Now More Than Ever is the Time for a Federal Solution
Two Peoples--One Land:
Federal Solutions for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan
Daniel J. Elazar
On December 8, 1987, a minor traffic accident near Gaza set off a
chain of events that led the Palestinian Arab residents in the
Gaza District, Judea, and Samaria to begin the disturbances known
to the world as the intifada (the literal meaning of that Arabic
term is "shaking out"). The image given to the world is of a
Palestinian uprising against Israeli-occupying forces limited to
the use of non-lethal weapons. For Israelis who know as well as
the Palestinians involved that stones, molotov cocktails, axes
and knives can and do kill, it is a perplexing and explosive
issue. For the Palestinians it has been a heady experience that
has fostered a sense of pride and self-satisfaction that they
have been able to stand up to the Israeli enemy, even though the
more sober among them know that if Israel had the heart to use
the force at its disposal, the intifada could have been
suppressed as similar activities have been suppressed in the
neighboring Arab states.
At first it seemed that the intifada was going to lead to a new
kind of stalemate as the only voices heard from the Palestinian
side once again called for throwing the Zionists into the sea and
establishing a Palestinian state in all of what they have come to
call "Falastin." In the first few months of the intifada an
increasing number of Israeli Jews, out of exasperation and
frustration, were willing to consider almost any means of getting
rid of the Palestinians, even at the price of giving away most of
the territories. No Palestinian voices came forward to catalyze
that frustration and take advantage of the opportunity they had
created for themselves. Nevertheless, the intifada continued
with Israeli opinion much divided as to how to deal with it.
Then in July 1988, King Hussein dramatically withdrew Jordan from
all formal connection with the territories. This led, in turn, to
a PLO peace offensive climaxing in the PLO Algiers resolutions
adopted on November 15th by the Palestinian National Council as
the "Palestinian Declaration of Independence" and Yasser Arafat's
statement to the press in Geneva a month later on December 14th
"recognizing" Israel's right to exist, which opened the door for
U.S. talks with the PLO. Increasingly it became clear to one and
all that the status quo ante had been altered, that the
Palestinians would have to be treated as more of a factor than
either Israel or the United States wished, that with all the
ambivalence in the PLO's actions there was a change in the
Palestinian position, murky and halting as it might be, that
offered new possibilities for a negotiated peace settlement.
Over twenty years of Israeli administration have brought general
prosperity and improvement of living conditions for the
Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza in virtually every
respect, but did not bring political satisfaction to the
indigenous population. The disturbances in the territories have
shocked everyone by their extent and intensity and by the fact
that they extended also to East Jerusalem and to a few Arab
villages in pre-1967 Israel. Outbreaks of adolescent anger a year
ago were transformed into organized aggression that knocked the
Israelis off balance, seriously changing the images of both
Israel and the Palestinians and leading to great uncertainty with
regard to the future at home.
King Hussein's formal withdrawal from the territories west of
the Jordan and the recent declaration of a Palestinian state by
the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers have only
added to that heady feeling. But heady feelings are not enough
to change the situation on the ground. In the short run the
Palestinians cannot dislodge the Israelis from what they refer to
as "the occupied territories." While in the long run, whatever
they may achieve, they cannot expect to be rid of either a
Jordanian or an Israeli presence.
This combination of realities has served to move leaders and
thinkers among all the parties toward a more serious
consideration of federal solutions. Among Israelis, hardliners
began to talk about a confederal relationship between Israel and
Jordan, with the Palestinians integrated into a
Jordanian-Palestinian state. Middle-of-the-roaders began to talk
about an Israel-Palestinian confederation that would leave the
Palestinians with an entity but not a state, while those on the
left began to speak of an Israel-Palestine confederation
involving two states, or perhaps an Israel-Palestine-Jordan
confederation involving three.
Palestinian moderates called for a two state solution in which
Israel, Palestine, and Jordan would form a semi-confederal
relationship like the Benelux countries or a
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation leagued with Israel. Yasser
Arafat, pressed by Egypt's Mubarak and the United States,
actively, if reluctantly, sought King Hussein's approval and
support for a Jordan-Palestine confederation. While each party
and group had its own ideas of what kind of federal solution
would best serve its interests and needs and in many cases their
thoughts were still relatively unformulated, these developments
have to be seen as a major breakthrough and movement toward
reaching a common field of discourse, which in itself could
constitute a giant step toward resolution of the conflict.
All this is still in the category of a first step. We know from
the experience of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots that common
commitment to a federal solution does not mean that the parties
will easily reach agreement as to what that solution should
involve. Both parties to the Cyprus dispute agree to the
ultimate achievement of a federal Cyprus, but the Greeks see
federalism as a means to reintegrate the Turkish-occupied
sections of the island within a very strong Greek-dominated
state, while the Turks see a federal solution as a means of
establishing a confederation to allow them maximum autonomy
without partitioning the island.1 Right now, even those Israelis
and Palestinians interested in federal solutions are talking at
similar cross-purposes. Thus the need before us is two-fold: to
strengthen the growing acceptance of a federal solution as the
only possible one that will do sufficient justice to the claims
of all parties involved, and to define the right federal
solution.
In a sense the present convergence around federal solutions is
the next step in twenty years of movement in that direction.
Almost immediately after the Six-Day War, Moshe Dayan and Shimon
Peres called for what they termed a "functional solution" to the
problem of the territories. While they never precisely defined
what they meant by a functional solution, it became clear over
the course of the next decade that it was akin to Option 9 --
shared Israeli-Jordanian rule over the territories with local
autonomy for the inhabitants. At approximately the same time,
Professor Raanan Weitz, then head of the Jewish Agency Settlement
Department, proposed a cantonal solution similar to federal
Option 3 -- a proposal which Shimon Peres later embraced as one
possibility.2 Professor Andre Chouraqui raised the idea of an
Israeli-Palestinian confederation (Option 2) in his book Letter
to an Arab Friend at roughly the same time.3 In a memo prepared
in 1970 and published as an article in 1972, this writer listed
three options to be considered: an Israeli-Palestinian federation
similar to Option 1, a federation of cantons (Option 3), or a
consociational federation like Option 8.4
At approximately the same time that my article was published,
King Hussein formally proposed a Jordanian-Palestinian federation
or confederation based on Israel's return of all of the
territories occupied as a result of the war and excluding Israel
from any formal role in the resultant polity.5 For many years
rejected by the PLO, in the 1980s they were brought to formally
accept it as a result of pressure from Egypt and the United
States and perhaps other Arab states as well.6
While a number of Israeli voices were raised on behalf of one or
another of these federal options from time to time, the first
serious exploration of the options was initiated by the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs early in 1976, stimulated by Shimon
Peres, then Minister of Defense, who was interested in
identifying all the possible options for a federal solution, and
Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem, interested in the specific
Jerusalem situation. Identifying the eleven options presented in
Chapter Four, the Jerusalem Center initiated a round of
international conferences and publications involving Israelis,
Palestinians, Americans, Canadians and Europeans to bring the
possibilities of a federal solution before the publics involved
and to develop a systematic understanding of the possibilities
and limitations of each. Through those conferences and its
publications, the JCPA laid a firm and thorough scholarly
groundwork for subsequent thinking on the subject and, through
its efforts as a thinktank, actively brought its ideas to the
attentions of Israeli, Palestinian, American, Egyptian, and
Jordanian policy-makers. Those efforts reached a climax in the
form of a report of the Center-sponsored Study Group for
Israel-Arab Peace, made public in June 1983.7 After Sadat's visit
to Jerusalem and the successful conclusion of the Camp David
talks, other Israelis, in particular Professors Yoram Dinstein
and Ruth Lapidoth, undertook explorations of the autonomy process
called for in the Camp David Accords.8
Reagan, Hussein and Begin Opt for Shared Rule
In retrospect, the turning point may have come in 1982 when Prime
Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, King Hussein of Jordan, and
President Ronald Reagan of the United States all came out in one
way or another for a federal solution. The active support of
Reagan and Hussein for a Jordanian-Palestinian federation was
headline news in September 1982. What is less well-known is that
Begin also came out for a federal solution even earlier. No
later than February of that year, he proposed that, some time
after the establishment of autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs in
the administered territories, Israel and Jordan be linked in a
confederation which would enable the Palestinians to strengthen
their ties with Jordan while retaining the links between the
territories and Israel. Begin stated this position publicly on
several occasions during 1982 and 1983 but his statements were
not treated seriously by the press. He is even responsible for
the best concise definition of federalism available: the
combination of self-rule and shared rule, which he offered during
that period.
In fact, they were very serious indeed. In addition to his own
statements, Arye Naor, former cabinet secretary of the Begin
government, almost unambiguously speaking for Begin, published an
article in the Israeli periodical Gesher entitled "From Autonomy
to Confederation" elaborating on Begin's proposed confederal
solution.9 Naor, describing Begin's initiative, stated "it is a
program built on a conception of peace as a dynamic process and
not a static 'given' that assumes the revision of position,
tactual stances, and priorities, from which flows a pragmatic
perspective which at times comes into conflict with an
ideological one," whereby time would be used to achieve
compromises presently unobtainable. Begin's program was designed
to take into account "not only Israel's desired national goals
but also international realities" and Arab aspirations.
Echoing the earlier work of the Jerusalem Center, Naor presented
four possibilities for resolving the problem of territories:
Israeli annexation, full Israeli withdrawal, territorial
compromise (repartition), or shared rule, and concluded that only
the latter was feasible, given the conflicting Jewish and Arab
claims and demographic and political realities. The first step
would be the autonomy plan, the only immediate step that did not
foreclose other options. It would be generous but carefully
limited to preclude unilateral actions to establish a Palestinian
state. Autonomy, he suggested, could only be an interim
solution, designed to end the state of conquest in the
territories and foster an atmosphere of cooperation that would
ultimately lead to a more permanent solution in the form of an
Israeli-Jordanian confederation that will resolve the ambiguities
in the status of the Palestinian Arabs resident in the
territories (i.e., the sovereignty issue) while protecting
Israeli rights. For Begin and Naor, sharing the land and its
governance was the only way to achieve peace.
When none of the foregoing trial balloons received proper
attention, Ehud Olmert, one of the up-and-coming young leaders of
Begin's Herut party published an essay on the Op-Ed page of the
New York Times calling for the same thing.10 It is a curious
example of the bias in the West that this important thrust on the
part of the Begin government was so thoroughly ignored. Just to
drive the point home, this writer published an op-ed piece in the
Los Angeles Times pointing all this out.11
A federal solution of one kind or another was implicit in the
Camp David Accords. For nearly fifty years, beginning with the
separation of Transjordan from western Palestine by the British
in 1921-22, the first of the many attempted solutions to the
conflict between Jews and Arabs in Eretz Israel/Palestine, the
thrust was toward a resolution of the conflict by partitioning
the land. Indeed, the original partition was devised by Winston
Churchill to satisfy both parties by giving each a potential
state in Eretz Israel/Palestine -- a land considered one by both
parties, then as now.
The Jews were forced to accept an even smaller share of the land
in order to gain a state in 1948. Had the Arabs recognized
Israel at that time, either the 1947 UN partition boundaries or
the armistice lines established as a result of Israel's War of
Independence would have become binding and accepted by all
parties. In fact, Israel made no effort to change these
boundaries even at the opening of the 1967 war, until King
Hussein of Jordan refused Israeli overtures to stay out of the
fighting. Then events took their own course and the end result
was the Israeli army sitting on the banks of the Jordan River.
Some in Israel, like the late Yigal Allon, were prepared for a
repartition of the land west of the Jordan River, albeit on terms
more favorable to Israel's security interests. But there were
no takers on the Arab side and great reluctance among many
Israelis as well.
What emerged out of this new reality was a situation in which the
territory of Israel within the 1949 armistice lines was more or
less recognized by all but the Arab world as the legitimate
territory of the Jewish state. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
east of the Jordan River had long since been recognized as an
Arab state, while neither Israel nor the Arabs were prepared to
relinquish control over the territory in dispute between the two
states. This set the stage for a return to consideration of
federal solutions, namely some combination of self-rule and
shared rule.
It is a sign of Israel's concern for its own integrity as a
Jewish state and the democratic rights of the Palestinian Arabs
that Prime Minister Begin came up with an alternate plan
suggesting an Israel-Jordanian confederation as the stage beyond
the autonomy. Had the Palestinian Arabs in the territories been
willing to assume Israeli citizenship, Begin would have been
fully ready to grant it to them. He said as much consistently
since first proposing his plan in 1977. But, recognizing their
refusal to do so, he came up with an alternative which would
enable them to be citizens of an Arab state even while
maintaining their connection with Israel by virtue of their place
of residence.
In 1982, each of the various federal solutions proposed was
ignored or implicitly rejected by one or more of the parties
involved. Now all parties seem to be willing to reconsider the
matter.
From Israel's point of view, a proper federal solution would
provide the Jewish state with appropriate security guarantees,
provide protection for the Jewish settlements in the territories,
and a share in the land's common resources, particularly water
resources. (Since the entire land of Eretz Israel/Palestine
represents a single water reserve, the latter is particularly
important.) These are three absolute necessities in the minds of
virtually all Israelis, however they interpret the way to achieve
and secure them.
For Hussein and his Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, such a plan
offers an opportunity to regain a foothold west of the river
including, I would imagine, a presence in Jerusalem, plus such
advantages as port facilities on the Mediterranean which would
come with Gaza. Does Jordan still want to be involved? Despite
King Hussein's dramatic announcement and subsequent actions
designed to speak even louder than his words, less than three
months after the presumed severence of the Jordanian involvement
he and Yasser Arafat had resumed discussions of a
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, first under the auspices of
Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and subsequently on a bilateral
basis in Amman.
The Palestinians stand to benefit at least as much, if not more,
than either of the other parties. There remains a strong
Palestinian interest in being linked with their fellow
Palestinians east of the river located in territory which,
according to the PLO platform, should be part of any future
Palestinian state. Whatever concessions the PNC made toward
recognizing Israel's right to exist in its Algiers declaration,
they made no concessions whatsoever with regard to Jordan's right
to exist. Their original doctrine continues to apply undiluted to
the East Bank.
If so, why is Yasser Arafat so reluctant to accept Hussein's
suggestions for a Jordanian-Palestinian federation? Part of the
reason, of course, is his own desire to head any state that would
emerge for the Palestinians without playing second fiddle to any
other party, but in part it is because the Palestinians know full
well that a simple Jordanian-Palestinian federation would leave
them at the mercy of the Hashemite rulers and the Jordanian army,
who have crushed them in the past and have promised to do so
again in the future if necessary. After all, federations require
some measure of republican, if not democratic, rule to be stable.
In 1989, Hussein began to move toward a republican form of
government, with an elected parliament, political parties and
competition, although real power in Jordan remains in the hands
of the king and his appointees, who sit at his pleasure. In
light of this positive step, the Palestinians must ask themselves
what they can realistically expect in the future.
The only way in which a Palestinian link with Jordan would
protect the Palestinians is if Israel were involved as a third
party. An Israeli counterbalance to the Hashemite ruler would
indeed be a powerful guarantee of Palestinian self-government.
Only the folly of approaching the issue with certain
preconceptions which exclude an Israeli role a priori has kept
this from being seen.
Of course, the Palestinians can reject all options other than a
fully separate and independent state of their own. In my
opinion, it is foolish to believe that any Israeli government in
the foreseeable future will allow such a state to come into
existence west of the Jordan River. Even the PLO leaders
understand that, with a few exceptions, even that segment of the
Israeli population willing to withdraw from territories occupied
by Israel in 1967 is not prepared for a separate Palestinian
state that is not linked with Jordan in some serious way.
The Palestinians have also hinted that they understand the need
for a continued connection with Israel as well, even if they get
their state, at the minimum out of economic necessity. Most
Israelis understand this as well. Certainly it is accepted
doctrine among Israeli policy-makers, even those who are prepared
to make the maximum territorial and political concessions to the
Palestinians. The idea of closing off any territory of the
historic Land of Israel to Israeli Jews or of dismantling the
Jewish settlements established in the past twenty years is
rejected by the vast majority of Israelis and both major parties.
Since it would be impossible to maintain settlements and access
and, even more important, serve Israel's defensive needs under a
situation where there was a complete separation between the
Jewish and Arab states, such links are as inevitable as they are
desirable.
Thus, the Palestinians, to gain a reasonable measure of
self-determination, must accept a federal solution and find the
appropriate partner or partners for it. Since neither Israel nor
Jordan is acceptable alone, perhaps the Palestinians can be
brought to realize that what is good for them is a combination of
both -- just as Israel has come to realize that since it will not
be allowed simply to absorb the territories, such an arrangement
would be the lesser of two evils for it. Since Jordan has no
other option, it will have to come to the same conclusion.
What this means is that a federal solution is necessary not only
to link the Palestinians with Jordan but with Israel as well.
This is not to suggest that federal solutions are inevitable --
nothing is inevitable in politics and, however desirable certain
alternatives are, people and polities do not necessarily
correctly perceive their own self-interest. In these matters,
more often then not, people are moved by emotion, symbols, and
astute or bad timing rather than rational considerations.
The Appropriate Federal Solution
What kind of federal solution can be constructed that will
satisfy the legitimate demands and needs of all parties concerned
when among those demands and needs is that of maximum separation
of Jews and Arabs when it comes to matters of self-government and
preservation of their respective cultures. While there are many
kinds of federal solutions, one seems to be particularly
appropriate at this juncture: a Palestinian-Jordanian federation
in new boundaries that will reflect Israel's security needs,
overlaid by a confederation with Israel.
A Palestinian-Jordanian federation would mean one over-arching
general government for the territories within it, both east and
west of the Jordan River, divided into two or more constituent
states (either Jordan-Palestine or Jordan, the West Bank, and
Gaza), at least one of which would be controlled by the
Palestinian Arabs west of the river. It is not for Israelis to
dictate the form of government that such a federation would take
other than to require that it be republican -- at least as a
constitutional monarchy. Israel's role in that federation will
be primarily as a guarantor to both sides that the other lives up
to its federal obligations as determined in the peace settlement
and the constitutional bargaining between King Hussein and the
Palestinians. Israel's principal concern will be that a real
federation between the two parties is involved so that for
purposes of international relations there will be only one Arab
state in the historic Land of Israel/Palestine, albeit with at
least two component federated states with substantial powers that
will together share in the common federal government.
The Nature of an Israeli-Jordanian/Palestinian Confederation
In order to better be able to play its role as guarantor and to
protect its own rights in the land, the State of Israel, with its
boundaries adjusted to include those segments of Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza needed for security purposes or so intensively settled
by Israeli Jews as to be appropriately part of the Jewish state,
will enter into a confederal relationship with the
Jordanian-Palestinian federation. Whereas in a federal
relationship a single polity is created with one overarching
government, in a confederation the states that come together
preserve their full political and juridical personalities while
establishing certain permanent joint bodies to serve their common
needs. This is particularly the case in the confederations that
have emerged since World War II, first and foremost of which is
the European Community.
Such a confederal arrangement will provide for Israel and
Israelis to continue to have rights in and access to the
territories they relinquish and a share in determining critical
decisions regarding those "goods" and resources such as water
which are common to the entire country and do not respect state
boundaries. It could involve extraterritorial status for both
Jewish and Arab settlements on one or another side of the new
border and obviate the necessity to either dismantle Jewish
settlements or to establish entirely contiguous links between
them and pre-1967 Israel. Among the tasks that could be
entrusted to the confederation would be security in the West Bank
and Gaza other than local police, control and distribution of
common water resources, economic and fiscal coordination
including the maintenance of an open labor market, and the
promotion of economic development.
How would such a confederation be governed? One way would be
through a council whose members would be appointed by the parties
involved either through the two states or, perhaps more
effectively, by Israel and each of the federated states of
Palestine/Jordan. If the former, voting could be on the basis of
parity. In the case of the latter, the voting would have to be
weighted so that the Israeli vote would equal that of the Arabs.
Another would be through several single or multi-purpose
functional authorities of a more technical character that could
be expanded or contracted as conditions change.
The functions assigned to the confederation can be conducted by
the confederation government or authority directly or assigned
temporarily or permanently to one state or another. Thus, for
example, Israel could be made solely or principally responsible
for security matters for a set period, after which if things work
well, security could become a shared function. A confederal
arrangement of this kind would provide for maximum separation
while maintaining the links needed by all the parties involved.
The capital of the confederation could be located in Jerusalem
and the Arab presence in Jerusalem could be acknowledged in an
appropriate manner. Moreover, any territorial concessions would
be based on an allocation of jurisdiction rather than decisions
on ultimate sovereignty, either indefinitely or for an interim
period.
In sum, such a federation-confederation combination could give
all the parties involved not only the peace they seek but their
other demands as well. The Palestinians would get their state,
albeit as a federal state rather than a separately independent
one, and also a guaranteed share in the common governance of the
Arab state. Jordan would continue to have a standing west of the
river. Israel would get secure borders, recognition by its Arab
neighbors, and a continuing relationship with those parts of the
historic Land of Israel not within its full political
jurisdiction. Most of all there would be peace, which by now the
vast majority of the people involved seriously want.
A Possible Governmental Structure
The plan presented here concentrates on three main aspects: 1)
possible structures for a successful federal solution; 2) the
functions of the political and administrative organs; and 3) the
institutional dynamics that should animate the structure. Basic
to the plan is that the instruments of governance include not
only territorial but also functional and personal dimensions in a
manner befitting the Middle East situation. Thus, for example,
while the organs designed for exclusively or principally
Palestinian control would be confined to their jurisdiction, the
joint authority handling transportation and communications could
also control Palestinian access to Israel's Mediterranean ports
for the benefit of both Palestine and Jordan.
An appropriate framework for the confederation would comprise two
spheres of government: political and administrative.
The Political Sphere. The principal organ in this sphere would
be the Confederation Joint Council (CJC), which should be
composed of an equal number of Israeli and Jordanian/Palestinian
representatives. Each state -- Israel and Jordan/Palestine --
would select its own representatives. At least one-half of the
Jordanian delegation should be composed of Palestinian residents
of the territories. The representatives of each state should
serve at the pleasure of their appointing governments. The
council would appoint a secretariat and, for day-to-day business,
would be linked to Israel through the prime minister's office and
to Jordan/Palestine through an appropriate counterpart.
The council would be the only body whose jurisdiction is
simultaneously territorial, functional, and personal. It would
be directly responsible for four functions within its sphere of
competence: enactment of ordinances and by-laws, budget and
fiscal management, planning, and legal coordination.
The Administrative Sphere. An indeterminate number of mixed
authorities would be established to administer those functions
related to the territories best shared by Israel, Jordan, and the
Palestinians on a trilateral or bilateral basis. Included among
such functions would be security, immigration and naturalization,
holy places, foreign trade and tourism, refugee rehabilitation,
land and water resources and development, banking and currency,
and posts and telecommunications. The management of each of
these authorities should be vested in a board composed of
representatives of the parties constituting each. Each functional
authority should have jurisdiction over all people and
territories served by its particular function. Because the
"service sheds" of different functions are necessarily different,
several functional authorities are necessary rather than one
multipurpose authority.
Formally, power would be shared not only between the constituting
states but also among the various institutions composing the
confederation. Informally, power could flow in various
directions, depending on the mechanisms that would emerge, the
relations between the constituent states, the new entities that
may be created, and other developments. In any event, the
distribution of power among various institutions opens a wide
variety of options for the future while securing at least the
minimum needs of each party.
Security Dynamics. Movement toward parity in responsibility for
security between the parties should be a gradual process. The
general direction, depending on the stability of and relations
between the governments, should be from Israeli dominance towards
parity through a reduction of Israel's overall military presence.
Gradually, these areas could become free of heavy artillery and
tank units. Thus the Jordan-Palestine federation might never be
allowed to station armored forces west of the river, and Israel
would gradually pull out its armored units as well. In the final
stage, both sides could maintain specially trained joint or mixed
units to keep order. Local order should be maintained by the
police force of the Palestinian federated state.
Economic Dynamics. The economic integration of the territories
with Israel and Jordan should be maintained and even
strengthened. This process would increase the interdependence of
the constituting states within the confederation. Economic
development should become a tool for strengthening the common
interests shared by the parties involved and for the solution of
the Palestinian refugee problem. Interdependence may be increased
by functional sharing of crucial sources of water and energy and
through the provision of other services through joint entities.
Such a system of cross linkages would increase the mutual
interest in maintaining the status quo.
How to Achieve It
How do we get there from here? Israel and the Palestinians must
begin the process through direct face-to-face negotiations. The
issue of the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization is
critical. Not only has the center-right in Israel rejected any
direct involvement of the PLO, but so too has a good part of the
center-left. At the same time, the Palestinians, almost to a
person, publicly declare the PLO is their sole legitimate
representative. Some way will have to be found to "finesse" this
problem, perhaps by bringing in Palestinian negotiators from the
territories with PLO connections for the first stages. On the
other hand, unless the Palestinians themselves develop alternate
leadership, Israel will have to at some point consider the
possibility of negotiating with their chosen figures, however
distasteful that may be.
The end result of the negotiations should be a covenant between
the parties which: 1) states and recognizes the claims of each;
2) agrees on how these claims will be exercised; 3) establishes
appropriate authorities for the governance of the territories; 4)
provides for processes of governance and adjudication in the
territories and between the parties; 5) fixes the new boundaries
of the Palestinian entity to be formed. Accompanying this
covenant should be an agreement regarding the stages of
implementation of Palestinian self-rule within the shared rule
framework and the procedures for moving from stage to stage. This
covenant should be the cornerstone of the evolving constitutional
relationship between Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan, and in
due course could become the source of sovereignty over the
territories.
If indeed a shared-rule solution will eventually lead to a more
stable system than partition, the question remains how to
overcome the difficulties that stand before such an approach.
Realistic shared rule has to be implemented through a series of
steps in which the inhabitants of the territories acquire an
appropriate framework for self-government and then are upgraded
from subordinate status to partnership in a broad power-sharing
arrangement.
The development process itself could involve three stages,
beginning with administrative autonomy and moving into
condominium and ultimately to a complete shared-rule arrangement,
involving both federation and confederation. The principle of
stage development could be an element of the initial agreement,
but actual movement from each stage to the next would depend upon
the agreement of all parties to the arrangement that appropriate
progress has been made. This mutual veto would, on the one hand,
ensure for all parties -- especially Israel -- that their
security interests will not be sacrificed, and on the other hand
would begin to build the cooperative environment that is a basic
requirement of any federal bargain.
In the first stage, a representative administrative council could
be established in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region and the
military government withdrawn. The Palestinians would gain
internal home rule within the framework of Israeli rule. They
would then be in a position to build their own instrumentalities
of governance and develop an indigenous political leadership.
Thus they could use home rule to develop the wherewithal to
become serious partners in the next stages.
A council would be elected by the Palestinian Arabs resident in
the territories. It would control such functional departments as
education, construction and housing, agriculture, health, labor,
and social welfare. The heads of the departments could be
nominated from among the members of the council. Within its
sphere, its jurisdiction would be limited to the Palestinian
Arabs or to the municipalities they control, since its primary
purpose would be to give the Palestinian Arabs scope for
self-rule.
Should the plan be implemented in one area first, for any reason,
the territories could be divided into two or three regions for
administrative and judicial purposes: for example, Gaza and the
West Bank as a unit or divided into Judea and Samaria. Under
such an arrangement each region would have its own council
instead of a single overall Palestinian council. The regional
councils would possess the same powers as the larger body.
At some point during this first stage, as matters progress,
Jordan could be invited to join with Israel in establishing a
condominium council. This council could assume supreme
responsibility for overall legislative, planning, budgeting, and
judicial functions for Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region. It
would be composed of equal Israeli and Jordanian representation,
with the Palestinians guaranteed full representation in the
Jordanian delegation, and would become the supreme authority for
the home rule council. At that point, certain functional
authorities could be established on a bilateral (Israel/Jordan or
Israel/Palestinian) or trilateral (Israel/Jordan/Palestinian)
basis to give the Arabs a larger governing role. For example,
security, immigration, and citizenship issues could be handled
through bilateral authorities, and economic development and
refugee resettlement through a trilateral body. Israeli or
Jordanian citizenship would be a matter of individual choice, and
municipal functions would be handled by existing local
authorities.
For the Palestinian Arabs, this condominium arrangement would be
another step toward an equal role in determining their future.
For Israel, it would involve a relinquishing of exclusive control
over certain powers in return for great legitimation of its
authority in the territories on a shared-rule basis. For Jordan
it would formally restore a political role west of the Jordan
River. Successful implementation of the condominium would fully
establish power-sharing as authoritative basis for a long-term
solution and also begin to develop the mechanism and techniques
necessary to translate principle into practice. The condominium
should continue to exist until all parties are prepared to agree
to a permanent solution.
Regarding the last stage, while all options should be left open
as long as they remain within a shared-rule framework, the final
result would most likely be a broad shared-rule arrangement, such
as the federation/confederation arrangement suggested above or,
if real peace is secured, a confederation or a community of two
or three states more or less along the lines of the European
Community. Alternatively, they could end up with a narrower
power-sharing agreement, such as a continuation of the
condominium or a federal arrangement between Israel and the
Palestinians, with functional cooperation with Jordan. Time,
events, and the relationships involved will no doubt point to the
appropriate model.
There has never been a better opportunity for doing this than
now. The clear signal that Israel has sent regarding its
rejection of an international conference or simple separation of
the West Bank and Gaza from its domain and the new spirit of
compromise, however murky it may be, to be found among the
Palestinians offer previously unparalleled opportunities for
moving ahead. Let us hope that there will be sufficiently
imaginative statesmanship among all the parties to do so.
What is needed is to come to the bargaining table under
the leadership of a skilled negotiator who could gain consent to
the general principles and then work out the details with the
parties involved. This can be undertaken through the good
offices of the United States or, for that matter, Egypt.
Linking Peoples: The Political Dimension
The legal and technical aspects of a federal solution are easily
dealt with. There is so much accumulated experience in the
world to draw upon. More important by far are the political
barriers to implementing such a solution. For in the last
analysis, peace is a political problem, not a legal or a
technical one. As a political problem it can only be achieved
when the parties perceive a political advantage in achieving it.
What does a staged solution offer for the various parties in the
long run? The crucial test for any staged plan is whether it
will create movement toward a full and comprehensive settlement.
It is here that the differences between the territorial
compromise approach and a federal plan become most apparent. In
the case of the former, the first step is also the final one,
that is to say, a refusal to agree upon a territorial compromise
offers no possibility for going any further, while agreement
requires a decision on the final territorial arrangement now. In
the case of a federal plan, a "no" would also close the doors to
movement, while a "yes" does not require a final solution
immediately but, rather, creates a framework for movement that
could lead in any number of directions. More than that, a
federal plan offers the possibility of building toward results
which may be mutually satisfactory for all parties, even if the
final result offers less to any one of them than they would
prefer.
Take what is for most Israelis the worst possible case, namely
the creation of a Palestinian state. If things came to that pass
as a result of the staged arrangement, they are likely to come to
that pass whatever Israel does. The overwhelming pressure of the
Arab states plus the rest of the world will prove irresistible in
one way or another. Under such circumstances, a staged
arrangement could provide a basis for learning to live together
in such a way that a Palestinian state would be neutralized as a
threat and change its direction toward a more pacific approach to
coexistence. Moreover, sufficient linkages between the two
states could be developed and institutionalized so as to provide
greater security for Israel even with this scenario.
On the other hand, take the worst possible case from the
Palestinian perspective, namely full absorption of the
territories into Israel. Even under such circumstances,
absorption could only take place in a way that continued a
meaningful framework for self-rule as long as the Palestinians
wanted it, thereby securing their status as an entity no matter
what. In essence, if the arrangement works at all, it could
prevent excessive damage to either side in either of the worst
case situations.
Steps Toward Negotiating a Solution
The achievement of a federal solution for the Israel-Palestinian
conflict is an extraordinarily difficult proposition. The only
thing that would be more difficult would be to achieve any other
kind of solution. Given their preferences, the Palestinians and
their Arab brethren would like Israel and the Jews to disappear,
certainly from their region. For many, if they had the power
they would force the issue and destroy Israel, in a bloodbath, if
necessary. Their willingness to even consider living with
Israel's presence is a matter of necessity which realists among
them are beginning to recognize.
Israeli and other Jews do not wish similar kinds of destruction
on the Palestinians or any other Arabs. Still, they would like
to be rid of them and they do not look forward with joy to
power-sharing. Were it is possible to reach an accommodation
with the Palestinians and Jordan that would safeguard Israel's
security and Jewish national interests on the basis of
separation, most Israelis would be prefer to do so, even at the
cost of some historic rights. But the latter seems to be no more
a possibility than the former. Reality dictates that both peoples
must find a way to live together, agreeing to maintain the
maximum possible separation, since that is what both desire, but
at least a minimum of political linkage to make peace possible.
The first step along this difficult path must be a recognition on
the part of both sides of this reality. The second must be the
mutual recognition of each other's legitimate existence,
fundamental interests, and needs. The third step involves a
recognition that there has to be a way to have one's cake and eat
it too, that the only way to allow each party to secure its
minimum fundamental interests and needs is through sharing
certain basics; that is to say, to forego futile demands for
exclusive power in some spheres in return for a share of the
authority and power in most.
Under such circumstances, negotiations can begin. Who should be
party to such negotiations? Israel has a right to insist that
whomever the other side puts forward, they should have recognized
Israel and renounced terrorism. In addition, Israel should
require them to explicitly recognize that the Jews are a people
with a right to self-determination. "Recognition" of Israel in
the manner that Yassir Arafat did in November 1988 can easily be
interpreted away by the Arabs as taking official notice of the
reality of a state without any commitment to its continued
existence as a Jewish state. Indeed, the PLO continues to insist
that while the Palestinians are a people, the Jews are merely a
religion and, as such, not entitled to self-determination, an
absurdity with regard to one of the world's oldest peoples. The
Arabs must make it clear once and for all that they do not
dispute the peoplehood of the Jews.
Israelis, in turn, must recognize that the Palestinians are also
entitled to a place in the sun. While not an historic people like
the Jews and clearly a self-proclaimed part of the larger Arab
nation, in the twentieth century circumstances have given the
Palestinians an identity of their own that by now is real enough
and must be accommodated if peace is to be achieved. Jordan, a
totally artificial creation, has also acquired a reality of its
own do to the diligent efforts of its Hashemite rulers. Mutual
recognition of these realities is necessary for negotiations and
no group that does not recognize the reality of the other and
agree to desist from aggression against them is a fit partner for
negotiations.
The negotiations must recognize that separate politically
sovereign statehood in the classic European mold is not the only
way to secure self-determination and that within this framework
the Palestinians will have to achieve self-determination through
federal arrangements. The negotiations must lead to a federated
statehood that is real for them, which means that while they will
not have complete self-rule, they clearly will have a meaningful
share in every aspect of their governance, if not immediately,
than ultimately. Progress toward peace will have to be in
stages, but there must be a commitment on the part of all parties
that if the earlier stages go well, later ones will follow as
agreed. This is something less than current Arab demands that
Israel must concede to eventual Palestinian statehood in the
early stages of the negotiations, if not before, or the demands
of some Israelis that no commitments be made to go beyond
autonomy.
The negotiations should provide for phasing in shared
responsibility for each function or group of functions at its own
pace. So if the Palestinians gain responsibility for their own
domestic affairs, they can do so before they gain similar
responsibility in security matters. Moreover, part of the
commitment to federalism is a commitment to differential shares
of responsibility at the end, since some functions will remain
shared as part of the end solution, while others will be
allocated to the individual entities.
In the last analysis, none of this can occur without an
increasing measure of will and even good will to achieve a
solution. Federal arrangements are far from being matters of
legal formulas. As already indicated in this volume, the legal
formulas are often the last step. At some point, federalism to
succeed must involve mutual trust and comity. This is a tall
order in a situation where mutual distrust has prevailed for so
many decades. It is true that while every solution requires
trust, federal solutions require a somewhat larger measure since
they involve day-to-day interaction. In a sense, the ability to
reach a solution that demands fewer irrevocable concessions is
balanced by a demand for greater ordinary trust. Since it is
clear that neither side is willing to make the concessions
demanded, they must decide whether they want to try for the trust
or simply to continue the war in a world that will be
progressively less tolerant of that possibility.
What Role for the United States?
Today, the United States seems to be committed to a policy
designed to lead to repartition, with the only issue open to
negotiations being the precise character of the Palestinian
entity. Under these conditions, there is no incentive for the
Arabs to explore any other options or for the Israelis to be more
forthcoming. Were the United States to shift its policy and
proclaim that a return to partition has lost its validity and
that a stable solution requires a new structure of relationships,
the present situation would change dramatically. The United
States could then advise all concerned sides that the framework
proposed here is a step toward a broader shared-rule arrangement
encompassing the Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians, and
develop a policy with that in mind. It could then initiate an
overall examination of particular issues, such as Jerusalem,
water resources, land, etc., that have proved absolutely
unresolvable as long as partition is assumed to be at the end of
the process.
It is time for the United States, the preeminent pioneer in the
development of federal solutions for itself, to break out of the
straightjacket of conventional international relations and to
begin "thinking federal." By doing so, the Americans could open
a whole new range of possibilities for Israeli-Arab peace.
No one can or should minimize the difficulties involved in
pursuing a self-rule/shared rule solution. The present Israeli
government, which has expressed a positive stance toward the
idea, still sees Palestinian self-rule in very limited terms.
The Palestinians have been unable to express any positive
position in regard to negotiations with Israel for a host of
reasons, and Jordan is standing aside, playing a waiting game.
Trust at present is so low among all parties that we are still
seeking the way to the first step. Under these circumstances,
only a great power conveying to all disputants that there is no
other way can set things in motion. In a parallel development,
only when Anwar Sadat concluded that peace was the only way out
did he come to Jerusalem. From the extremities of failure,
progress can be made.
What Role for Europe?
Until the early 1950s, Great Britain and France were the major
Western powers in the Middle East. Then, forced by the
necessities of postwar recovery at home and decolonization
abroad, they abandoned the field to the United States. For
nearly forty years Europe has been relegated to a minor role in
the region. Today, however, the European Community is on its way
to becoming a superpower in its own right and the Middle East is
its neighbor.
The European Community is by its very nature a Mediterranean
power and has already developed special relationships with the
states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean including
Israel. This has been possible because the European Community
itself has moved towards federal unity through a new-style
confederation. The European Community, originally touted as
"merely" a functional solution to certain economic problems, has
developed new devices for confederation in a very creative way.
It can truly be said that the European Community is to federalism
in the twentieth century what the United States was to federalism
in the eighteenth. The United States invented modern federation;
Europe has invented postmodern confederation. Consequently, if
the United States must draw upon its federal experience to help
Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan to find the right road to
peace, the European Community has even more of a reason to draw
upon its federal experience, whose relevance is more immediate in
this situation.
Unfortunately, Europe seems to have also followed the
partitionist path of least resistence, advocating the
establishment of a separate Palestinian state without a real
consideration of Israel's security needs or the problem of three
states in so small a country. As Europe moves toward 1992, it is
appropriate for its leaders to reexamine their position and to
lend their support and counsel for a federal solution in Eretz
Israel/Palestine. Because of their own immediate experience and
their proximity to the region, that shift could be of decisive
importance in setting the conflict on the course of a peaceful
resolution. The end result would be a more secure Mediterranean
back door for Europe as well, one that offers great promise for a
future of peace and prosperity for all the countries and peoples
involved.
A Final Word
There are basically two reasons to enter into a federal
arrangement: One is optimistic, to have one's cake and eat it
too. The other is far more sober, as a kind of mutual insurance
society whose members are covered by a system of mutual
protection and indemnification that exceeds their own unaided
capacities.
Both reasons are important in the context of the Jewish-Arab
conflict over Eretz Israel/Palestine. Both sides very much seek
to have their cake and to eat it too. Both claim the entire land
and only reluctantly concede any part of it to the other,
recognizing that necessity is the mother of concession. At the
same time both seek to preserve some connection with those parts
where they are not to be the primary rulers, some way in which
they can continue to claim to have a share in the land.
Federal solutions are ideal for such a situation but the desire
to have one's cake and eat it too is not enough to enable a
federal solution to work. The more sober need for mutual
insurance adds that dimension. In this case, each party needs to
be insured with respect to the others and with respect to certain
outside forces that threaten them all. The desire to have one's
cake and eat it too makes a federal solution possible in this
particular context. The need for mutual insurance makes a
federal solution necessary. What is not clear is whether two
together are sufficient to overcome differences in political
culture and problems of federal will and political aspirations
that stand in the way of easily adopting a federal solution.
The history of the founding of the Swiss confederation is
especially relevant in this regard. Today the world looks upon
Switzerland as the most successful example of a peaceful polity,
so peaceful as to be considered dull. More than that, Switzerland
is perceived as being without real enemies and in a protected
part of Europe. Its experience is viewed as utterly irrelevant
to those contemporary conflict situations where federal solutions
have been proposed.
In fact, quite the opposite is true. The peaceful, neutral
Switzerland of today had to struggle for 600 years for its
present privileged position. From the mid-thirteenth to the
mid-nineteenth century its future was in doubt. Not only was it
either occupied or surrounded by great powers, usually hostile to
the interests of the inhabitants of what is today Switzerland,
but since it controlled the mountain passes which represented the
principal links between Northern Europe and the Mediterranean
world, it was considered a strategic asset that had to be
controlled by the great powers of the time or at the very least
prevented from falling into the hands of rival powers.
If that were not enough, within its territory were successively
different groups of antagonists, pastoral mountain people versus
aggressive commercial city-dwellers, French-speakers versus
German-speakers, and later, Protestants versus Catholics. At
different times each of those divisions was as intense and real
as the division between Arab and Jew today. In the end, the
Swiss confederation was born and survived because the Swiss
valued their independence above anything else and discovered that
the only way to gain and retain that independence was to
confederate, to overcome deep-seated conflict and burning
rivalries and jealousies to find a way to live together, yet not
so together that the various parts would lose their identities.
This took a long time to achieve. In the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, three mountain republics developed along the main
ridge of the Swiss alps, controlling the area of the principal
north-south passes. Each struggled alone against Austrian
domination until they found that they could better struggle
together, so they formed the Swiss confederation in the pact on
the field at Rutli overlooking the road to the St. Gotthard Pass
in 1291. Not only did they continue their struggle against
Austria but also against the lowland Swiss cities, particularly
the city republic of Zurich. Only sixty years later, in 1351,
did Zurich adhere to the confederation, which it did primarily to
safeguard its political interests.
This linkage was not undertaken without reservations. Indeed,
Zurich had first negotiated with Austria, but the latter power
was unwilling to give the city sufficiently good terms. The city
fathers chose the embryonic confederation more than partly in
hopes that they would then be able to renegotiate better terms
with Austria. Only in time did Zurich discover that linkage with
the confederation was the best option for the preservation of its
liberties.
The expansion onto the Piedmont at the northern base of the Alps
gave it the economic base necessary for the confederation to
survive. Was the issue settled so easily? Nearly a hundred years
after 1351, Zurich fought a civil war with the other cantons,
clashing over political and economic interests and then another
in the following century over religious concerns, before settling
down to comfortable membership in the confederation.
Much the same reasoning was connected with the adherence of the
other Swiss republics to the confederation. In almost every case
it was a matter case of considering the alternatives and choosing
the least worst at the beginning and then to discover that the
least worst was indeed the best. Still, the Swiss confederation
had its enemies and however independent its constituent republics
were in practice, it was not until 1648 that Swiss independence
was recognized by the surrounding powers. Nor did that end
matters. Sporadic fighting continued, culminating in Napoleon's
conquest of Switzerland at the end of the eighteenth century.
The restoration of an enlarged confederation in 1815 led to a
period of internal tension over the form it should take,
climaxing in the adoption of the federal constitution of 1848
after a near civil war, but not culminating until the 1870s when
civil war was again narrowly averted through a constitutional
renegotiation. Nor was Switzerland prosperous in those years.
It was only after it solved its political problems that it could
turn its attention to mobilizing the intelligence and ingenuity
of its people to create a shared prosperity in a country with
virtually no natural resources.
The lessons of Switzerland should be clear to us all.
Notes
1. On the Cyprus dispute, see Criton G. Tornaritis, Cyprus and
Federalism (Nicosia, 1974); James H. Wolfe, "Cyprus: Federation
Under International Safeguards," Publius 18:2 (Spring 1988); N.M.
Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (Nicosia: K. Rustem, 1984); Polyvios G.
Polyviou, "Cyprus: What Is To Be Done?" International Affairs
52:4 (1976): 582-597.
2. Raanan Weitz outlines his federal plan in his book, Facing the
Future; Outline of a Development Program for Israel Compatible
for Possible Political Solutions (Jerusalem, 1973).
3. Andre Chouraqui, Letter to an Arab Friend (Amherst: University
of Massachusetts Press, 1972).
4. Daniel J. Elazar, "Israel and the Territories: Toward a
Workable Federal Solution," Jewish Frontier (October 1972):
17-23.
5. On King Hussein's March 1972 peace offer, see Zvi Elpeleg,
King Hussein's Federation Plan: Genesis and Reaction (Tel Aviv:
Tel Aviv University, 1977) (Hebrew); E.R.F. Sheehan, "Visit with
Hussein, Palestinians and Golda Meir," New York Times Magazine
(August 27, 1972), pp. 10-11; Keesing's Contemporary Archives
1971-1972 Vol. XVIII (London: Keesing's Publications Limited), p.
25191; "Hussein's Peace, Launched and Promptly Shot Down," US
News and World Report 72:60 (March 27, 1972).
6. On pressures on the PLO to accept Hussein's offer, see
Keesing's 1973, p. 26158 and Keesing's 1975, p. 26926.
7. Daniel J. Elazar, Shared-Rule: The Only Realistic Option for
Peace (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March
1985).
8. Yoram Dinstein, ed., Models of Autonomy (New Brunswick and
London: Transaction Books, 1981); Ruth Lapidoth, The Camp David
Process and the New U.S. Plan for the Middle East: A Legal
Analysis (University of Southern California: The Law Center,
Fall-Winter 1982-83), "The Autonomy Negotiations," Jerusalem
Quarterly No. 24 (Summer 1982), and "Some Reflections on
Autonomy," Melanges Reuter (Paris: Pedone, 1981), pp. 379-389.
9. Arye Naor, "From Autonomy to Confederation," Gesher 1/106
(Winter-Spring 1982).
10. Ehud Olmert, "Sharing with Jordan," (Op-ed) New York Times (September 10, 1982).
11. Daniel J. Elazar, "A Federal Solution for Palestinians?
Linkup with Jordan, Israel Even Has Begin's Backing," (Op-ed) Los
Angeles Times (December 16, 1982).
