What are Federal Solutions?
Two Peoples -- One Land:
Federal Solutions for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan
Daniel J. Elazar
Whatever form it takes, federalism involves some combination of
self-rule and shared rule to enable the parties to the federal
bargain to govern themselves insofar as possible and share in the
tasks of governance insofar as necessary.1
The great strength of federalism (including the federal idea and
the structures and processes that flow from it) lies in its
flexibility and adaptability. The argument that federalism is
particularly flexible goes against much of the conventional
wisdom which, to the extent that it focuses on a juridical
understanding of federalism, often emphasizes rigid divisions of
power. While particular federal systems may be quite inflexible,
the federal principle has been successfully applied in a great
many different ways, under a wide variety of circumstances,
easily justifying the claim of flexibility.2
The scope of federalism as a theoretical and operational concept
involves some seeming contradictions that, when properly
combined, make it a most effective device.
Federalism involves both structure and processes of
government.
Federalism is directed to the achievement and maintenance of
both unity and diversity.
There are several varieties of political arrangements to which
the term federal has properly been applied.
Federalism as Structure and Process
Federalism is most commonly perceived to be a matter of
governmental structure involving two or more "units," "arenas,"
"planes," "tiers," or "levels" of government, each endowed with a
substantial degree of independence, full legitimacy, and a
constitutionally guaranteed place in the overall system and
possessing its own set of institutions, powers, and
responsibilities, constitutionally linked within a common
governing framework for specified purposes. Proponents of
federalism properly argue that this structural dimension is a key
to the utility of the federal principle, because it creates a
firm institutional framework for the achievement of the goals for
which federalism was instituted in the first place. This
perception is accurate enough as far as it goes.
In the earlier stages of the history of modern federalism,
structural considerations were not only first and foremost but
essentially the be-all and end-all of the concern for federal
arrangements, the assumption being that the introduction of a
proper federal structure would create a functioning federal
system. More recently, students of federalism have come to
understand the limits of, as well as the necessities for, a
structural approach to federalism. This recognition was born out
of experience whereby it was seen that many polities with federal
structures were not federal in practice. After further
exploration, many came to the conclusion that federalism is as
much a matter of process as of structure.
The elements of a federal process include a sense of partnership
on the part of the parties to the federal compact, manifested
through negotiated cooperation on issues and programs and based
on a commitment to open bargaining between all parties to an
issue in such a way as to strive for consensus or, failing that,
an accommodation which protects the fundamental integrity of all
the partners. Only in those polities where the processes of
government reflect this is the structure of federalism
meaningful. In the last analysis, federalism must combine both
structure and process. That, indeed, is what creates a federal
system.
Federalism as Unity and Diversity
One of the most ambiguous characteristics of federalism is its
aspiration and purpose to simultaneously generate and maintain
both unity for certain purposes while encouraging diversity.
This ambiguity is reflected in a certain confusion over the very
use of the term. People use the terms "federalism,"
"federalist," and "federalize" to describe both the process of
political unification and the maintenance of the diffusion of
political power. More than one discussion of federalism has
foundered upon a basic misunderstanding on the part of the
parties involved as to which sense of the term is being used. In
fact, the ambiguity is a real one to the extent that federalism
and its related terms do express both processes simultaneously.
Federalizing does involve both the creation and maintenance of
unity and the diffusion and sharing of power in the name of
diversity. Indeed, that is why federalism is not a matter of
centralization or decentralization but is predicated on
non-centralization, or the effective combination of unity and
diversity.
When discussing federalism, it is a mistake to present unity and
diversity as opposites. Unity should be contrasted with disunity
and diversity with homogeneity, emphasizing the political
dimensions and implications of each. It is possible to have a
strong federal system that combines a high degree of unity with a
high degree of diversity (Switzerland, for example) just as it is
possible for a high degree of diversity to lead to great disunity
(in Iraq, for example, where the Arabs and the Kurds are in
seemingly perpetual civil war). Not every kind of homogeneity
promotes unity. Substantial ethnic homogeneity in the nineteenth
century United States did not prevent the clash of sectionally
based interests from leading to civil war just as the substantial
ethnic homogeneity of Great Britain and her American colonies did
not prevent the American revolution in the eighteenth century.
Moreover, there are various forms of unity and disunity to be
considered, and even more varieties of diversity.
There is a difference between consolidated unity (e.g., France)
and federal unity (e.g., Switzerland). Diversity is manifested
through nationality or ethnic, religious, ideological, social and
interest factors which may or may not gain political expression.
Consolidated unity attempts to either depoliticize or carefully
limit the political effects of diversity, relegating
manifestations of diversity to other spheres. Federal unity, on
the other hand, is not only comfortable with the political
expression of diversity but is from its roots a means to
accommodate diversity as a legitimate element in the polity. Thus
consolidated polities can be diverse but to them, diversity is
not considered desirable per se, even if reality requires its
reconciliation within the body politic. The question remains
open as to what kind of combinations of diversity are compatible
with federal unity and which kinds or combinations are not.
The Basic Forms of Federalism3
The foregoing are made real in specific polities through one or
another of the variety of federal arrangements found in operation
in the world today and in the past. When classified by form, we have the two classic forms
of federalism, federation and confederation. Two new forms are
just now being recognized for what they are, which we have here
called federacy and associated-state federalism. All four are
federal systems.
Several other forms, including unions, consociations,
condominiums, and leagues, are, strictly speaking, not federal
systems but political systems drawing on federal principles.
Each of these forms can be further classified as to whether its
basis is predominantly territorial or consociational (although
several may manifest characteristics of both).
The sheer number of polities or regimes that can be classified
within this framework is impressive and in every case the
classification is either apparent or not difficult to justify. In
other words, all do indeed partake of some aspect of federalism.
1. Federation
What is commonly referred to as federalism today -- roughly
defined as the constitutional division of powers within a single
political entity between a federal (sometimes called national or
general) government and the governments of the constituent
entities (states, provinces, cantons, lander, etc.) with both
having direct contact with the individual citizen. This is,
strictly speaking, modern federation. It was first conceived in
theory and operationalized by the United States toward the end of
the eighteenth century. It spread to Latin America early in the
nineteenth century, to Switzerland in mid-century, to several
British dominions in the late nineteenth century, to Germany and
Austria after World War I and to several of the new African and
Asian nations after World War II.
Because it can be harmonized with modern nationalism, this form
of federalism has become the dominant federal arrangement in the
world today and, in fact, is synonymous with the idea of
federalism in the minds of most people. Federation requires a
strong general government operating directly on all citizens who,
in return, are entitled to equal political status and rights.4
2. Confederation
In fact, the inventors of modern federation actually had to
appropriate the term "federal" for themselves to give their
invention a proper name. Until the adoption of the American
federal constitution, the term was widely used to describe
another form of federal arrangement, what is today usually called
confederation, in which the constituent states retain the better
part of their political independence but band together in
perpetual union under a common constitution to form a joint
government for quite specific and limited purposes, usually
defense and foreign affairs. In such cases, the new entity
combines elements of shared governance with the strong and
permanent commitment to the maintenance of primordial divisions
through the constituent states. Switzerland until 1848, and the
Netherlands until 1795, were confederations of this kind. The
political theorists of those days referred to them as federal
systems and traced the origins of that form of federalism to the
ancient leagues of Greek city-states.
Since pre-modern federalism, or confederation, was principally a
device for linking groups of small polities of the kind that
existed prior to the rise of the modern nation-state, modern
nationalism rejected it as a political solution and it virtually
disappeared from the map after the Napoleonic Wars. As modern
federal arrangements spread, it certainly came to be considered
as something other than federalism.
Today, in the post-modern epoch, when national sovereignty is
once again being limited as a result of new realities,
confederation is reemerging as a federal alternative in new forms. The European Community, a new style confederation,
has most of the characteristics of a classic confederation,
except that its primary purposes have turned out to be economic
rather than defense. It is pointing the way to confederation as
a viable federal alternative under certain conditions.5 On the
other hand, Yugoslavia, formally a federation, has become, in
effect, a confederation with real power vested in the republics
and a plural Yugoslav executive in which all are represented.
The European Community had its formal beginning in an
international treaty, the Treaty of Rome, signed by its original
six members in 1957. Over time that treaty has evolved into a
constitution while still retaining the form of a treaty.
Moreover, membership in the community has grown from six to
twelve, stretching from Ireland to Greece.
Subsequently other post-modern confederations have been
established. In the West Indies, after the British-initiated
effort to establish a West Indies Federation failed because of
the insularity of its island members who did not perceive
themselves as sufficiently tied to their sister islands to share
a common government, the individual members became independent
microstates while simultaneously establishing joint authorities
in the form of a common supreme court, a common university, a
common currency, and, to a degree, a common market known as the
Caribbean Community.
Quite a different confederal arrangement was established to link
Senegal and Gambia. Gambia, which is for all intents and
purposes an enclave surrounded by Senegal, was the victim of a
coup that would have installed a dictatorial government hostile
to Senegal and detrimental to the people of Gambia. The Gambians
asked Senegal to intervene, which it did to restore the
duly-constituted government. To prevent any efforts of a similar
nature, the two states established a formal confederation in the
form of an overarching government but for very limited purposes.
Characteristic of confederations is that each of the constituent
or partner entities maintains a comprehensive set of governmental
institutions. There may or may not be common citizenship in the
confederation, but if there is it is based on citizenship in the
constituent entities. Moreover, the confederal authorities
formally are excluded from direct contact with the citizens of
the constituent entities. Rather they work through the
governments of those entities to fulfill their functions.
European Community (EC)
Founded: 1957 by Treaty of Rome.
Membership: Belgium, France, German Federal Republic, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands (1951); Denmark, Eire, United Kingdom
(1973); (Greece (1981); Portugal (1985); Spain (1985).
Constitution: 1957 Treaty of Rome and related treaty-like
documents
Purposes: Economic integration, political cooperation, common
human rights standards
Government Structure:
1) Commission of the EC (17 members appointed by member-states
for 4 year terms headed by president serving for 2 years) --
supervises implementation of the treaties in the name of the EC
as a whole.
2) Council of Ministers (12 members, 1 appointed from each member
state) -- the decision-making body of the community representing
national interests.
3) European Council (heads of government of each member-state) --
meets three times a year to establish EC policies.
4) European Parliament (518 members apportioned among the
member-states, elected by direct universal suffrage) -- has power
to reject or force modification of annual EC budgets and to
dismiss the Commission by a 2/3 vote.
5) Court of Justice (13 judges and 4 advocates general) --
adjudication of disputes pertaining to the application of
treaties.
Functions: Coal and steel community; atomic energy community;
customs union; free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital; common fiscal policy; encourage market competition
within EC, common transport policy; common external trade policy;
common agricultural policy; European monetary system; common
educational policy; common social policy; consumer protection;
environmental policy; regional development.
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Founded: 1973 by Treaty of Chiguaramas
Membership: Antigua and Barbuda, Balonterns, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago.
Constitution: CARICOM's associate institutions are the East
Caribbean Common Market Council of Ministers; Caribbean
Development Bank; Caribbean Examinations Council; Caribbean
Investment Corporation; Caribbean Meterological Council; Council
of Legal Education; Regional Shipping Council; University of
Guyana; University of the West Indies; and West Indies Associated
States Council of Ministers.
Purposes: Economic integration and development, foreign policy
coordination, regional educational and cultural programs, common
currency, common supreme court.
Governing Structure:
1) The Heads of Government Conference is CARICOM's principal
organ. It is responsible for determining policy, concluding
treaties between the community and international organizations
and states, and meeting financial obligations of the community.
2) The Common Market Council is the main body of the Common
Market. It is made up of a minister of government designated by
each member state. It oversees the development and operation of
the common market and is authorized to deal with any problems
arising in that connection.
3) The secretariat deals with trade, economics and statistics;
sectoral policy and planning; functional cooperation; legal; and
general services and administration. An appointed
secretary-general is responsible for carrying ou the
secretariat's functions, presides and controls the agenda at all
meetings.
Functions: Common external tariffs, internal common market,
agricultural development and marketing, higher education, common
currency.
Confederation of Senegambia
Founded: 1982 by framework of agreement between the leaders of
the two states and 3 protocols ratified by their respective
legislatures
Membership: Senegal and Gambia
Constitution: 3 protocols on the institutions of the
Confederation, financial regulations, and coordination of
external relations policy.
Purposes: Common defense, economic and monetary union,
coordinated foreign relations and communications.
Governing Structure:
1) President of Senegal is president of the Confederation. President of Gambia is vice president of the Confederation.
2) General secretariat headed by secretary-general assists
president and is responsible for policy implementation.
3) Council of Ministers (president, vice president,
secretary-general, ministers from the state governments appointed
by the president with the consent of the vice president)
4) Confederal Parliament (60 members, 1/3 from the Gambian House
of Representatives and 2/3 from the Senegalese National Assembly)
meets twice a year.
Functions: Joint armed forces, economic union, monetary union,
other joint functions being developed.
What is characteristic of postmodern confederations is that they
rarely begin with a single overarching confederal government, but
rather are constructed out of joint and overlapping functional
authorities established by the constituent entities to handle
specific tasks. They may or may not develop common comprehensive
executive, legislative, and/or judicial instruments. The
European Community has done so, within limits. The Caribbean
Community, a confederation of English-speaking island states in
the West Indies, has not, and has deliberately abjured such
instrumentalities, while Senegambia has a common confederal
government but with extremely limited functions and powers.
A strong case can be made that the United Arab Emirates and
Yugoslavia should be considered confederations despite their
formal designation as federations. The former assigns the
exercise of different functions of the whole to individual
emirates and does virtually nothing as a collectivity, while the
latter has developed a system of collective decision-making
through common institutions in which all of the republics and
autonomous regions sit as equals and decide by consensus.
The principal advantage of confederation in a multi-ethnic,
multi-racial society is that, since the confederal government
serves the constituent or partner states first and foremost,
issues of equal political status and rights can be handled on two
levels: equality of all states within the confederation as states
and equality of individuals within each state as defined by that
state.
3. Federacy and Associated Statehood6
The post-war world has given birth to two other kinds of federal
arrangements, associated state federalism and federacy. Associated state arrangements or federacies (asymmetrical
federations) have become increasingly popular in the post-war
period because they offer options for self-government to
political entities that would otherwise have to forego that
possibility, along with democratic political linkage to another
entity where conditions require maintenance of ties. In the
process of decolonization, most former colonies became fully
independent states in their own right. But, in some cases, full
independence was found to be less advantageous while, at the same
time, conventional federation was also not a viable option. In
place of either, an asymmetrical federal relationship was
developed usually involving the following:
-
A perpetual constitutional tie between the federate power and
the federacy or associated state ratified by the peoples of both
and/or their chosen representatives.
-
A comprehensive set of governmental institutions for each,
with a minimum of overlapping authority or shared structures.
-
In federacies, common citizenship, but with specified
distinctions in rights and duties in some spheres.
Allocation and division of functions in such a way that the
federate power preserves control over certain external functions
such as foreign affairs and defense, while the federacy or
associated state preserves control over certain internal
functions beyond that normally allocated within conventional
federations.
Mutual allocation of benefits in such a way that each partner
receives some special benefit in return for foregoing some usual
benefit of conventional federal arrangements.
There are presently over twenty functioning federacies in
existence. Some, like the Netherlands and Curacao, are the
result of decolonization in circumstances that made it beneficial
for the former colony to retain ties with what was once the
mother country, but on a new basis. Others, such as the one
between Switzerland and Lichtenstein, reflect the association of
two political entities that came together for mutual advantages
such a link offered (in this case, a customs union that gave
Lichtenstein needed economic benefits while allowing it to
preserve its independence and non-republican form of government).
Some are relatively new, like the relationship between New
Zealand and the Cook Islands; others, such as the link between
the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands, are centuries old. In
Finland and the Aaland Islands, regional security considerations
have made federacy the only reasonable option serving the basic
interests of both parties. Similarly, Berlin and the German
Federal Republic are associated in this form because of
conditions imposed by the great powers.
Federacies, then, come in all shapes and sizes and are
established for a variety of reasons. What is common to all is a
mutual agreement that both parties shall remain far more
separated in their institutions than in conventional federal
arrangements, while retaining links to one another for certain
common purposes. Beyond that, federacy has proved to be extremely
flexible. Thus there is no one common form of federacy. In each
case a special institutional framework and set of relationships
has developed to meet the specific needs of the parties involved.
One of the best examples of federacy is the arrangement between
the United States and Puerto Rico, whose 3,435 square miles
comprise an area approximately 50 percent larger than Judea,
Samaria and the Gaza Strip combined.
Puerto Rico became an American colony in 1898 as a result of
unanticipated military conquest. In the course of time, the
Puerto Ricans (now numbering 2.7 million on the island) were
given institutions for internal self-government whose range,
scope, and powers were periodically expanded. By the 1940s it was
clear that the island would not remain a colony much longer; the
only question was what new status would it acquire. The U.S. had
an interest in maintaining the island as the anchor of its
strategic position in the Caribbean, but at the same time had no
desire to limit the freedom of the island's residents.
Puerto Ricans have a deep sense of their own identity and great
national pride. Hence any solution to their search for a place
in the sun had to recognize their national aspirations. Since
the islanders represented a different cultural tradition and
speak a different language (Spanish), there was also little
desire on either side for incorporating the island into the U.S.
as a constituent state like those on the mainland.
The Puerto Rican leadership, while seeking substantial
independence, recognized the advantages of economic and security
links with the U.S. Puerto Rico needed the benefits of sharing
in the American "common market" in order to improve its economic
position and better the lot of its people; moreover, it did not
need the burden of maintaining its own military defense.
The arrangement that was worked out provided for complete
internal self-government on the island, subject only to minimum
U.S. standards, exemption from most federal taxation, and an
advantageous position with regard to the attraction of American
industry. On the other hand, Puerto Rico was excluded from the
governing institutions of the U.S. as a whole, and was given only
nominal access to Congress.
After a decade of testing, the arrangement was formulated in
detail in a compact ratified by both Congress and the people of
Puerto Rico in 1952. Subsequently tested in a Puerto Rican
plebiscite, it has become the basis for a continuing productive
relationship between the two polities. The arrangement has been
so successful that it has essentially obliterated the drive for
independence on the island. In a series of elections and
referenda that have been models of freedom of the ballot in an
area not always noted for such freedom, over three-fifths of the
population have consistently voted for maintaining the
association with the U.S., nearly two-fifths have opted for
constituent statehood (that is, to become the 51st state in the
American Union), and perhaps three percent have voted for
independence.
The most common federacy and associated
state relationships are between mainland powers and islands. Even
so, there are some examples of this relationship between adjacent
mainland territories as between India and Bhutan, Italy and San
Marino, and Switzerland and Lichtenstein.
The difference between federacy and associated statehood is that
the former is a form of asymmetrical federation; that is to say,
in order to change the terms of the union or its constitution,
both parties must agree. Associated statehood is a form of
asymmetrical confederation in which the original agreement
provides for unilateral action on the part of one party or
another to dissolve the relationship under specified conditions.
Federacy is a constitutionalized extension of the principle of
self rule-shared rule that provides adequate guarantees to the
weaker entity while obviating the necessity to deal with the
sovereignty issue. Like all applications of the federal
principle, it decisively turns away from the preoccupation with
the sovereignty question that is characteristic of the modern
European nation-state, and has been exported from Europe to
various corners of the world for the last century. It focuses on
people, not states, as the real repositories of political
sovereignty and legitimacy.
The major benefit of the federacy arrangement is that both
political entities involved can preserve their respective
integrities in essentially undiluted form while maintaining a
common framework in areas of mutual agreement. The major
drawback is that the arrangement may be a transitional one.
While currently operational federacies may be about equally
divided into long-established ones and those of recent vintage,
in some cases, at any rate, federacy seems to have been a holding
action rather than a final constitutional arrangement. It has
led either to the incorporation of the smaller associated polity
fully within the larger one, or the separation of the two into
completely separate and independent units. An example of the
first is India and Sikkim, and of the second, the Netherlands and
Surinam.
When India became independent, Sikkim remained outside the Indian
union as an associated state under its own princely ruler. His
actions were perceived by India to potentially threaten Indian
security in its conflict with China. The Indians engineered a
popular revolt in Sikkim against their ruler and a request by the
new government to be incorporated as a constituent state within
India. On the other hand, the Netherlands Antilles, which became
a federacy under the Dutch crown shortly after the end of World
War II, later decided that they wished to be independent. The
Dutch acquiesced with no further problems. Even if these forms
of federalism turn out to be transitional, they have proven
themselves to be very useful in moving toward a more permanent
status in one direction or another.
4. Consociation7
Consociational arrangements represent a potentially
non-territorial form of federalism, though, in practice, they
seem to work best (and perhaps only work at all) where they are
accompanied by some kind of appropriate territorial framework.
Consociational arrangements involve
the formal or semi-formal constitutionalized distribution of
power among presumably permanent (i.e., inter-generational)
groupings -- religious, ideological, or linguistic -- within a
polity so as to guarantee all their ability to maintain their
particular ways of life while having a share in the governance of
the whole polity. They differ from ordinary pluralism in that
the polity recognizes the existence of permanent groups, provides
them with resources for their self-maintenance, and guarantees
them an equal place in the constitutional system that can only be
changed through constitutional means. By and large, such
arrangements are designed to guarantee religious, ideological and
cultural differences and autonomy in the spheres that relate to
the maintenance of those differences (e.g., education, mass
communications, religious services, etc.).
The consociational framework provides for a general government to
handle normal political activities which is either shared through
some formula among the several groups (where there is no single
majority group, or at least none with a very large majority), or,
in rare cases, dominated by one of the groups (where there is a
great disparity in size between the majority group and the
minorities that benefit from consociational arrangements).
Consociational arrangements work best where the various groups
also have some territorial base, if not formally recognized
politically then at least demographically, a "turf" as it were,
which eases the problem of maintaining their separate
institutions and ways of life. The maintenance of consociational
arrangements depends upon either overwhelming power on the part
of one group, which seeks to conciliate the minorities among it
in order to avoid problems, or a balance among groups that makes
it mutually advantageous for all of them to maintain a
consociational consensus.
5. Union8
While there is a real question as to whether union is a form of
federalism, it does involve at least a utilization of federal
principles in the constitution of the polity. The
principle characteristic of a union is that the constituent
polities surrender their separate political character and
institutions in return for a guaranteed share in the governance
of the whole and a guarantee of their continued existence as
subpolitical or administrative entities with regional or
municipal powers.
The Union of South Africa is a case in point. When it was
constituted out of the four colonies or states whose
representatives came together in 1910, its founders explicitly
rejected federation as an impediment to the Afrikaners' ability
to gain control over the whole country. Consequently the
constituting entities surrendered all but certain limited powers
to the union government, but preserved their own roles in the
activation of that government in such a way as to enable them to
preserve their respective integrities. In this respect, it was
not a unitary state that was created with a single center of
power but a compound polity whose framing agent was itself
compounded out of the representatives of the constituting units
and which provided for the maintenance of this compound structure
in the ordinary business of government.
When the Union was replaced by the Republic of South Africa in
1961, one of the purposes of the change was to centralize in the
state what power remained with the provinces. The provinces were
reduced to strictly municipal entities, basically territorial
vessels for the organization of the Nationalist Party, which
always has been a federation of provincial party organizations.
At the present time, even the structure of provincial government
is about to be changed to complete the transformation of the RSA
from a territorial union to a consociational polity. The
provinces will lose their legislative bodies and be governed by
executive councils whose heads will be appointed by the state
president. On the other hand, they will be strengthened to serve
as vehicles for each of the three ethnoracial groups represented
in the government of the republic to organize themselves to
provide regional services to their respective populations.
6. Constitutionally Decentralized States9
In the years since World War II there has developed a group of
formerly centralized unitary states which have been divided into
regions whose existence and powers are written into the state
constitutions. While not fully federal, this constitutional
decentralization guarantees a substantial measure of autonomy and
home rule to those regions and the regional governments have
powers that go beyond those of municipal government. In a sense,
they are like unions except that constitutionally the state
preexisted the regions, devolved some of its powers to them, and
the regions do not have a significant share as regions in the
governance of the state. The best examples of this form of
government are Belgium, Italy, and Spain. Japan, the Solomon
Islands, and Sudan also fall into this category.
Belgium adopted regionalization to accommodate the demands for
separate development on the part of the Flemings. In 1988 it
moved from regional decentralization to become a full federation.
Italy, which had deliberately rejected federalism when it was
unified in the nineteenth century on behalf of a unitary monarchy
had always lived with internal tensions based upon separate
regional identities, particularly at its peripheries. After
World War II, in an effort to prevent the concentration of
authority and power which had enabled Mussolini to seize power,
the Allies required Italy to provide in its new constitution for
special autonomous powers to the five regions od its peripheries,
including the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, and somewhat less
autonomy for fifteen other regions.
When Spain reestablished democratic government in 1978 after
Franco's death, it sought to accommodate the intense demands for
self-determination of the Basques and Catalonians as well as the
demands for home rule on the part of Galicians, Andalusians, and
other regional groupings, through a constitution which provided
for autonomous regions. The most important of these "autonomies"
were established through bilateral negotiations with Madrid on
the basis of separate constitutional statutes reminiscent of the
medieval Spanish fueros. Wisely, the Spanish government insisted
that all designated autonomous communities organize themselves
accordingly by a specific deadline, thereby effectively
federalizing the entire country. Today Spain is a federation in
all but name.
The Allies also required Japan to increase the power of the
prefectures in its postwar constitution as a substitute for
imposing a full-fledged federal system which General Douglas
MacArthur realized was not suited to Japan's political culture.
Japan has retained that system, structured around great
decentralization of expenditure and subsidiarity in
policy-making, whereby prefectural authorities defer to local
officials and national authorities to their prefectural
counterparts as a matter of routine, even while retaining
ultimate authority.
When Jafar Numieri was the ruler of Sudan, he recognized that the
southern third of the country, inhabited by non-Muslims of a
different race, needed to be given autonomy. Wisely, he also
recognized that an asymmetrical arrangement would not work, so
decided that it would be in the interests of the country to
divide its whole territory into seven autonomous regions of which
the south would be one. He struggled valiantly to make the
system work but was only partially successful before he was
overthrown.
7. Unitary States With Federal Arrangements10
In addition, a growing number of polities which are formally
unitary utilize federal arrangements in their organization to
accommodate ethnic, religious, linguistic, or ideological
differences that exist among their populations. In
most cases, these take the form of autonomy arrangements for
particular territories or groups. In half of the cases,
especially those in which autonomy has been granted to peripheral
regions or groups, as in China, Equatorial Guinea, and Iraq, they
are no more than pro forma.
8. Economic Unions and Leagues
A different kind of federal option is economic union, usually
built around a customs union, in which two or more politically
sovereign states unite to form a common economy for mutual
benefit. Southern Africa has such an arrangement, linking the
Republic of South Africa with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland,
three independent black states that have never been under South
African rule, and the four former South African homelands granted
their independence by the RSA. A better example for our purposes
is that of the Benelux economic union.
Such unions may be complete in their specific spheres without
providing for any formal linkages in any others.
Leagues normally offer less integration in any single sphere than
economic unions, but provide for intergovernmental sharing on a
quasi-voluntary basis across several spheres. One of the most
visible leagues in recent years has been the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), consisting of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei. The
ASEAN nations maintain a common defense policy and intensive
cultural and associational links, but have only minimal economic
ties.
An older and more firmly grounded league is the Nordic Council. While formally far less binding than the other federal
options, the close ethnic, cultural and religious links among the
Nordic states have combined to give the Nordic Council strength
which is now being manifested in the economic realm as well. Of
the Council members, only Denmark is also a member of the
European Community, but since the five countries form a free
trade area, the non-member states have begun to use Denmark as
their gateway into the Common Market on a duty-free basis.
The foregoing arrangements are at the edges of federalism.
Nevertheless, they need to be considered in any pursuit of
Israel-Palestinian-Jordanian peace.
Benelux Economic Union
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg -- the historic "low
countries" of northwestern Europe -- had once been under a single
government. After the secession of the seven northern provinces
in 1581 to form the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the
remaining provinces remained under Hapsburg rule until the wars
of the French Revolution. In 1815 the southern provinces were
reunited with the Netherlands. The nine provinces of Belgium
seceeded in 1830, while Luxembourg remained tied to the
Netherlands through personal monarchic union until 1890, after
which it became fully independent. Belgium and Luxembourg
entered into a customs union in 1922. In 1947 the Netherlands
agreed to join them. All three states joined the European
Community upon its formation and continued their customs union
within the framework of the EC.
Since November 1, 1960 the Benelux Economic Union Treaty has been
in effect, expanding the original agreement into a complete
economic union among the three countries. A joint customs tariff
was adopted for imports into the three countries from outside
sources and import duties were no longer levied on imports into
each of the three countries from the other two.
The Economic Union is governed by a number of institutions. The
Committee of Ministers is made up of at least three ministers
from each country, usually the ministers of foreign affairs,
foreign trade, economic affairs, agriculture, finance and social
affairs. Its function is to supervise the implementation of the
Benelux Economic Union Treaty. It has the power to establish
working parties and joint services to which certain
responsibilities may be delegated.
There also is a Consultative Inter-Parliamentary Council composed
of 49 parliamentary delegates, 21 each from the Netherlands and
Belgiumand 7 from Luxembourg. Since 1956, it has functioned as
an advisory board to the three countries on issues related to
Benelux. An annual report is released on cultural relations,
foreign policy and the standardization of laws.
The Council of Economic Union consists of one chairman from each
member state and the presidents of the committees. Its
responsibilities include supervising the implementation of
decisiosn voted upon by the committee of ministers and
coordinating the activities of the regular and special
committees.
There are eight Benelux committees, in the areas of foreign
economic relations; monetary and financial; industrial and
commercial; agriculture, food and fisheries; customs and
taxation; transport; social; and movement and establishment of
persons. Special committees deal with coordination of
statistics; comparison of government budgets; public tenders;
public health; retail, trade and handicrafts; movement of persons
(external frontiers control); territorial planning; tourism;
administrative and judicial cooperation; and environment.
The secretary-general is always a Netherland representative
assisted by two deputy secretaries-general, one Belgian and one
Luxembourgian. They are appointed by the Committee of Ministers
and directly responsible to them. Joint services are empowered
with executive responsibilities. Since 1979, the two which exist
are the Benelux office on trademarks and brands and the joint
service for the registration of medicaments.
The two Benelux judicial bodies are: 1) the arbitration tribunal,
a six-person board whose function is to settle disputes arising
from the union's activities; and 2) court of justice which is
empowered to give binding interpretations on judicial ruling
common to the three countries, advise on interpretations of
common judicial ruling, and supervise the legal protection of
union employees. There is also an economic and social advisory
council consisting of representatives from the member-states
economic and social organizations.
The Nordic Council
The Nordic Council was formed in 1953 through a treaty of
cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
It is an advisory body dealing with economic, social, cultural,
environmental, legal and communications issues. Since 1971, the
Nordic Council has functioned as the advisory board for the
Nordic Council of Ministers.
Under the provisions of a revised treaty of cooperation of 1972
and 1974, the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway
and Sweden formed the Nordic Council of Ministers. The ministers
of defense and foreign affairs of the member-states do not
participate in this arrangement.
The Council is composed of 78 delegates elected annually from the
parliaments of each member country with participation by
non-voting government representatives. The recommendations
adopted at the annual meetings are sent to the Nordic Council of
Ministers.
The presidium consists of five members and is empowered with the
responsibility to deal with all issues which arise between
sessions. There are five standing committees meeting
periodically which also convene for joint sessions with the
Nordic Council of Ministers. There are also several other
special committees. Each delegation to the Nordic Council has a
secretariat at its national parliament There is also a cabinet
minister appointed by each member-state to serve as a minister
for Nordic cooperation.
Both formal and informal meetings of the Nordic Council of
Ministers are held with the participation of ministers of the
member-states concerned with the specific area under discussion.
There is also a secretariat for Nordic cultural cooperation
focusing on education, research, general cultural activities and
radio and television. In addition, various sub-committees exist,
including a committee of deputies and a committee of senior
officials, both dealing with administrative issues.
Areas of discussion deal with agreements and treaties, guidelines
for national legislation, recommendations from the Nordic
Council, financing of joint studies, and setting up Nordic
institutions. All formal decisions must be unanimously approved
and are binding on the member governments, except in instances
requiring ratification by members' parliaments. The Council of
Ministers must report annually to the Nordic Council on its
progress and future plans.
The functions of the secretariat are divided into the following
areas:
1) Coordination, budget and legislative issues;
2) Economic cooperation, industry and energy policy, regional
policy, cooperation in the building sector, trade and money
policy, resources policies, transportation, communications,
tourism, development, farming, forestry and fishing.
3) Social policy and health care, labor market issues,
occupational environment, environmental protection, and equality
and consumer issues.
Federal Combinations
While in the foregoing pages, each particular federal arrangement
has been presented as exclusive, in reality, many polities are
combinations of more than one arrangement, sometimes in
overlapping ways and sometimes in the variety of options offered
within the polity as a whole. It has already been noted that
consociational arrangements tend to be longer lived when they are
implemented within federations. Austria, Belgium, and
Switzerland are the best examples of this. Austria and
Switzerland were federal before they were consociational, while
Belgium moved from simple consociationalism to territorial
federalism while also being part of a customs union with
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Even in the Netherlands the
existence of strong provincial and local governments made it
easier to implement consociational arrangements when they were at
their peak. As those arrangements decline, they are being
replaced by increasing decentralization to the territorial units.
In addition, most of the classic federal systems, while based on
one dominant federal arrangement, are likely to include others as
well. So, for example, the United States, a federation of 50
states, has developed federacy arrangements with Puerto Rico, the
Northern Marianas, and, in a semi-recognized way, with the Indian
tribes within its borders. It is in the process of developing
associated state relationships with the three republics of
Micronesia, one of which is a federation in its own right.
Finally, many of the American states are unions of their counties
or towns, and offer the latter extensive constitutional home
rule. Or, to take a different example, the United Kingdom is a
union with different arrangements for Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland, plus federacy arrangements with its offshore
islands and some of its remaining West Indian territories. the
remaining colonies all have constitutional home rule.
The Will to Federate
Given this variety and flexibility of federal principles and
arrangements, the scope which federalism offers for the solution
of complex problems of political organization is great indeed.
If there is a will to federate, it is likely that a suitable
arrangement can be found. What is crucial, however, is that
those who must build a political life together must have the will
to do so and to do so on a federal basis. Lacking that will,
even the great scope which federalism provides is insufficient.
The will to federate need not be based upon a strong commitment
to federalism per se or even to one's potential partners per se.
It is sufficient if the constituent parties develop the will to
federate for lack of any alternative or to achieve minimal common
goals which they recognize can be achieved in no other way.
There are federal systems based upon the idea that federalism
itself is a comprehensive human end, but there are far more
whose will to federate is based upon such very limited common
ends as the need to foster military security, to promote economic
prosperity or simply to maintain law and order among peoples and
polities that history and geography have placed adjacent to one
another. With the proper spirit, that is quite sufficient.
While it is by no means certain that the parties to the
Israeli-Arab conflict have the will to federate, there is no
reason to presuppose that they cannot. The objective conditions
for federal solutions prevail and the historical experience of
the peoples involved does not preclude the development of a will
to federate although it makes it difficult to achieve. One other
question remains, however, that is, is there a sufficient
cultural basis for federation among these peoples?
While scholars are not united on this point, there is a growing
tendency to understand one of the major factors in successful
implementation and maintenance of federal systems as the
existence of a federal political culture among the constituent
population. Such a political culture includes a commitment to
democratic government, a willingness to accept pluralism and
power-sharing, a penchant for resolving conflicts through
negotiation, and a sense of self-restraint in pursuing political
goals and in the exercise of power, even where it is available to
be exercised. Many of these are predispositions which are
generally related to democratic government, but they go somewhat
beyond that by including a commitment to power-sharing. While a
federal political culture is not sufficient in and of itself --
constitutionally established arrangements are of the essence in
the preservation of federal systems -- it does seem to be one
major element in making the constitutional arrangements work.
The basis for such a political culture exists among the Jews,
rooted as they are in a theo-political tradition with a strong
covenantal dimension. They should certainly be open to federal
solutions from a tactical point of view. Since federal
principles are derived from the covenant idea (indeed the world
"federal" is derived from the Latin foedus, meaning covenant),
there is a natural relationship, one which can be traced back to
the Bible where the first political manifestation of God's
covenant with Israel was the confederation of the twelve tribes.
On the other hand, there is a tendency for covenanted peoples to
be able to develop close ties only with other covenanted peoples.
Since the Jews see themselves as a covenanted people and do not
see the Arabs as such, this may serve to neutralize the federal
impulses which their religion introduces into their culture.
No generalization can be made about the Arabs as a group. Rather,
different corners of the Arab world have different cultural
orientations. The Egyptians, for example, have nothing in their
history to indicate a predisposition toward power-sharing. Quite
to the contrary, since the days of the Pharaohs their very
national existence has been based upon a strong hierarchical
order. At the same time, the village and familial structure of
the Palestinians provides for a strong measure of
institutionalized decentralization. The Bedouin tribes have a
background which is more open to federal arrangements, since they
have maintained confederal links among clans and tribes since
time immemorial that was always grounded in putative kinship
ties. In general, modern Arab states have relied on
centralization and hierarchical organization, combining the
spirit of traditional Arab imperial rule with the theory and
practice of the modern European state. On balance, then, the
possibility that a federal political culture could develop in the
land is a real one, even if the predispositions toward it are not
uniform throughout the societies involved.
Thinking Federal
In thinking about the organization of power in any federal
arrangement, it is necessary to remove the hierarchical images
which in our times have normally accompanied thinking about
states and to reconceptualize them as cybernetic models in place
of federal power pyramids. The very idea of federalism is based
upon a matrix model in which a number of political arenas, each
with its own governing institutions, are linked to one another
for purposes of power-sharing in specified spheres on a
self-rule/shared rule basis. There is no higher and lower among
them. By combining they introduce a synergism into their efforts
to solve problems, to gain mutual goals or mutual advantage. In
this sense, federalism is a political application of the
principles of cybernetics which we now see sweeping the world,
not only to reorganize the means of communication but
reorganizing the workplace, education, health care, and so many
vital services.
It is no wonder that so much of the world is undergoing a
federalist revolution in its political arrangements at the same
time. Forty years ago a federal solution still involved some
measure of swimming against the stream at a time when every
people sought exclusive statehood for itself. Today it is a
matter of leaping forward into the twenty-first century by
recognizing the realities of the cybernetic frontier.
Notes
1. This definition of federalism is presented and developed in
Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Self-Rule/Shared Rule (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1984).
2. Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University, Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1986), includes an extensive
bibliography on federalism.
3. For up-to-date information on polities in the catogories
presented here, see Daniel J. Elazar, et al., Handbook of Federal
and Autonomy Arrangements (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, forthcoming).
4. On federations, see Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The
Territorial Dimension of Politics (Lanham, MD: University Press
of America, 1987); William S. Livingston, Federalism and
Constitutional Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956);
K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York: Oxford University
Press, Galaxy Book, 1964); Arthur W. Macmahon, Federalism: Mature
and Emergent (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962); Preston King,
Federalism and Federation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1982); Rufus S. Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey
Through Time in Quest of a Meaning (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1970).
5. On contemporary confederations, see Mauro Cappeletti,
Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal
Experience (Firenze: Walter de Gruyter, 1986); E.H. Freeman, A
History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, 2nd ed.
(London: Macmillian, 1982).
6. On federacy and associated state arrangements, Daniel J.
Elazar, ed., Handbook of Federal and Autonmy Arrangements, and
Exploring Federalism; R. Michael Stevens, "Asymmetrical
Federalism: The Federal Principle and the Survival of the Small
Republic," Publius 7:4 (1977): 177-204; Robert I. Ratborg, and
John Barret, eds., Conflict and Compromise in South Africa
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980).
On Belgium, see Frank Delmartino, "Regionalisation in Belgium:
Evaluation of an Ongoing Institutional Crisis," European Journal
of Political Research 16 (1988): 381-394; G.V. Stephenson,
"Cultural Regionalism and the Unitary State Idea in Belgium,"
Geographical Review 62 (October 1972): 501-523; Jean Beaufays,
"Belgium: A Dualist Political System?" Publius 18:2 (Spring
1988); R. Denolf, "Federalism in Belgium as a Constitutional
Problem," Res Republica 10:3 (1968): 383-406.
On Spain, see Cesar Enrique Diaz Lopez, "The State of the
Autonomic Process," Publius 11:3-4 (Summer 1981); "Votes By the
Basques and Catalans Seem to Favor Home-Rule Statutes," The New
York Times (October 26, 1979). On Italy, see Dan Segre,
Regionalism in Italy -- An International Conflict Internalized
(Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies, January
1978); Fabio Lorenzoni, "Italian Accommodation of Cultural
Differences," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Governing Peoples and
Territories; Robert Leonardi, Rafaella Y. Nanetti, and Robert D.
Putnam, "Devolution as a Political Process: The Case of Italy,"
Publius 11:1 (Winter 1981).
7. On consociations and consociationalism, see K.D. McRae, ed.,
Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented
Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); Gerhard
Lehmbruch, "Federalism and Consociationalism: Some Comments."
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association (Chicago, September 1983), pp. 1-2; Arend
Lijphart, "Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical
Links," Canadian Journal of Political Science 12 (September
1979): 499, and Democracies: Patterns of Majoritanian and
Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1984); Federalism and Consociationalism: A
Symposium, a special edition of Publius 15:2 (Spring 1985).
8. There has been almost nothing written on the theory of union
and only a limited literature on the union dimension of existing
unions. See Richard Rose, The Territorial Dimension in
Government: Understanding the United Kingdom (Chatham, N.J.:
Chatham House, 1982).
9. On constitutionally decentralized states, see C. Lloyd
Brown-John, "Introduction: Centralizing and Decentralizing Trends
in Federal States," in Centralizing and Decentralizing Trends in
Federal States (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988);
Cesar Enrique Diaz Lopez, "The State of the Autonomic Process in
Spain," Publius 11:3-4 (Summer 1981): 193-218; Keith G. Banting
and Richard Simeon, eds., The Politics of Constitutional Change
in International Societies; Redesigning the State (London:
MacMillan Press, 1986); Richard Simeon, "Considerations on
Centralization and Decentralization," Canadian Public
Administration 29:3 (1986): 445-461.
10. See Handbook of Federal and Autonomy Arrangements.
