The Federal Dimensions of State-Diaspora Relations
in Constitutional Design and Power-Sharing
in the Post-Modern Epoch
Daniel J. Elazar
The question of state-diaspora relations is an old-new one in
human history. A common phenomenon during the Hellenistic and
Roman periods, it remained real, if lower key, with the rise of
the modern nation-state whose exclusivism militated against
formal diaspora political expression.1 In the interdependent
world of the post-modern epoch, however, among whose principal
characteristics are increasingly permeable state boundaries, the
revival of ethnicity, and multi-ethnic states as the norm, the
phenomenon has emerged once again.2
The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs has been especially
active in studying state-diaspora relations, principally because
of our interest in the relations between Israel and the Jewish
people. I will draw upon some of our findings to offer an
introduction to this phenomenon.3
States and Diasporas in the Contemporary World
State-diaspora relations deal first and foremost with nations
that extend beyond states and across state boundaries. The
Jewish situation is perhaps the classic example of this but it is
not the only one. The Chinese, for example, have their own set
of state-diaspora relations involving two or three competing
states: the Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, and Singapore.4
The Somalis offer another example. Somalia is one of the few
truly homogenous nation-states in the world, with 99.9 percent of
its population Somali. But about half of the Somalis live
outside of Somalia in neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, where they
form a particularly troubling diaspora and, indeed, of late, in
the case of Somalia and Ethiopia, to a brief but serious war.5
To take a very different example, under French law one cannot
renounce French citizenship - once a Frenchman, always a
Frenchman. Accordingly, the French constitution makes provision
for French citizens living outside of France to elect two members
of the French Senate as representatives of the French diaspora.
There are polling places in French embassies and consulates
around the world where French extra-territorial nationals may go
and vote. This is symbolic representation, no more, but it does
reflect the phenomenon.6
The United States is, in theory, a more difficult case. American
political theory does not provide for such a phenomenon since the
United States is very oriented toward territorial democracy. One
has the right to emigrate (Americans have always stood for free
emigration, if not always for free immigration), but if one does,
he or she must become part of the body politic in the new land of
settlement.
Today, however, there are several million Americans living abroad
for longer or shorter periods. Willy-nilly, American diasporas
have emerged around the world. Some of them are connected with
American military bases or other installations, where they
literally build American towns as kinds of golden ghettos, but
still ghettos, in the countries in which they are located. This
happens in Spain and Germany. Iran was a classic example before
the fall of the Shah. The contrast between driving into the
walled-off American city north of Teheran and the rest of Iran
was really extraordinary. Even in Canada and France where
Americans do not live apart, the vast majority remain Americans
by choice, retaining citizenship and other ties to "back home."
Not surprisingly, Americans institutions have begun to adapt.
There now are organized groups of Democrats and Republicans
Abroad. They select delegates to their respective National
Conventions and they seek better ways to secure absentee voting
rights for Americans living abroad in federal and state
elections. Congress has enacted legislation to further that
end.7 American corporations provide other kinds of links, and
there are American-owned and operated English language newspapers
throughout the world.
On another level, the Arabs have considered themselves a nation
with many states since the breakup of the first Muslim caliphate.
That condition has intensified with the decolonization of the
Arab world in the 20th century. Now an Arab diaspora is emerging
outside of the Arab world as a result of emigration. The recent
effort to secure recognition of the PLO by the City of Berkeley in
a referendum is an example of the Arabs successfully mobilizing
an Arab diaspora on behalf of an issue. They failed on the
issue, but they were successful in the mobilization.8
In this respect, nation-states are becoming more like federated
or constituent states, serving both as polities and as
receptacles and service providers for a variety of enduring
groups, some of which may be transnational in scope.
Some of those people may identify exclusively with their state.
Others may identify with that state plus another people or may
not identify with their state at all. I doubt if Somalis in
Ethiopia identify with Ethiopia in any way, manner or form.
Jews, on the other hand, clearly prize their citizenship in most
of the Western states in which they are located and not only
identify with those states but with their people. This is a new
reality.
Nevertheless, while so-called "sovereign states" may not be as
"sovereign" as they like to think they are, the state system
remains the foundation of the international order, such as
exists, and states are crucially important in the state-diaspora
relationship. To put it another way, in the contemporary world
diasporas without states do not seem to be able to do very well;
a people must have a state in order to have a diaspora. The
Gypsies, for example, have never been able to transcend a narrow
tribalism. They may continue to exist as a scattered tribe, but
are decreasing as more Gypsies seem to be assimilating in to a
world in which individualism rather than tribal or ethnic
identity is a commanding value.
The Armenians are a good example of this. The Armenians have had
to use Soviet Armenia as their state, with all their reservations
about it. Even Armenians who are anti-Communists relate to that
territory as their state. In the last decades, there has been a
reconciliation between the anti-Communist Armenians and the
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, which has had two effects.
On one hand, it has connected them with the Soviet Republic, but
on the other hand it has also strengthened the independence of
the Armenian SSSR within Armenia.9 In rare cases a historical
state may do, if it is not likely to be restored, but there
must be a state in some form.
In sum, unless there is some possibility of achieving territorial
statehood for at least some part of a people, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to maintain intergenerational diaspora
links. It may not be impossible -- we do not know that yet.
Hence the importance of states should not be entirely denigrated,
even though the idea and reality of state sovereignty have
diminished in other respects.
Hellenistic and Roman Models
We have no appropriate theory for the present condition of
state-diaspora relations. We do have some antecedent theories
going back to Hellenistic and Roman times. As in most cases, the
Greeks had a word for it. In the Hellenistic world the term
politeuma was used to describe a polity within a polity -- a
diaspora community located within a politaeia. They developed at
least an operational constitutional theory to enable that
combination to work.10 The Jews benefitted because of this
phenomenon, putting together a combination of state and diaspora,
but other such groups functioned in the Hellenistic and later the
Roman world. While the conditions in that world were different
from those of our own, I believe we could usefully study the
constitutional arrangements of that period as we try to build
theory for this.
One principle that can be learned from that period is that active
and extensive state-diaspora relations require a kind of pax
romana in order to flourish. To the extent that today's world
system, whatever its problematics, has achieved, on one level, a
common world peace that enables small states to survive within
security-communities, to use Karl Deutsch's phrase, it has
enabled this kind of relationship to develop and even has
provided the conditions for it.
The Jewish People as a Case Study
Both empirical research and new theory are needed in this area.
For those purposes, it is possible to treat the Jewish people as
a case study.
For the Jewish people, their restoration to their historic
homeland in our time and their establishment there of a concrete
state was probably utterly necessary, both for the sheer physical
survival of many Jews, and for the survival of the Jewish people
as a people.11 Until the beginning of the modern epoch in the
mid-17th century, Jews, even in exile, were accepted by all as a
nation apart with an appropriate juridical status, communal
autonomy, and governmental institutions to make that status and
autonomy real. Feudal Europe and the ethno-religiously plural
Muslim world offered space for a separate Jewish corporate
existence. In Europe, the Jews were viewed as a guild or an
estate among other guilds and estates and in the Muslim world as
a millet among other millets.
With the coming of the modern epoch and the rise of the nation
state, the Jews lost their autonomy, just as the separate guilds,
estates and millets did. They were transformed into subjects
of the new states as individuals and formally their institutions
were left with religious functions only. In due course, they
were also emancipated from the restrictions on their
participation as equals in modern society, transformed from
subjects into citizens and given at least a formal equality with
other citizens. This process was slow and erratic, beginning in
the New World in the late 17th century and not culminating in the
Islamic world until the middle of the 20th century, after the
modern epoch had already passed into the post-modern one.
As individual subjects or citizens within their respective
states, Jews were expected to adopt the culture and social mores
of the state in which they found themselves. Thus, the only ways
to preserve Jewish national identity and a meaningful Jewish
culture was for the Jews to build their own state, which they did
in their historic homeland.
The reestablishment of the Jewish state has brought about a
period of re-constitution for the Jewish people as a whole, now
in process.12 Hence the Jewish people today are much involved in
constitutional design, not only of their state, but also of
state-diaspora relations through the State of Israel and its
institutions and the individual diaspora country communities,
first and foremost the United States. The Jewish Agency for
Israel is becoming the nexus of the network of transstate
organizations that are involved in institutionalizing the
state-diaspora relationship.13 The issue that most concerns the
Agency's governing bodies at this time is this process of
re-constitution. While they have to give due attention to their
various functional responsibilities in absorption and settlement
of immigrants to Israel, for rural settlement and development, in
urban revitalization and Jewish education -- all those kinds of
very real, if mundane tasks, what is uppermost on the minds of
all of them is this problem of re-constitution, because that is
what they have been involved in doing for the past twenty years.
They are making some real progress. But it is a re-constitution
of the kind of magnitude that, at least for the Jewish people, is
quite like the magnitude of the re-constitution of the American
Revolutionary -- Constitutional period, or the French Revolution
for those nations at that time.
In the remainder of this essay I will try and suggest some of the
lines that this reconstitution is taking as an example of the
kind of institution-building that reflects a constitutional
design for power-sharing. How is it possible to have
power-sharing between a state and a diaspora? A state is, after
all, a state. It has a certain status in international
relations. More than that, it has obligations in the
international arena. It does not have the freedom diaspora
communities have, especially diaspora communities that are
voluntary.
Today for all intents and purposes, all Jewish diaspora
communities are voluntary. They exist through the voluntary
consent of their members, who are not only free to be involved
with them or not but can freely determine how involved they want
to be, the ways in which they want to be involved, and the degree
to which they will accept even that communal discipline which is
consentually established. This is very different from the
situation in a state, which, because it is bounded physically,
can enforce legitimate demands that everybody within it must
fulfill certain obligations. Whether particular citizens agree or
not, they have to pay taxes and serve in the army; they are bound
by the whole network and system of laws. The issue before the
Jewish people is how to deal with power-sharing between elements
quite disparate in character, even though united by a common
sense of peoplehood and a very strong sense of common faith and
interdependence.
Once that is solved, how is it possible to design
constitutionally the institutions and the instruments for linking
state and diaspora? I have been involved in constitutional
design in a variety of contexts, and I have found nothing more
fascinating than being involved in this particular process of
constitutional design, precisely because of its complexity and
its many facets.
The Context of the State-Diaspora Relationship
The relationship between Israel and the diaspora may be described
as prismatic. Every way one looks at it, it looks different.
That makes it a very exciting phenomenon. For that reason alone,
it has captured the interest of some intellectually and
politically powerful people who devote a great deal of their time
to the issue not only because of their commitment to the idea,
but, I am convinced, also because it is a fascinating problem,
whether they say so or not. I think that this is almost always
the case. People with good minds are attracted to fascinating
problems.
Let us briefly examine the environment of the institutional
framework, and the governance processes of this state-diaspora
relationship. Israel is a state with all the characteristics of
a state, with all the pretensions to total sovereignty that every
state has, yet with all the limitations on sovereignty that are
real for the small states in the world. On one hand, Israel is
more dependent on outside support than a number of other states,
but, because it has a will to be sovereign, it is probably more
independent vis-a-vis its major patron, the United States, than
all of the Atlantic Alliance.14
At the same time, there are organized Jewish communities in over
80 countries of the world, ranging in population from a few
hundred people to nearly six million in the United States. Their
ties, within and between communities, in every case are
voluntary. The vast majority of Jews live in countrywide
communities of 80,000 Jews or more (Table 1). The largest
diaspora Jewish community, the United States, has something less
than twice as many Jews as are in Israel. But it is also the
most open of the voluntary communities, the one in which choice
is most an individual matter with the least external
constraints.15
Table 1
LARGEST COUNTRYWIDE JEWISH COMMUNITIES
1. United States - 5,800,000
2. Israel - 3,450,000
3. USSR - 2,000,000
4. France - 650,000
5. United Kingdom - 390,000
6. Argentina - 350,000
7. Canada - 308,000
8. South Africa - 120,000
9. Brazil - 110,000
10. Australia - 80,000
11. Hungary - 80,000
The second largest is the Soviet Union whose Jewish population
of approximately 2 million cannot really be much of a player in
this game, though the Jews of the Soviet Union do play a role,
both as an object of concern and as an active force for world
Jewish solidarity. Leaving aside the moral aspects of the Soviet
Jewish case, it is a very useful focal point for the
state-diaspora nexus, for the Jewish polity that has emerged. It
is a useful focal point because it is one around which there can
be a wide basis for agreement that something needs to be done to
rescue Soviet Jewry. At the same time, it also forces the issue
of how it is to be done because of the different ideological
presuppositions of the leaders of the state who believe that all
Soviet Jewish emigrants shall be brought to Israel in fulfillment
of Zionist ideology, and those leaders of the diaspora who share
their constituents' views that what is needed is to rescue Soviet
Jews regardless of where they go. So it has become an issue in
which relationships are tested in very concrete ways.16
The other communities are considerably smaller. There are over
500,000 Jews in France, just under 400,000 Jews in Britain, and
over 300,000 Jews in Canada and Argentina.17 Brazil and South
Africa have approximately 120,000 each; Australia and Hungary
have approximately 80,000 each.18 The other organized
communities range from a high of 35,000 to a few hundred. They
are players in a far more modest way. All told, however, the
existence of a network of organized communities creates a whole
that is invariably greater than the sum of its parts. That
network both requires and generates appropriate leadership and
financing.19
Components of the Contemporary Jewish Polity
Jews outside of Israel tax themselves voluntarily through the
various welfare and Israel/overseas campaigns that are conducted
in each community and raise substantial sums of money. According
to this writer's calculations, world Jewry, including Israel,
raises something like $35 billion annually for Jewish purposes.
Israel has an annual budget of some $25 billion. The Jews of the
United States raise voluntarily or mobilize in some way something
like $5 billion a year for their local expenditures and for their
contributions to Israel and to the needs of world Jewry. Jews in
other countries raise or receive the equivalent in voluntary
contributions or government support for their educational and
social service institutions.
A serious civil service has developed for world Jewry and the
larger communities to administer these sums. Israel as a state
has a full, even overblown, bureaucracy. American Jewry has
created a strong professional civil service. The major world
Jewish relief organizations, such as the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee, which is nominally an American Jewish
voluntary organization, maintains an internationally-recruited
civil service functioning in dozens of countries around the
world, including Israel. So all the institutional components
have developed that are needed for governance.
There are also the beginnings of an institutional framework,
linking the state, the voluntary countrywide bodies, and
particularly the local communities which are the real focal
points of diaspora Jewish life. They are linked through several
mediating institutions that have developed to accommodate the
problem of linking a state with what are, in the end, voluntary
organizations. The principle, if very limited, mediating
institution for many years was the World Zionist Organization.
The World Zionist Organization was the organized expression of
world Jewry that gave birth to the State. After the State was
established, the WZO's functions were, for the most part,
transferred to the new entity. The WZO then found itself in what
has become known in the United States as the "March of Dimes
situation." When polio was eradicated, the Polio Foundation had
one of two choices. It could close down or it could re-adapt and
find a new mission. It chose the latter course. The Polio
Foundation became the Birth Defects Foundation. It had a superb
fund-raising mechanism, it had a good research establishment. It
is generally agreed that it has done a good job in making the
transition, although it had to sacrifice much of its public
visibility to do so.
The WZO made the same effort but had less success than the Polio
Foundation. From the early 1950s to the present, the WZO has
been in a process of adaptation, during which time it has moved,
like it or not, from being the principle mediating institution to
merely one of the State's links to the diaspora. The major
diaspora communities have not been organized through the Zionist
movement, but have created their own community organizations
responsible for and controlling the major sources of funding for
Jewish purposes. They control the purse and since they control
the purse, the government of Israel allied itself with them,
saying in effect to the local WZO leadership: you are all nice
people and we want you to come to Israel twice a year for
meetings, but we are going to make our alliances with those who
can provide funding for the relief and rehabilitation needs that
diaspora contributions are used for in Israel.
Nevertheless, in 1952 the State of Israel regularized its
relationship with the WZO through a Covenant signed by the
leaders of the two bodies and enacted into law by the Israeli
Knesset. The covenant provided that the WZO, through its arm,
the Jewish Agency, would retain responsibility for aliyah --
immigration to Israel and the subsequent absorption of the
immigrants -- as well as for Zionist education in the diaspora.
This seemingly modest agenda offered the opportunity for
widespread WZO involvement in both the state and the diaspora
communities, limited only by its organizational competence and
the counter claims of other bodies.
Meanwhile a parallel process was developing in the diaspora.
Initially, the diaspora communities were happy to view Israel
strictly as a beneficiary of their fundraising for relief and
rehabilitation needs. However in due course they began to
perceive -- without using the terms -- that they were involved in
reconstituting a state. Subsequently, they came to see their
role as key to a peoplehood relationship with a state-diaspora
dimension. It was at that point that they sought a role in the
governance of that relationship.
So, between 1968 and 1971 the Jewish Agency, which had been the
arm of the WZO for these relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction
activities was reconstituted -- they used that term. Together
Israeli and diaspora leaders wrote the Jewish Agency's
constitution. Once that was completed, they went through a whole
ceremony of recovenanting, including the signing of a new
three-way covenant for the Jewish Agency, involving the state,
the WZO, and the representatives of the diaspora communities in
the form of their fundraising organs.20
The new constitution provided for a reconstituted Jewish Agency
in which the WZO and the fundraising representatives of the
communities were equal partners. In fact what was created was a
nexus institution which could serve as a mediating institution
between a state whose responsibilities were defined by
international law and the voluntary diaspora communities.
The Jewish Agency's original constitutional configuration made it
particularly appropriate for this role. Originally, it was
established as a result of the League of Nations Mandate for
Palestine which was given to the British in 1921. Under the
terms of the Mandate a "Jewish agency" was to be established
under international law as the arm of the Jewish people for
building the Jewish national home. From the first it was to be a
unique international organization, just as the Jewish people is
unique. Consequently, it has a special status in international
law; there is no other organization with that status, which
survives to this day.21 So the Jewish Agency exists not only by
virtue of its status in Israeli law, or its recognition in the
laws of the various countries in which it functions, (in most
cases, where there are Jewish diasporas, it also has acquired
appropriate legal status), but by virtue of its status in
international law which gives it a special position.
From a federalist perspective, the Jewish Agency is worthy of
investigation as a model for other such arrangements since it
links a group of voluntary organizations, organized on three
planes -- worldwide, countrywide, and local -- and a politically
independent state on a permanent basis in a set of common tasks.
The Jewish Agency network now comprises some six or seven major
organizations that are linked to it as the nexus for those common
tasks. They include: (1) the United Jewish Appeal, which is the
principal fundraising body of American Jewry for Israel, and its
two constituting bodies, (2) the United Israel Appeal, whose task
it is to transfer, oversee and evaluate the use of the UJA funds,
and (3) the Joint Distribution Committee, which offers relief,
rescue, and rehabilitation services to Jews wherever they are in
need; (4) the WZO and its two subsidiaries, (5) Keren Hayesod,
the principle Israel fundraising body for the rest of the
diaspora, and (6) the Jewish National Fund, the entity
responsible for land purchase and reclamation in the Land of
Israel; and (7) the Council of Jewish Federations, the principle
framing institution of American Jewry, the largest diaspora
community. Each has functions of its own in Israel and in the
diaspora so that all maintain their own integrities and exist in
a confederal relationship with one another through the Jewish
Agency and, as a result, with the State of Israel.
In addition, there are a group of organizations peripheral to the
Jewish Agency that have developed to deal with problems that
cannot be appropriately dealt with by those organizations clearly
identified with this nexus. One of these is the World Jewish
Congress, founded in 1936 at the initiative of the WZO as a
vehicle for fighting anti-Semitism worldwide. At one time the
World Jewish Congress sought to be the parliament of world Jewry.
It is not, but what it has become over the years is a vehicle
through which to represent Jewish interests in the USSR and
Eastern Europe and in those African and Asian countries that do
not want direct relations with Israel or with Zionist-related
organizations. This is because it has maintained an independent
posture toward the nexus while at the same time being tied to it
fiscally and organizationally. The WZO remains represented in
the WJC at all levels, in recent years with less influence than
previously.
There are other such functional authorities that handle a variety
of tasks that serve the common needs of the Jewish people. ORT,
for example, is a worldwide service for vocational training that
does much to help non-Jews as well as Jews acquire the skills
with which to earn a living. The Memorial Foundation for
Jewish Culture, founded as a result of the joint and
successful effort of world Jewry to exact reparations from the
German Federal Republic for the Holocaust victims, is a worldwide
body that funds Jewish cultural and scholarly enterprises. It is
composed of representatives of most of the relevant institutions
mentioned here. The reparations themselves were obtained through
a temporary authority, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Against Germany. All of Israel's universities are in this
category. In Hebrew, these are called "national institutions,"
an old term designed to reflect the difference between them, the
state and the individual diaspora communities.
Federalism Out of Necessity and Culture
What is characteristic of this network is that it is federal in
both its structure and its processes. Because it is a network of
interlocking institutions whose decision-making is based upon
consensus and consultation, it cannot be otherwise. There is no
real way to exert coercive power in such a network, though the
partners can bring to bear considerable pressure on certain
issues. If the State of Israel really needs something that is
perceived by all to be in its interest, it is very unlikely that
the diaspora communities will not respond in some way. If there
is an attack on Israel by the Arab states, obviously there is
going to be a response without going through a large round of
consultations, because there is a consensus as to what the issue
is and what needs to be done. But on most other issues, even the
State must consult with diaspora leadership if it wants to gain
their support.
This is highly congruent with Jewish political culture, which is
federalist in orientation, yet it has developed out of
necessity.22 There is very strong evidence that the founders of
the Jewish state saw statehood as being monolithic. Their views
grew out of the continental European tradition of reified
statehood, in its Eastern and Central European formulations of
centralized, monolithic rule. They not only expected a major
ingathering of Jews but assumed that the state would unilaterally
speak for all of Jewry.23 They and their successors changed
their views very reluctantly and only out of necessity, and have
never given up the theory. The history of the change is in
itself worthy of exploration.
All told, there is as yet no real theory for the phenomena
described here. There are principles that are becoming
increasingly accepted, but there is no theory. There is an
emerging set of rules as to what can and cannot be done. These
rules are still in the process of being formulated, crystallized,
and generally accepted.
None of this will lead, in my opinion, to the establishment of
any kind of parliament of the Jewish people in the near future.
The period from the 1880s to the 1950s was a period in which
there were a number of attempts to establish such a parliament,
first through the World Zionist Organization and second through
the World Jewish Congress. This idea was rejected for two
reasons: the State of Israel as part of the family of
independent, politically sovereign states in the world cannot
subject itself to such a parliament and the diaspora communities
as voluntary bodies composed of individual citizens of their
respective countries who owe their first political loyalty to
those countries, cannot identify themselves with such an
extra-territorial body. Such a parliament would break the rules
that bind each of the parties to other games. Since a parliament
would jeopardize both sides, there is a consensus on both sides
as to why not to have such a thing, albeit for different reasons.
What has developed instead is a network of functional
authorities. Some multi-purpose, some single purpose, which do
the business of world Jewry and, as such have begun to provide a
model of at least one form of state diaspora organization in the
post-modern epoch.
The Palestinian Arabs are now trying to develop similar
mechanisms. They are learning from the Jews in that regard,
quite appropriately since the Arabs are appropriately structured
as a people to do so because they come out of the same general
West Asian culture area as the Jews. In general, diasporas are
particularly an Asian phenomenon. Other nations are building
other kinds of links to their diasporas. The Chinese use trade
associations as their means of connection. The Irish and other
ethnic groups use fraternal associations. In no case have they
become more than what are essentially private groups which may
acquire some public purpose. They have not created public bodies
as have the Jews. Hence the Jewish model is one that still has
no analogue. Religious institutions might have filled that void
but in the modern epoch they were reduced in scope so drastically
that they could not continue to have much influence beyond what
was narrowly defined by moderns as the sphere of organized
religion. This may be changing, especially in Asia.
Whatever emerges it is clear that in a world grown smaller where
international migration no longer means the permanent severing of
ties with the old home -- a world that is, in any case, in the
midst of an ethnic revival, diasporas are likely to become an
even more common phenomenon. Even the most modern states, such
as the United States of America, will have their own diaspora
communities scattered throughout the world. Each will have to
make its own institutional and legal accommodation to them. That
accommodation is not likely to be in every case federal since not
in every case will diasporas be organized into communities, but
at least in those cases where there is a tradition of separate
ethnic or religious organization, federal arrangements are likely
to be important in the connection. In many cases those
relationships will require new forms of federalism adapted to the
asymmetries of the state-diaspora relationship.
Notes
1. Salo Wittmayer Baron, The Jewish Community, 3 vols.
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938-1944).
2. Gabi Sheffer, ed., Modern Diaspora in International Relations
(London: Cromhelm Publishing Co., 1986); Ivo Duchacek,
"Consociations of Fatherlands: The Revival of Confederal
Principles and Practices," Publius, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1982).
3. For a full list of JCPA publications in this field, see the
JCPA Catalog, issued biennially.
4. On the Chinese diaspora, see: Harley Farnsworth MacNair, The
Chinese Abroad, Their Position and Protection; A Study in
International Law and Relations (Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing
Co., 1971); Robert Elegant, The Dragon's Seed: Peking and the
Overseas Chinese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959).
5. On Somalia and the Somalis, see Catherine Hoskyns, ed. and
comp., The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya Dispute, 1960-1967 (Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press, 1969).
6. On the French system, see: Alain Lancelot, L'Absentionissme
Electoral en France (Paris: A. Colin, 1968); Segun Osoba and
Obaro Ikime, eds., France in Africa (London: Longmans, Green,
1969).
7. On American accommodations, see The Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (42 U.S.C. 1973 ff(b)). (Tel Aviv:
U.S. Information Service, 1988).
8. On the Arab nation, see Philip Hitti, "The Changing Scene:
Impact of the West," History of the Arabs Tenth Edition (London:
MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1970).
9. On the Berkeley referendum, see Earl Raab and Edwin Epstein,
"The Foreign Policy of Berkeley, California," Moment, September
1984.
10. On the Armenians and Soviet Armenia, see: Aghavnie Yeghia
Yeghenian, The Red Flag at Ararat (New York: Women's Press,
1932); Emanuel Sarkisyanz, A Modern History of Transcaucasian
Armenia: Social, Cultural and Political (Nagpur: Udyama
Commercial Press, 1975).
11. On such arrangements in the Hellenistic world, cf. Baron, The
Jewish Community, Vol. 1; Michael Grant, The Jews in the Roman
World (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).
12. Cf. Howard Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History (New
York: 1958; Walter Lacquer, A History of Zionism (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972).
13. For an examination of this process in the context of Jewish
constitutional history, see Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart A. Cohen,
The Jewish Polity (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press,
1984), especially Epochs 13 and 14.
14. On the Jewish Agency and its network, see Daniel J. Elazar
and Alysa Dortort, eds. Understanding the Jewish Agency, 2nd ed.
(Jerusalem and Philadelphia: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
1986) and Zelig Chinitz, A Common Agenda (Jerusalem and
Philadelphia: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1985).
15. On the governance of Israel with a particular eye to its
place in the Jewish polity, see Daniel J. Elazar, Israel:
Building a New Society (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University
Press, 1986).
16. On the governance of American Jewry, see Daniel J. Elazar,
Community and Polity, The Organizational Dynamics of American
Jewry (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1976).
17. On Soviet Jewry and their rescue, see Martin Gilbert, The
Jews of Russia; Their History in Maps and Photographs (London:
National Council for Soviet Jewry, 1976).
18. On the governance of the Jews of France, see Ilan
Greilsammer, The Governance of the Jews of France
(Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, forthcoming); on
Britain, see Ernest Krausz, Trend Report on Jewish Social
Research in Britain (Jerusalem: Center for Jewish Community
Studies, 1971); on Canada, see Harold Waller and Daniel J.
Elazar, Maintaining Consensus: The Canadian Jewish Polity in the
Postwar World (Lanham, Md.: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
and University Press of America, 1990); and on Argentina, see
Daniel J. Elazar and Peter Medding, Jewish Communities in
Frontier Societies (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983).
19. On the governance of the Jewish community of Brazil, see
Daniel J. Elazar, People and Polity, The Organizational Dynamics
of World Jewry (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1989; on South Africa and Australia, see Elazar and
Medding, Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies; on Hungary,
see Elizabeth Eppler, "Hungary: Organized Decline," European
Judaism (Summer 1968), pp. 15-18.
20. For a comprehensive analysis of the entire structure and each
community within it, see Elazar, People and Polity.
21. The best history of the process is to be found in Ernest
Stock, Partners and Pursestrings (Lanham, Md.: Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs and University Press of America, 1987);
Chinitz, A Common Agenda; and Elazar and Dortort, Understanding
the Jewish Agency. For a study of the period from 1948 to 1968,
see Charles S. Liebman, Pressure Without Sanctions (Rutherford:
Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1977).
22. See Eli Lichovsky, "Memorandum on Reconstitution Agreement"
in Elazar and Dortort, eds., Understanding the Jewish Agency, pp.
98-100.
23. See Elazar, People and Polity, Part I.
24. See Elazar, Israel, Chap. 10.
