at Lisbon rather than Palos or any other Spanish port. It also explains why Columbus, in spite of his belief that he had reached the "Indies" and was very near Japan, did not make a serious effort to sail further westward until after the Portuguese had reached India (1497) and Brazil (1500).
Columbus' knowledge of astronomy and cartography were obtained from the tables (in Hebrew) developed by Portuguese Jewish astronomers and cartographers6 and his famous mystical signature can best be understood in terms of the Kabbalah. >SUP>7 Much of his nautical knowledge and familiarity with the sea-lanes to Madeira, the Azores, and Cape Verde were obtained from converted Jews.
Of the many contradictory theories regarding the foreign Columbus, the most difficult and antagonistic for Spaniards to swallow is that he was both Portuguese and of Jewish origin! It may seem strange that "Columbus" (Zarco) could remain so loyal to the Portuguese given their equally disgraceful behavior toward the Jews. The explanation lies partly in Zarco's family connections to the Portuguese royal house, including the fear of his great-uncle "Prince Henry the Navigator," that his sons would be deprived of their inheritance in Spain, and his mystical devotion to the "end of days" vision of a new "Promised Land" where the Jews might find refuge and "salvation."
Barreto's book is controversial. It makes a very strong case for the Jewish and Portuguese identity of Columbus. However, even if it is never substantiated by any "final proof," it helps to understand the intense rivalry between Spain and Portugal as a result of his discoveries, the willingness of the Portuguese to offer a refuge and then a moratorium from the Inquisition and the revision of the Treaty of Tordesillas in Portugal's favor, extending and guaranteeing Portuguese control over Brazil in exchange for Portuguese recognition of the Canary Islands as Spanish territory.
The Political and Economic Background
of the Expulsion
The background to the expulsion and the end of the Spanish Jewish community owes much to the determined policy of Ferdinand and Isabella to achieve Spanish unification and eventually absorb Portugal, dynastic rivalries, and the perceived threat of an established, wealthy, and competitive Jewish middle class that presented an obstacle to the power of the throne. A number of Spanish historians admit that from an objective point of view, the expulsion of the Jews was an erroneous decision that wounded Spain economically.
The absolutist plans of the new monarchy in a unified Spain linking Castille, Aragon, and Navarra envisioned a new hierarchy of patronage dispensed by court and church, with the nobility subject to absolute rule. The Jewish assets seized as a result of the expulsion in 1492 - including homes, lands, goods, and money - placed a major new instrument in the hands of the state to carry out its policies. The monarchs had previously been restricted by a powerful noble class that enjoyed traditional rights and privileges (fueros). The Jews had often been useful pawns serving either the monarch or the nobility in administration, tax collection, commerce, translations, medical treatment, and other services. Their removal and the use of the Church as an ally of the throne to weed out "heretics" and "Judaizers" tipped the balance on the side of the monarchy. The nobility dared not oppose the expulsion for fear of being labeled as allies of the Jews, a tactic encouraged by the Church to appeal to the masses and weaken the power of both monarchy and nobility.
Spanish historians such as Américo Castro and Juan Eslava Galan have concluded that in the long run, the expulsion had disastrous consequences.8 Had the Jewish financiers, merchants, artisans, and bureaucrats remained in Spain during the following centuries, the gold and silver arriving from America would have been wisely invested - creating new wealth - and directed towards industry. Instead, the new wealth was disastrously wasted on extravagance, attempts to maintain Spain as the ruling power in the Holy Roman Empire and dominate the Netherlands and parts of Italy, as well as launch the "Invincible Armada" to invade and regain England for the Catholic Church.
When Portugal's King Manuel I offered the Jews refuge in Portugal, it aroused enormous resentment in Spain. The "Catholic monarchs" feared that Portugal would make use of a valuable asset provided by Spain herself. The division of Spanish society between "old Christians" and "new Christians" (the conversos - converted Jews) had already been exploited in two civil wars in which dynastic rivals accused both sides of Jewish support. The transfer of this divisive element to Spain's traditional enemy, Portugal, was unthinkable. The Jewish presence in the Iberian peninsula was the largest in Europe. More than one-third of the entire European Jewish population of the late fifteenth century lived in Spain and Portugal. Estimates place the 1492 Jewish population at 160,000 in Castille, 75,000 in Aragon, and 15,000 in Navarre. In Portugal, approximately 80,000 Jews comprised at least 5 to 8 percent of the population, and there were much more if conversos are included.9
The intended marriage of Isabel, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, to King Manuel I of Portugal was meant to safeguard Spain from the possibility of a hostile neighbor, and it was forced upon Portugal at the price of compelling her rulers to copy the expulsion order, a policy to which Portugal reluctantly agreed. By this time, however, the Portuguese had reached India (1497) and opened the route to the Far East. Three years later (1500), they discovered Brazil. Many Jews posing as conversos took advantage of the opportunity to leave Portugal and help establish colonies in the new territories, notably in Goa, the Cape Verde islands, and Brazil.
The new Portuguese king, Manuel, who came to the throne in 1494, was an opportunist like his father, King John II, and like Pharaoh was reluctant to let the Jews leave the country. Portugal, with its scarce population of just one million, even prevented many Jews, especially children, from leaving, and instead used them as forced colonists in the Cape Verde Islands. Spanish suspicions lingered that this converso population was still being used to further Portuguese separatism and even extend Portuguese power in spite of the dynastic alliance and marriage that the Spanish Catholic monarchs had hoped would cement Portugal into becoming its permanent vassal. Portugal had to take heed of the now more powerful, united, much larger Spain that had just conquered Granada.
Portuguese records show that the approximately 120,000 Jews legally crossing the frontier in 1492 before the expiration of the official eight-months deadline had to pay a fee of eight cruzeiros each. King Manuel I changed the planned edict of expulsion to one of forced conversion in May 1497, and granted legal residence to 630 of the wealthiest and most talented Spanish-Jewish families. The exploitation of this elite was clearly an opportunistic move by the Portuguese king to take maximum advantage of the expulsion.
He also proclaimed a twenty-year moratorium on the activities of the Inquisition, thus facilitating the integration of conversos into Portuguese society. This confirmed the suspicion of many Spaniards that the Portuguese were taking unfair advantage and utilizing this valuable human resource for its own good. For the Portuguese conversos, it mean a respite of twenty years when their loyalty was not questioned. Unfortunately, this did not prevent further hostility and mob attacks against the "New Christians," most notably in Lisbon in 1506 following an epidemic. The mobs were convinced that the former Jews still had wealth and were being sheltered by the crown. The Portuguese king was angry and ordered the public execution of forty-five culprits who had incited the mob, which indeed lends suspicion that close ties had existed between the Portuguese crown and the Jewish community, which is why an individual such as Colombus-Zarco would have acted as an agent.
Spanish Role as Big Brother Resented
Intense Spanish pressure forced the Portuguese to follow the Spanish example of expelling the Jews in 1497, a step that deprived Portugal of some of its best merchants, diplomats, mathematicians, and mapmakers. Feelings of resentment were aggravated by the Spanish attempts to absorb Portugal that temporarily succeeded between 1580-1640, a period known as "the Spanish Captivity." It was a political mistake that only encouraged a strong and proud reaction that cemented the identity of the independent Portuguese nation as a separate state and culture. Imagine what problems Spain would have today if - on top of contentious separatists sentiment in the Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia - Portugal were added to the list!
There is also great resentment that Portugal was drained of resources and forced to provide the "Invincible Armada" with a substantial part of the ships, its nautical expertise, and thousands of trained seamen. Many of the ships and men ended up at the bottom of the sea as a result of the vain and foolhardy attempt in 1588 to invade England and restore it to Catholicism. The Portuguese often reflect sadly that the loss of their empire was the result of attempts to seize control of much of Morocco and North Africa from its base in Ceuta and that it faced a numerically superior enemy armed with equivalent weaponry, while the Spanish obtained their great empire in Mexico, Peru, and the rest of South and Central America by fighting people who possessed a stone-age technology.
World War I and Spain's Sudden Pro-Zionist Policy
Relations between the two countries have been marked by mutual suspicion, fear, and scheming ever since Portugal reestablished its independence in 1640. For almost three centuries, the two countries coexisted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, especially since Great Britain became Portugal's strongest ally and Spain schemed to recover its loss of Gibraltar. The successful Portuguese revolution in October 1910 deposed the corrupt monarchy and established a republic, setting an example that remained a nightmare for the Spanish monarchy. The Portuguese broke with the past overnight, introducing a new flag and a national anthem, separating church and state, and adopting a new constitution as well as ending the monarchy - all anathema to the ruling circles in Spain.
These fears made Spanish King Alfonso XIII play with the idea of intervening to overthrow the Portuguese republic. He considered Spanish aid to the Allies in World War I and eventual entry into the war in return for British recognition of a Spanish "re-integration" (conquest) of Portugal into one realm again. This scheme encouraged Portugal to outbid Spain and enter the war. Spain remained neutral and devoted itself to being a meeting ground for peace advocates. The Spanish king even succeeded in using his personal prestige to back several humanitarian projects in order to counteract Portugal's attempts to enter the war on the Allied side.
Foremost among these humanitarian projects was Spanish pressure on Germany to call upon its ally, Turkey, to rescind the order of expulsion against the Jews of Jaffa in Palestine. Germany was determined to keep Spain neutral, fearing that it might follow Portugal in joining with the Allies and entering the war. These measures only increased Portuguese suspicions that Spain was capitalizing on its neutrality to gain increased recognition and prestige on the international stage. Although these diplomatic ploys have not received major attention by most historians (except in Portugal and Spain; see for example the two works in Portuguese by the Spanish historian Hipólito de la Tórre Gómez10), the end result was the rescue of the largest Zionist settlement and new economic center of the "Yishuv" in Palestine, Tel Aviv. Had the Turkish expulsion order remained in force, it most likely would have made it much more difficult to obtain approval of the Balfour declaration.
Fear of losing their independence and their African colonies in the event of a German victory drove the Portuguese to enter the war on the Allied side in 1916. The British could simply promise the Portuguese that they would keep what they already had of their colonial empire, whereas they were hardly ready to bargain away their important naval base in Gibraltar in order to buy Spain's promise to join the Allied side.
The popular reaction to Portugal's disastrous losses in the trenches of France provoked a renewed debate over the country's individuality. For many, it was the outrageous and exaggerated sense of the "Spanish danger" that had impelled the leaders of the various factions that made up the Republican movement to actually "force Britain to accept Portugal as an ally." The Portuguese leaders were aware of schemes and secret treaties that had been made by Germany and Britain to eventually dispose of Portugal's great African empire in the event of serious disorders affecting mainland Portugal or its African colonies. A British "Anti-Slavery Society" was also extremely critical of Portuguese colonial policies and an important public pressure group.
Portugal's Lament at the Versailles Peace Conference
Portugal had to face the ultimate humiliation that despite its decision to actively participate in the war and suffer grievous casualties on the Western Front in the trenches, neutral Spain won a seat on the Council of the League of Nations at the suggestion of President Wilson and the approval of Great Britain. The Spaniards had indeed played their cards well as a benevolent neutral, and Alfonso XIII had become a respected figure on the world stage. The Portuguese could only lodge an official protest that the "traditional, reactionary, Germanophile Spain" had "usurped" its rightful position at the League of Nations and that Portuguese blood had been shed in vain for the Allied cause.
The Spanish-Portuguese rivalry continued as late as the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), in spite of Portugal's aid to Franco and the ostensibly "friendly alliance" between the Fascist dictator and Portugal's authoritarian leader, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Part of the Portuguese high command under the leadership of Colonel Rodrigo Pereira Botelho plotted to seize Olivença, a disputed border town, and restore it to Portuguese sovereignty. However, the Fascist uprising quickly took control of the town and its leaders were careful to expel any local sympathizer who might have joined in a Portuguese attempt to assault the town.
Spain's military found it difficult to abandon the image of Portugal as an "eternal ally" of Great Britain and a possible invasion route by the British navy to attack Spain (as had occurred in the Napoleonic period of the Peninsular War). It comes as quite a surprise to those only familiar with English language sources that Portugal's leader Salazar, in spite of the "Iberian Pact of Non-Aggression" signed with General Franco (1940) and Portugal's open sympathy and aid to Spain during the Spanish Civil War, was still concerned with possible treachery by Franco and an Axis invasion of Portugal in connection with a possible attack on Gibraltar.10
The Rivalry Continues and Benefits Jewish Refugees!
An important consideration of the different behavior of the two countries in World War II was the strategic importance of Portugal's Atlantic island possessions in the Azores. These "stepping-stones" on the way to North America were envisioned by the German high command as critical for the threat to strike the United States. New York City lies only 2,500 miles from the Azores. German control of the islands would have aided their U-boats and posed a real threat to the United States' eastern coast.
In 1940 (the 300th anniversary of Portugal's regaining its independence), a leading Spanish magazine wrote (threatened?) that: "it was God's will that the two countries be reunited again." This anecdotal incident reflected much of Spanish anxiety over Portuguese "neutrality" and possible cooperation with the British. In April 1941, President Roosevelt declared that the Portuguese possession of the Azores lay in the "Western Hemisphere," implying that they came under the protection of the American "Monroe Doctrine." Their significance for the American and British navies in combating the German U-boat threat was essential. Franco maintained a strict neutrality, and even permitted thousands of Spanish volunteers to serve with the German Army in a special "Blue Division" to fight communist Russia (5,000 were killed and missing in combat on the Eastern Front).
The Portuguese, however, knew where their most vital interests lay and by June 1943 the British formally invoked their ancient alliance with Portugal, requesting the use of airfields on the islands. Portugal agreed. Following the war, Portugal was an honored ally - a founding member of NATO in 1949 - whereas Spain under Franco remained a pariah state for another decade and was not even admitted to the United Nations until 1955.
It is unlikely that Portugal would have been so well regarded by the Allies had it not been for an amazing turn of events that worked to the advantage of Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar. Along with the noble Swedish ambassador to Hungary, Raoul Wallenberg, another diplomat of much lesser rank, the Portuguese Consul in Bordeaux at the time of the German conquest of France in June 1940, Aristides de Sousa Mendes,12 deserves to be regarded as a truly "Righteous Gentile." An austere career diplomat, he was struck by the awful human tragedy engulfing so many refugees, among whom were many Jews trapped in France, and he took it wholly upon himself to use his office to help all of them in contradiction to strict orders.
Sousa Mendes provided families with Portuguese documents to legally enter Portugal and transit Spain from France. He did this knowing that he would be severely punished, and doubting that his documents would be honored by Spanish officials. Portugal was obligated by the ancient Treaty of Windsor with Great Britain to provide assistance in wartime, but as in World War I, it was not applicable since neither country had been directly attacked by an aggressor. Salazar had signed the much more demanding "Pacto Ibérico" treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Spain's Generalissimo Franco in March 1939.
The clever Portuguese dictator knew that he was most vulnerable to a German-supported Spanish attack if suspected of treachery or if Spain would decide to realize its age-old ambition to annex Portugal. He therefore played for time and demonstrated pro-Axis sympathies by shipping supplies of much needed foodstuffs to Spain. He expressly forbade his diplomats to grant transit visas to "Jews expelled from countries of their nationality" and "stateless persons," as well as all "those who cannot safely return to the countries from whence they came."
He reinforced this with another directive on 17 May 1940, that "Under NO circumstances" was any visa to be issued unless previously authorized from Lisbon on a case-by-case basis. This was a reserve safety clause for the dictator, who knew that he might find it advantageous to let a few prominent individuals escape to America to win goodwill there. However, he never expected a third-rate minor diplomat to open the floodgates, or that the Spanish authorities would accept this wave of refugee traffic.
Sousa Mendes personally intervened at the border when Spanish guards questioned the authenticity of the visas at the border towns of Bayonne, Hendaye, and Irun. Approximately 30,000 refugees, among them 10,000 Jews, directly owed their lives to the Portuguese consul who was recalled and declared insane, the official explanation later reported in the Spanish and Portuguese press. Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador to Spain, had to intervene and relieve Sousa Mendes of his post.
Salazar demanded an enquiry and that "appropriate punishment" be meted out, but before a decision could be taken, Life magazine featured a headline story on 29 July 1940 calling Salazar "The greatest Portuguese since Henry the Navigator!" The naïve Life reporters could not accept the story that a minor Portuguese consular official had acted on his own conscience. They were unaware of the press reports of insanity or the charges to be filed against him so they concluded that this magnificent act of humanity must have been the work of Portugal's leader, Salazar.
The simple reality of the situation demanded a cover-up from the Portuguese and Spanish officials, who could not admit to such incompetence and risk losing the good will earned by Portugal. Sousa Mendes was removed from office and declared guilty of "professional incapacity," but the entire matter was handled with the utmost tact so as not to ruin the good press the country had received in the United States. It was also a kind of insurance for Salazar that Spain could not threaten Portugal in the future and use its "German" card, since Portugal could then retaliate with both American and British support. So, although he never forgave Sousa Mendes, he did not close the Portuguese border for the remainder of the war and Lisbon became the chief embarkation point to the new world for refugees who managed to flee Nazi-occupied Europe.
Franco Responds in Kind
Franco did not personally whip up anti-Semitism or employ anti-Semitic themes in his campaign to seize power and topple the republic. Embarrassed by the favorable American press received by Salazar in June 1940, Franco made it Spanish policy to accept all refugees who legally entered Spain and even gave special attention to Jews of Spanish-Portuguese descent (the "Sephardim").13 He also realized that it could conceivably be in Spain's interest to maintain a decent and humanitarian respect for the refugees and he was determined not to play "second fiddle" to Salazar. Although neither had intended to aid Jewish refugees, the inherent sense of rivalry between the two countries inadvertently came into play as a result of a sensationalist story in the American press of humanitarian interest. It is perhaps on this positive note that the Spanish-Portuguese rivalry played out its last card.
The rivalry has almost evaporated completely except for the passions of a major confrontation between the two countries' football teams in the European Cup and some vestigial antagonisms that arise among some "die-hards," especially on the Portuguese side. Celebrations of the restoration of Portugal's independence (1 December) are still occasionally marked by such anti-Spanish signs as "Better Poor than Spanish," and letters of protest continue to be featured in some Portuguese dailies expressing resentment at Portuguese national television for bringing Spanish language news reports from Spanish TV without subtitles in Portuguese. To most observers, this only proves that some Portuguese still have an inferiority complex.
There is popular opposition in Portugal to the far-reaching economic and planning proposals for a trans-national Euro-region embracing the Portuguese province of Alentejo and the autonomous region Extremadura of Spain, and there is still no direct road link between Madrid and Lisbon. However, in all other areas, the two regimes and peoples have never been so close or harmonious. Nevertheless, from the Jewish viewpoint, the long rivalry had important and beneficial consequences, even if unintended.
* * *
1. Pierre Birot, Le Portugal: Étude de Géographie Regionale (Paris: Colin, 1950).
2. J. P. Oliveira Martins, Historia da Civilizaçao Ibérica (Mem Martins, Portugal: Publicações Europa-América, 1987).
3. Mascarenhas Barreto, The Portuguese Columbus; Secret Agent of King John II (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
4. Samuel Kurinsky, "Jews and Navigation," Fact Report No. 9 (New York: Hebrew History Federation Ltd., 1997).
5. Baretto, The Portuguese Columbus.
6. Kurinsky, "Jews and Navigation."
7. Baretto, The Portuguese Columbus, pp. 262-322
8. Juan Eslava Galan, La Historia de España contada para escépticos (Madrid: Planeta, 1995). See also Jose Luis Lacave, Guía de la España Judía (Cordoba: Ediciones El Almendro, 2000) and Mordecai Arbell, The Jewish Nation of the Caribbean; The Spanish-Portuguese Jewish Settlements in the Caribbean and the Guianas (Jerusalem: Gefen Books, 2002).
9. Compared to the Jews of Spain who comprised less than 3 percent of the total population in a much larger population of approximately eight million. Portugal's total population was one million.
10. Hipólito de la Tórre Gómez, Na Encruzilhada da Grande Guerra, Portugal-Espanha 1913-1919 (In the Crossfire of the Great War), (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1980); Hipólito de la Tórre Gómez, Do "Perigo Espanhol" a Amizade Peninsular; Portugal-Espanha 1919-1930 (From the "Spanish Danger" to Peninsular Friendship), (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1985).
11. Dennis J. Fodor and editors of Time-Life Books, "Chapter 3 - Dictators on a High Wire," The Neutrals (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1982), pp. 76-119.
12. Maria Julia Cirurgiao and Michael D. Hull, "Aristide de Sousa Mendes," in Lay Witness (October 1998), [publication of the Catholics United for the Faith].
13. Haim Avni España, Franco y los Judíos (Madrid: Altalena, 1982) and Julio Varaz del Vayo "Franco as a Friend of the Jews," Congress Weekly, vol. 16, no. 7, 1949.
* * *
NORMAN BERDICHEVSKY is a native New Yorker currently living in Santiago de la Ribera (Murcia), Spain. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Wisconsin-Madison (1974) and is the author of The Danish-German Border Dispute (Bethesda, MD: Academica Press LLC, 2002) and Nations, Language and Citizenship (Jefferson, NC: McFarland Publishing, 2004) and one of the contributors to Best Jewish Writing 2003 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), He is the author of 150 publications that have appeared in World Affairs, Midstream, Ariel, Contemporary Review, Journal of Cultural Geography, The World & I, Ethnicity, Ecumene, Landscape Journal, Scandinavian Review, Israel Affairs, and many others. His new book, Spanish Vignettes - An Insight into Spanish Society, Culture and History, will be published at the end of this year (2004) by Ediciones Santana (Malaga, Spain).
The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect
those of the Board of Fellows of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
The above article appears in the Spring 2004 issue of the Jewish Political Studies Review, the first and only journal dedicated to the study of Jewish political institutions and behavior, Jewish political thought, and Jewish public affairs.
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