Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Daniel Elazar Papers Index


The Federal Dimensions of State-Diaspora Relations

in Constitutional Design and Power-Sharing
in the Post-Modern Epoch

Daniel J. Elazar

The question of state-diaspora relations is an old-new one in human history. A common phenomenon during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, it remained real, if lower key, with the rise of the modern nation-state whose exclusivism militated against formal diaspora political expression.1 In the interdependent world of the post-modern epoch, however, among whose principal characteristics are increasingly permeable state boundaries, the revival of ethnicity, and multi-ethnic states as the norm, the phenomenon has emerged once again.2

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs has been especially active in studying state-diaspora relations, principally because of our interest in the relations between Israel and the Jewish people. I will draw upon some of our findings to offer an introduction to this phenomenon.3

States and Diasporas in the Contemporary World

State-diaspora relations deal first and foremost with nations that extend beyond states and across state boundaries. The Jewish situation is perhaps the classic example of this but it is not the only one. The Chinese, for example, have their own set of state-diaspora relations involving two or three competing states: the Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, and Singapore.4

The Somalis offer another example. Somalia is one of the few truly homogenous nation-states in the world, with 99.9 percent of its population Somali. But about half of the Somalis live outside of Somalia in neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, where they form a particularly troubling diaspora and, indeed, of late, in the case of Somalia and Ethiopia, to a brief but serious war.5

To take a very different example, under French law one cannot renounce French citizenship - once a Frenchman, always a Frenchman. Accordingly, the French constitution makes provision for French citizens living outside of France to elect two members of the French Senate as representatives of the French diaspora. There are polling places in French embassies and consulates around the world where French extra-territorial nationals may go and vote. This is symbolic representation, no more, but it does reflect the phenomenon.6

The United States is, in theory, a more difficult case. American political theory does not provide for such a phenomenon since the United States is very oriented toward territorial democracy. One has the right to emigrate (Americans have always stood for free emigration, if not always for free immigration), but if one does, he or she must become part of the body politic in the new land of settlement.

Today, however, there are several million Americans living abroad for longer or shorter periods. Willy-nilly, American diasporas have emerged around the world. Some of them are connected with American military bases or other installations, where they literally build American towns as kinds of golden ghettos, but still ghettos, in the countries in which they are located. This happens in Spain and Germany. Iran was a classic example before the fall of the Shah. The contrast between driving into the walled-off American city north of Teheran and the rest of Iran was really extraordinary. Even in Canada and France where Americans do not live apart, the vast majority remain Americans by choice, retaining citizenship and other ties to "back home."

Not surprisingly, Americans institutions have begun to adapt. There now are organized groups of Democrats and Republicans Abroad. They select delegates to their respective National Conventions and they seek better ways to secure absentee voting rights for Americans living abroad in federal and state elections. Congress has enacted legislation to further that end.7 American corporations provide other kinds of links, and there are American-owned and operated English language newspapers throughout the world.

On another level, the Arabs have considered themselves a nation with many states since the breakup of the first Muslim caliphate. That condition has intensified with the decolonization of the Arab world in the 20th century. Now an Arab diaspora is emerging outside of the Arab world as a result of emigration. The recent effort to secure recognition of the PLO by the City of Berkeley in a referendum is an example of the Arabs successfully mobilizing an Arab diaspora on behalf of an issue. They failed on the issue, but they were successful in the mobilization.8

In this respect, nation-states are becoming more like federated or constituent states, serving both as polities and as receptacles and service providers for a variety of enduring groups, some of which may be transnational in scope.

Some of those people may identify exclusively with their state. Others may identify with that state plus another people or may not identify with their state at all. I doubt if Somalis in Ethiopia identify with Ethiopia in any way, manner or form. Jews, on the other hand, clearly prize their citizenship in most of the Western states in which they are located and not only identify with those states but with their people. This is a new reality.

Nevertheless, while so-called "sovereign states" may not be as "sovereign" as they like to think they are, the state system remains the foundation of the international order, such as exists, and states are crucially important in the state-diaspora relationship. To put it another way, in the contemporary world diasporas without states do not seem to be able to do very well; a people must have a state in order to have a diaspora. The Gypsies, for example, have never been able to transcend a narrow tribalism. They may continue to exist as a scattered tribe, but are decreasing as more Gypsies seem to be assimilating in to a world in which individualism rather than tribal or ethnic identity is a commanding value.

The Armenians are a good example of this. The Armenians have had to use Soviet Armenia as their state, with all their reservations about it. Even Armenians who are anti-Communists relate to that territory as their state. In the last decades, there has been a reconciliation between the anti-Communist Armenians and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, which has had two effects. On one hand, it has connected them with the Soviet Republic, but on the other hand it has also strengthened the independence of the Armenian SSSR within Armenia.9 In rare cases a historical state may do, if it is not likely to be restored, but there must be a state in some form.

In sum, unless there is some possibility of achieving territorial statehood for at least some part of a people, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain intergenerational diaspora links. It may not be impossible -- we do not know that yet. Hence the importance of states should not be entirely denigrated, even though the idea and reality of state sovereignty have diminished in other respects.

Hellenistic and Roman Models

We have no appropriate theory for the present condition of state-diaspora relations. We do have some antecedent theories going back to Hellenistic and Roman times. As in most cases, the Greeks had a word for it. In the Hellenistic world the term politeuma was used to describe a polity within a polity -- a diaspora community located within a politaeia. They developed at least an operational constitutional theory to enable that combination to work.10 The Jews benefitted because of this phenomenon, putting together a combination of state and diaspora, but other such groups functioned in the Hellenistic and later the Roman world. While the conditions in that world were different from those of our own, I believe we could usefully study the constitutional arrangements of that period as we try to build theory for this.

One principle that can be learned from that period is that active and extensive state-diaspora relations require a kind of pax romana in order to flourish. To the extent that today's world system, whatever its problematics, has achieved, on one level, a common world peace that enables small states to survive within security-communities, to use Karl Deutsch's phrase, it has enabled this kind of relationship to develop and even has provided the conditions for it.

The Jewish People as a Case Study

Both empirical research and new theory are needed in this area. For those purposes, it is possible to treat the Jewish people as a case study.

For the Jewish people, their restoration to their historic homeland in our time and their establishment there of a concrete state was probably utterly necessary, both for the sheer physical survival of many Jews, and for the survival of the Jewish people as a people.11 Until the beginning of the modern epoch in the mid-17th century, Jews, even in exile, were accepted by all as a nation apart with an appropriate juridical status, communal autonomy, and governmental institutions to make that status and autonomy real. Feudal Europe and the ethno-religiously plural Muslim world offered space for a separate Jewish corporate existence. In Europe, the Jews were viewed as a guild or an estate among other guilds and estates and in the Muslim world as a millet among other millets.

With the coming of the modern epoch and the rise of the nation state, the Jews lost their autonomy, just as the separate guilds, estates and millets did. They were transformed into subjects of the new states as individuals and formally their institutions were left with religious functions only. In due course, they were also emancipated from the restrictions on their participation as equals in modern society, transformed from subjects into citizens and given at least a formal equality with other citizens. This process was slow and erratic, beginning in the New World in the late 17th century and not culminating in the Islamic world until the middle of the 20th century, after the modern epoch had already passed into the post-modern one.

As individual subjects or citizens within their respective states, Jews were expected to adopt the culture and social mores of the state in which they found themselves. Thus, the only ways to preserve Jewish national identity and a meaningful Jewish culture was for the Jews to build their own state, which they did in their historic homeland.

The reestablishment of the Jewish state has brought about a period of re-constitution for the Jewish people as a whole, now in process.12 Hence the Jewish people today are much involved in constitutional design, not only of their state, but also of state-diaspora relations through the State of Israel and its institutions and the individual diaspora country communities, first and foremost the United States. The Jewish Agency for Israel is becoming the nexus of the network of transstate organizations that are involved in institutionalizing the state-diaspora relationship.13 The issue that most concerns the Agency's governing bodies at this time is this process of re-constitution. While they have to give due attention to their various functional responsibilities in absorption and settlement of immigrants to Israel, for rural settlement and development, in urban revitalization and Jewish education -- all those kinds of very real, if mundane tasks, what is uppermost on the minds of all of them is this problem of re-constitution, because that is what they have been involved in doing for the past twenty years.

They are making some real progress. But it is a re-constitution of the kind of magnitude that, at least for the Jewish people, is quite like the magnitude of the re-constitution of the American Revolutionary -- Constitutional period, or the French Revolution for those nations at that time.

In the remainder of this essay I will try and suggest some of the lines that this reconstitution is taking as an example of the kind of institution-building that reflects a constitutional design for power-sharing. How is it possible to have power-sharing between a state and a diaspora? A state is, after all, a state. It has a certain status in international relations. More than that, it has obligations in the international arena. It does not have the freedom diaspora communities have, especially diaspora communities that are voluntary.

Today for all intents and purposes, all Jewish diaspora communities are voluntary. They exist through the voluntary consent of their members, who are not only free to be involved with them or not but can freely determine how involved they want to be, the ways in which they want to be involved, and the degree to which they will accept even that communal discipline which is consentually established. This is very different from the situation in a state, which, because it is bounded physically, can enforce legitimate demands that everybody within it must fulfill certain obligations. Whether particular citizens agree or not, they have to pay taxes and serve in the army; they are bound by the whole network and system of laws. The issue before the Jewish people is how to deal with power-sharing between elements quite disparate in character, even though united by a common sense of peoplehood and a very strong sense of common faith and interdependence.

Once that is solved, how is it possible to design constitutionally the institutions and the instruments for linking state and diaspora? I have been involved in constitutional design in a variety of contexts, and I have found nothing more fascinating than being involved in this particular process of constitutional design, precisely because of its complexity and its many facets.

The Context of the State-Diaspora Relationship

The relationship between Israel and the diaspora may be described as prismatic. Every way one looks at it, it looks different. That makes it a very exciting phenomenon. For that reason alone, it has captured the interest of some intellectually and politically powerful people who devote a great deal of their time to the issue not only because of their commitment to the idea, but, I am convinced, also because it is a fascinating problem, whether they say so or not. I think that this is almost always the case. People with good minds are attracted to fascinating problems.

Let us briefly examine the environment of the institutional framework, and the governance processes of this state-diaspora relationship. Israel is a state with all the characteristics of a state, with all the pretensions to total sovereignty that every state has, yet with all the limitations on sovereignty that are real for the small states in the world. On one hand, Israel is more dependent on outside support than a number of other states, but, because it has a will to be sovereign, it is probably more independent vis-a-vis its major patron, the United States, than all of the Atlantic Alliance.14

At the same time, there are organized Jewish communities in over 80 countries of the world, ranging in population from a few hundred people to nearly six million in the United States. Their ties, within and between communities, in every case are voluntary. The vast majority of Jews live in countrywide communities of 80,000 Jews or more (Table 1). The largest diaspora Jewish community, the United States, has something less than twice as many Jews as are in Israel. But it is also the most open of the voluntary communities, the one in which choice is most an individual matter with the least external constraints.15

Table 1


1. United States - 5,800,000
2. Israel - 3,450,000
3. USSR - 2,000,000
4. France - 650,000
5. United Kingdom - 390,000
6. Argentina - 350,000
7. Canada - 308,000
8. South Africa - 120,000
9. Brazil - 110,000
10. Australia - 80,000
11. Hungary - 80,000

The second largest is the Soviet Union whose Jewish population of approximately 2 million cannot really be much of a player in this game, though the Jews of the Soviet Union do play a role, both as an object of concern and as an active force for world Jewish solidarity. Leaving aside the moral aspects of the Soviet Jewish case, it is a very useful focal point for the state-diaspora nexus, for the Jewish polity that has emerged. It is a useful focal point because it is one around which there can be a wide basis for agreement that something needs to be done to rescue Soviet Jewry. At the same time, it also forces the issue of how it is to be done because of the different ideological presuppositions of the leaders of the state who believe that all Soviet Jewish emigrants shall be brought to Israel in fulfillment of Zionist ideology, and those leaders of the diaspora who share their constituents' views that what is needed is to rescue Soviet Jews regardless of where they go. So it has become an issue in which relationships are tested in very concrete ways.16

The other communities are considerably smaller. There are over 500,000 Jews in France, just under 400,000 Jews in Britain, and over 300,000 Jews in Canada and Argentina.17 Brazil and South Africa have approximately 120,000 each; Australia and Hungary have approximately 80,000 each.18 The other organized communities range from a high of 35,000 to a few hundred. They are players in a far more modest way. All told, however, the existence of a network of organized communities creates a whole that is invariably greater than the sum of its parts. That network both requires and generates appropriate leadership and financing.19

Components of the Contemporary Jewish Polity

Jews outside of Israel tax themselves voluntarily through the various welfare and Israel/overseas campaigns that are conducted in each community and raise substantial sums of money. According to this writer's calculations, world Jewry, including Israel, raises something like $35 billion annually for Jewish purposes. Israel has an annual budget of some $25 billion. The Jews of the United States raise voluntarily or mobilize in some way something like $5 billion a year for their local expenditures and for their contributions to Israel and to the needs of world Jewry. Jews in other countries raise or receive the equivalent in voluntary contributions or government support for their educational and social service institutions.

A serious civil service has developed for world Jewry and the larger communities to administer these sums. Israel as a state has a full, even overblown, bureaucracy. American Jewry has created a strong professional civil service. The major world Jewish relief organizations, such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which is nominally an American Jewish voluntary organization, maintains an internationally-recruited civil service functioning in dozens of countries around the world, including Israel. So all the institutional components have developed that are needed for governance.

There are also the beginnings of an institutional framework, linking the state, the voluntary countrywide bodies, and particularly the local communities which are the real focal points of diaspora Jewish life. They are linked through several mediating institutions that have developed to accommodate the problem of linking a state with what are, in the end, voluntary organizations. The principle, if very limited, mediating institution for many years was the World Zionist Organization.

The World Zionist Organization was the organized expression of world Jewry that gave birth to the State. After the State was established, the WZO's functions were, for the most part, transferred to the new entity. The WZO then found itself in what has become known in the United States as the "March of Dimes situation." When polio was eradicated, the Polio Foundation had one of two choices. It could close down or it could re-adapt and find a new mission. It chose the latter course. The Polio Foundation became the Birth Defects Foundation. It had a superb fund-raising mechanism, it had a good research establishment. It is generally agreed that it has done a good job in making the transition, although it had to sacrifice much of its public visibility to do so.

The WZO made the same effort but had less success than the Polio Foundation. From the early 1950s to the present, the WZO has been in a process of adaptation, during which time it has moved, like it or not, from being the principle mediating institution to merely one of the State's links to the diaspora. The major diaspora communities have not been organized through the Zionist movement, but have created their own community organizations responsible for and controlling the major sources of funding for Jewish purposes. They control the purse and since they control the purse, the government of Israel allied itself with them, saying in effect to the local WZO leadership: you are all nice people and we want you to come to Israel twice a year for meetings, but we are going to make our alliances with those who can provide funding for the relief and rehabilitation needs that diaspora contributions are used for in Israel.

Nevertheless, in 1952 the State of Israel regularized its relationship with the WZO through a Covenant signed by the leaders of the two bodies and enacted into law by the Israeli Knesset. The covenant provided that the WZO, through its arm, the Jewish Agency, would retain responsibility for aliyah -- immigration to Israel and the subsequent absorption of the immigrants -- as well as for Zionist education in the diaspora. This seemingly modest agenda offered the opportunity for widespread WZO involvement in both the state and the diaspora communities, limited only by its organizational competence and the counter claims of other bodies.

Meanwhile a parallel process was developing in the diaspora. Initially, the diaspora communities were happy to view Israel strictly as a beneficiary of their fundraising for relief and rehabilitation needs. However in due course they began to perceive -- without using the terms -- that they were involved in reconstituting a state. Subsequently, they came to see their role as key to a peoplehood relationship with a state-diaspora dimension. It was at that point that they sought a role in the governance of that relationship.

So, between 1968 and 1971 the Jewish Agency, which had been the arm of the WZO for these relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction activities was reconstituted -- they used that term. Together Israeli and diaspora leaders wrote the Jewish Agency's constitution. Once that was completed, they went through a whole ceremony of recovenanting, including the signing of a new three-way covenant for the Jewish Agency, involving the state, the WZO, and the representatives of the diaspora communities in the form of their fundraising organs.20

The new constitution provided for a reconstituted Jewish Agency in which the WZO and the fundraising representatives of the communities were equal partners. In fact what was created was a nexus institution which could serve as a mediating institution between a state whose responsibilities were defined by international law and the voluntary diaspora communities.

The Jewish Agency's original constitutional configuration made it particularly appropriate for this role. Originally, it was established as a result of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine which was given to the British in 1921. Under the terms of the Mandate a "Jewish agency" was to be established under international law as the arm of the Jewish people for building the Jewish national home. From the first it was to be a unique international organization, just as the Jewish people is unique. Consequently, it has a special status in international law; there is no other organization with that status, which survives to this day.21 So the Jewish Agency exists not only by virtue of its status in Israeli law, or its recognition in the laws of the various countries in which it functions, (in most cases, where there are Jewish diasporas, it also has acquired appropriate legal status), but by virtue of its status in international law which gives it a special position.

From a federalist perspective, the Jewish Agency is worthy of investigation as a model for other such arrangements since it links a group of voluntary organizations, organized on three planes -- worldwide, countrywide, and local -- and a politically independent state on a permanent basis in a set of common tasks.

The Jewish Agency network now comprises some six or seven major organizations that are linked to it as the nexus for those common tasks. They include: (1) the United Jewish Appeal, which is the principal fundraising body of American Jewry for Israel, and its two constituting bodies, (2) the United Israel Appeal, whose task it is to transfer, oversee and evaluate the use of the UJA funds, and (3) the Joint Distribution Committee, which offers relief, rescue, and rehabilitation services to Jews wherever they are in need; (4) the WZO and its two subsidiaries, (5) Keren Hayesod, the principle Israel fundraising body for the rest of the diaspora, and (6) the Jewish National Fund, the entity responsible for land purchase and reclamation in the Land of Israel; and (7) the Council of Jewish Federations, the principle framing institution of American Jewry, the largest diaspora community. Each has functions of its own in Israel and in the diaspora so that all maintain their own integrities and exist in a confederal relationship with one another through the Jewish Agency and, as a result, with the State of Israel.

In addition, there are a group of organizations peripheral to the Jewish Agency that have developed to deal with problems that cannot be appropriately dealt with by those organizations clearly identified with this nexus. One of these is the World Jewish Congress, founded in 1936 at the initiative of the WZO as a vehicle for fighting anti-Semitism worldwide. At one time the World Jewish Congress sought to be the parliament of world Jewry. It is not, but what it has become over the years is a vehicle through which to represent Jewish interests in the USSR and Eastern Europe and in those African and Asian countries that do not want direct relations with Israel or with Zionist-related organizations. This is because it has maintained an independent posture toward the nexus while at the same time being tied to it fiscally and organizationally. The WZO remains represented in the WJC at all levels, in recent years with less influence than previously.

There are other such functional authorities that handle a variety of tasks that serve the common needs of the Jewish people. ORT, for example, is a worldwide service for vocational training that does much to help non-Jews as well as Jews acquire the skills with which to earn a living. The Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, founded as a result of the joint and successful effort of world Jewry to exact reparations from the German Federal Republic for the Holocaust victims, is a worldwide body that funds Jewish cultural and scholarly enterprises. It is composed of representatives of most of the relevant institutions mentioned here. The reparations themselves were obtained through a temporary authority, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. All of Israel's universities are in this category. In Hebrew, these are called "national institutions," an old term designed to reflect the difference between them, the state and the individual diaspora communities.

Federalism Out of Necessity and Culture

What is characteristic of this network is that it is federal in both its structure and its processes. Because it is a network of interlocking institutions whose decision-making is based upon consensus and consultation, it cannot be otherwise. There is no real way to exert coercive power in such a network, though the partners can bring to bear considerable pressure on certain issues. If the State of Israel really needs something that is perceived by all to be in its interest, it is very unlikely that the diaspora communities will not respond in some way. If there is an attack on Israel by the Arab states, obviously there is going to be a response without going through a large round of consultations, because there is a consensus as to what the issue is and what needs to be done. But on most other issues, even the State must consult with diaspora leadership if it wants to gain their support.

This is highly congruent with Jewish political culture, which is federalist in orientation, yet it has developed out of necessity.22 There is very strong evidence that the founders of the Jewish state saw statehood as being monolithic. Their views grew out of the continental European tradition of reified statehood, in its Eastern and Central European formulations of centralized, monolithic rule. They not only expected a major ingathering of Jews but assumed that the state would unilaterally speak for all of Jewry.23 They and their successors changed their views very reluctantly and only out of necessity, and have never given up the theory. The history of the change is in itself worthy of exploration.

All told, there is as yet no real theory for the phenomena described here. There are principles that are becoming increasingly accepted, but there is no theory. There is an emerging set of rules as to what can and cannot be done. These rules are still in the process of being formulated, crystallized, and generally accepted.

None of this will lead, in my opinion, to the establishment of any kind of parliament of the Jewish people in the near future. The period from the 1880s to the 1950s was a period in which there were a number of attempts to establish such a parliament, first through the World Zionist Organization and second through the World Jewish Congress. This idea was rejected for two reasons: the State of Israel as part of the family of independent, politically sovereign states in the world cannot subject itself to such a parliament and the diaspora communities as voluntary bodies composed of individual citizens of their respective countries who owe their first political loyalty to those countries, cannot identify themselves with such an extra-territorial body. Such a parliament would break the rules that bind each of the parties to other games. Since a parliament would jeopardize both sides, there is a consensus on both sides as to why not to have such a thing, albeit for different reasons.

What has developed instead is a network of functional authorities. Some multi-purpose, some single purpose, which do the business of world Jewry and, as such have begun to provide a model of at least one form of state diaspora organization in the post-modern epoch.

The Palestinian Arabs are now trying to develop similar mechanisms. They are learning from the Jews in that regard, quite appropriately since the Arabs are appropriately structured as a people to do so because they come out of the same general West Asian culture area as the Jews. In general, diasporas are particularly an Asian phenomenon. Other nations are building other kinds of links to their diasporas. The Chinese use trade associations as their means of connection. The Irish and other ethnic groups use fraternal associations. In no case have they become more than what are essentially private groups which may acquire some public purpose. They have not created public bodies as have the Jews. Hence the Jewish model is one that still has no analogue. Religious institutions might have filled that void but in the modern epoch they were reduced in scope so drastically that they could not continue to have much influence beyond what was narrowly defined by moderns as the sphere of organized religion. This may be changing, especially in Asia.

Whatever emerges it is clear that in a world grown smaller where international migration no longer means the permanent severing of ties with the old home -- a world that is, in any case, in the midst of an ethnic revival, diasporas are likely to become an even more common phenomenon. Even the most modern states, such as the United States of America, will have their own diaspora communities scattered throughout the world. Each will have to make its own institutional and legal accommodation to them. That accommodation is not likely to be in every case federal since not in every case will diasporas be organized into communities, but at least in those cases where there is a tradition of separate ethnic or religious organization, federal arrangements are likely to be important in the connection. In many cases those relationships will require new forms of federalism adapted to the asymmetries of the state-diaspora relationship.


1. Salo Wittmayer Baron, The Jewish Community, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938-1944).

2. Gabi Sheffer, ed., Modern Diaspora in International Relations (London: Cromhelm Publishing Co., 1986); Ivo Duchacek, "Consociations of Fatherlands: The Revival of Confederal Principles and Practices," Publius, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1982).

3. For a full list of JCPA publications in this field, see the JCPA Catalog, issued biennially.

4. On the Chinese diaspora, see: Harley Farnsworth MacNair, The Chinese Abroad, Their Position and Protection; A Study in International Law and Relations (Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing Co., 1971); Robert Elegant, The Dragon's Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959).

5. On Somalia and the Somalis, see Catherine Hoskyns, ed. and comp., The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya Dispute, 1960-1967 (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Oxford University Press, 1969).

6. On the French system, see: Alain Lancelot, L'Absentionissme Electoral en France (Paris: A. Colin, 1968); Segun Osoba and Obaro Ikime, eds., France in Africa (London: Longmans, Green, 1969).

7. On American accommodations, see The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (42 U.S.C. 1973 ff(b)). (Tel Aviv: U.S. Information Service, 1988).

8. On the Arab nation, see Philip Hitti, "The Changing Scene: Impact of the West," History of the Arabs Tenth Edition (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1970).

9. On the Berkeley referendum, see Earl Raab and Edwin Epstein, "The Foreign Policy of Berkeley, California," Moment, September 1984.

10. On the Armenians and Soviet Armenia, see: Aghavnie Yeghia Yeghenian, The Red Flag at Ararat (New York: Women's Press, 1932); Emanuel Sarkisyanz, A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia: Social, Cultural and Political (Nagpur: Udyama Commercial Press, 1975).

11. On such arrangements in the Hellenistic world, cf. Baron, The Jewish Community, Vol. 1; Michael Grant, The Jews in the Roman World (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).

12. Cf. Howard Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History (New York: 1958; Walter Lacquer, A History of Zionism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972).

13. For an examination of this process in the context of Jewish constitutional history, see Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart A. Cohen, The Jewish Polity (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984), especially Epochs 13 and 14.

14. On the Jewish Agency and its network, see Daniel J. Elazar and Alysa Dortort, eds. Understanding the Jewish Agency, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem and Philadelphia: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1986) and Zelig Chinitz, A Common Agenda (Jerusalem and Philadelphia: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1985).

15. On the governance of Israel with a particular eye to its place in the Jewish polity, see Daniel J. Elazar, Israel: Building a New Society (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986).

16. On the governance of American Jewry, see Daniel J. Elazar, Community and Polity, The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1976).

17. On Soviet Jewry and their rescue, see Martin Gilbert, The Jews of Russia; Their History in Maps and Photographs (London: National Council for Soviet Jewry, 1976).

18. On the governance of the Jews of France, see Ilan Greilsammer, The Governance of the Jews of France (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, forthcoming); on Britain, see Ernest Krausz, Trend Report on Jewish Social Research in Britain (Jerusalem: Center for Jewish Community Studies, 1971); on Canada, see Harold Waller and Daniel J. Elazar, Maintaining Consensus: The Canadian Jewish Polity in the Postwar World (Lanham, Md.: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and University Press of America, 1990); and on Argentina, see Daniel J. Elazar and Peter Medding, Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983).

19. On the governance of the Jewish community of Brazil, see Daniel J. Elazar, People and Polity, The Organizational Dynamics of World Jewry (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989; on South Africa and Australia, see Elazar and Medding, Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies; on Hungary, see Elizabeth Eppler, "Hungary: Organized Decline," European Judaism (Summer 1968), pp. 15-18.

20. For a comprehensive analysis of the entire structure and each community within it, see Elazar, People and Polity.

21. The best history of the process is to be found in Ernest Stock, Partners and Pursestrings (Lanham, Md.: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and University Press of America, 1987); Chinitz, A Common Agenda; and Elazar and Dortort, Understanding the Jewish Agency. For a study of the period from 1948 to 1968, see Charles S. Liebman, Pressure Without Sanctions (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1977).

22. See Eli Lichovsky, "Memorandum on Reconstitution Agreement" in Elazar and Dortort, eds., Understanding the Jewish Agency, pp. 98-100.

23. See Elazar, People and Polity, Part I.

24. See Elazar, Israel, Chap. 10.

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