Jerusalem Letter
No. 112 6 Nissan 5750 / 1 April 1990
HAS THE INTIFADA REALLY WEAKENED AMERICAN JEWISH SUPPORT FOR
ISRAEL?
Eytan Gilboa
Is the Intifada Just Another Round of the Arab War on Israel? /
What is Appropriate Use of Force? / Perceptions of Media Bias /
Impressions of Israel and the Arabs / Negotiating with the PLO /
Possible Solutions / Jewish Attachment to Israel
American Jews have traditionally been known for their close
attachment to Israel. Some have suggested, however, that
due to recent controversial events and scandals such as the
Palestinian uprising, the "who is a Jew" issue, and the Pollard
spy affair, that Jewish ties to Israel have eroded to the
point where American Jews were distancing themselves from their
long-standing support of the Jewish state. To test this claim, I
compared the attitudes of American Jews and non-Jews toward the
Palestinian uprising and fundamental Arab-Israeli issues.
Evidence presented and analyzed here clearly shows that during
the uprising American Jews have been more supportive of Israel
than non-Jews. This pattern was verified over time and across
many central and critical issues related both to the Palestinian
uprising and to the more general levels of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Even those American Jews who have been critical of
Israel distinguished between criticism and attachment. This was
best expressed in an April 1988 poll, when an overwhelming
majority of 82 to 8 percent said that "even if I disagree with
the actions of Israel's government, that does not change how
close I feel about Israel."
Is the Intifada Just Another Round of the Arab War on Israel?
The Palestinian Arab uprising represented a new form of
confrontation in an ongoing conflict. Due to its unprecedented
nature, there has been wide disagreement among observers as to
how to characterize the violence. The Palestinians depicted the
disturbances as spontaneous, non-violent acts of disobedience
against Israeli occupation. The Israelis characterized the same
events as just another round of Arab-Israeli warfare, albeit a
more subtle and sophisticated one. How did American Jews and
non-Jews perceive the unrest? Which version, the Palestinian or
the Israeli, was accepted by American Jews and non-Jews?
In March-April 1988, several months after the outbreak of the
riots, American Jews accepted the Israeli version by a 51 to 33
percent majority, with 18 percent not sure. Non-Jews held the
same opinion by a lesser plurality of 42 to 33 percent, with 23
percent of this sample selecting the "not sure" answer.
What is Appropriate Use of Force?
With regard to the question of Israel's use of force in dealing
with the riots, Jews similarly manifested greater support for the
Israeli position than non-Jews. A typical question on this issue
read: "In responding to Palestinian protests, do you think
Israeli soldiers are using too much force, about the right amount
of force, or not enough force?" At the beginning of the riots, 41
percent of the Jewish sample, compared to 31 percent of the
non-Jewish sample, said Israel's use of force was either
appropriate or not harsh enough, while 31 percent of the Jews,
compared to 42 percent of the non-Jews, thought the use of force
was too harsh. The continuation of the uprising, rather than
bringing Jewish and non-Jewish opinions closer on this issue,
appears to have driven Jews further away from their compatriots.
In April 1988, the gap between the two groups was much wider.
Sixty-five percent of the Jewish sample, compared to only 26
percent of the non-Jewish sample, agreed that: "aside from a few
regrettable incidents, Israel has used a reasonable and
appropriate level of force in countering recent Arab violence on
the West Bank and Gaza."
Perceptions of Media Bias
Jews were furthermore much less willing to accept the media's
version of the uprising and much more inclined to see coverage as
biased against Israel. In January 1988, the Jewish sample
thought the media had been biased against Israel by a 48 to 37
percent plurality, while the non-Jewish sample held the opposite
view by a 46 to 26 percent plurality. Once again, the test of
time scores against the claim that Jewish support for Israel is
eroding. In March-April, the gap between the two groups was much
wider. At that time, a 58 to 21 percent majority of the Jewish
sample thought the media had been unfair in its coverage of the
Palestinian riots. Forty-three to 24 percent of non-Jews held the
opposite view. By January-February 1989, one year after the
start of the uprising, a national Jewish sample was even more
critical of the media; an overwhelming 79 to 9 percent majority
felt the press treated Israelis unfairly.
Thus, comparison of Jewish and non-Jewish opinions on several
crucial issues in the uprising yielded considerable differences.
Jews proved to be much more supportive of Israel in terms of
their characterization of the uprising, view of Israel's use of
force, and acceptance of media coverage.
Impressions of Israel and the Arabs
Although American Jews remained more supportive of Israel than
non-Jews on the immediate issue of the uprising, did their
general views toward the actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
peace process, and possible solutions shift towards those of
non-Jews during this period?
Since the 1967 Six Day War, Americans have held highly favorable
opinions toward Israel and highly unfavorable opinions toward the
PLO. At the same time, they have distinguished between the PLO
and the Palestinians, expressing less negative views of the
latter. The same trends were found in American Jewish opinion,
but with greater approval of Israel and stronger rejection of the
PLO. How have the riots affected the images of Israel and the
Palestinians in the eyes of American Jews and non-Jews?
TABLE 1
Impressions of Israel and the Palestinians
|
| Jews | Non-Jews |
| Favorable | Unfavorable | Favorable | Unfavorable |
|
Government of Israel | 70% | 18% | 33% | 29% |
People of Israel | 83 | 4 | 50 | 14 |
Palestinians | 26 | 51 | 27 | 35 |
PLO | 9 | 83 | 11 | 52 |
|
Source: Los Angeles Times Poll: Israel and the Palestinians,
March 26-April 7, 1988.
As can be seen in Table 1, in March-April 1988, the Jewish sample
held favorable impressions of the government of Israel by a ratio
of 70 to 18 percent, while the non-Jewish sample held the same
impressions only by a 33 to 29 percent plurality. Similarly,
impressions of the Israeli people were favorable by a 83 to 4
percent majority among Jews, but by only a 50 to 14 percent
plurality among non-Jews.
American Jews and non-Jews held unfavorable views of both the PLO
and the Palestinians. Half of the Jewish sample had unfavorable
views of the Palestinians; only a quarter had a favorable
impression. Among non-Jews, the unfavorable-to-favorable ratio
was 35 to 27 percent. Impressions of the PLO were even more
negative. Eighty-three and 52 percent respectively of the two
samples had unfavorable views of this organization, while only 9
and 11 percent respectively held favorable views of the PLO.
Thus, both Jews and non-Jews had unfavorable opinions of both the
PLO and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinians, but a much greater
percentage of Jews than non-Jews held these views.
The PLO's image in the U.S. did not improve even after PLO
Chairman Yasir Arafat's press conference in Geneva on December
14, 1988. His statement was designed to create the impression
that his organization had completely altered its attitudes toward
Israel and the U.S. The American public, however, simply did not
believe him. In a poll taken in January-February 1989, just a few
weeks after his statement, a national Jewish sample
overwhelmingly agreed, by a ratio of 86 to 2 percent, that the
PLO is a terrorist organization. During the same period, 74
percent of a general national sample said they did not believe
the PLO had given up terrorism and only 6 percent believed
Arafat.
On the broader plane of the Arab-Israeli conflict, when Israel
has been pitted by pollsters against the Arab countries Americans
have always sympathized much more with Israel. Table 2 provides
data on this issue from 1988 and earlier years for both Jews and
non-Jews. In April 1988, the Jews sympathized more with Israel by
a ratio of 87 to 2 percent. Non-Jews held the same preference by
a ratio of 51 to 12 percent. Table 2 also reveals similar scores
and differences in the views of the two groups registering
several times since 1976. The results of the Los Angeles Times
poll in 1979 are statistically identical to those registered in
1988 in the same poll for both groups. Finally, Table 2 indicates
that over time Jews consistently sympathized much more with
Israel and much less with the Arab nations than non-Jews.
TABLE 2
Sympathies for Israel and the Arab Nations
|
Year | 1976 | 1979 | 1981 | 1988 |
Party/Sample | Jews | Non-Jews | Jews | Non-Jews | Jews | Non-Jews | Jews | Non-Jews |
|
Israel | 97% | 52% | 85% | 49% | 95% | 44% | 87% | 51% |
Arab Nations | 1 | 6 | 0 | 12 | - | 3 | 2 | 12 |
Neither | 2 | 23 | 7 | 19 | 2 | 28 | 5 | 19 |
Don't Know | - | 19 | 8 | 20 | 3 | 25 | 6 | 18 |
|
In sum, both Jews and non-Jews had favorable impressions of
Israel and unfavorable impressions of the PLO and the
Palestinians. Both had more favorable views of the peoples than
of their leaders. Also, both groups continued to view the PLO as
a terrorist organization not interested in peace with Israel,
even after Arafat specifically renounced terrorism in Geneva.
However, the scope of all these feelings was, once again, much
wider among Jews.
Negotiating with the PLO
Actors in the peacemaking process in the Arab-Israeli conflict
have had to contend with several serious preliminary negotiating
issues such as representation of the Palestinians, the
appropriate forum for negotiations, the roles of the U.N. and
the superpowers, and the principles and goals of the peace
process. In recent years, the most difficult issue has been
representation of the Palestinians. The Palestinians claim that
the PLO is their only legitimate representative. Israel rejects
the PLO because of its practice of terrorism and its extreme
ideology, as embodied in the Palestinian National Covenant, which
calls for the elimination of Israel.
In the past, the U.S. rejected the PLO for the same reasons. It
laid down several conditions for official and formal negotiations
with this organization including acceptance of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 242, recognition of Israel's right to exist,
and cessation of terrorist attacks. Arafat's Geneva statement was
interpreted by the Reagan administration as sufficient to meet
the conditions for a dialogue. Consequently, the two sides began
official talks.
TABLE 3
U.S. Negotiations with the PLO
|
| Jews | Non-Jews | |
Date | Yes | No | DK | Yes | No | DK | Poll |
|
Oct. 1979 | 46% | 54% | - | 62% | 31% | 7% | [LA] |
Apr. 1988 | 29 | 60 | 11 | 52 | 34 | 14 | [LA] |
After Arafat Statement and U.S. Decision to talk with PLO |
Jan. 1989 | 38 | 28 | 34 | | | | [MF] |
Jan. 1989 | | | | 67 | 17 | 16 | [AP] |
Jan. 1989 | | | | 64 | 23 | 13 | [CN} |
|
Table 3 shows that in April 1988, prior to Arafat's statement and
the U.S. decision to begin talks with the PLO, American Jews
opposed such talks by a 60 to 29 percent majority. The non-Jewish
sample, however, approved of hypothetical U.S.-PLO talks by a 52
to 34 percent majority. Therefore, in the middle of 1988 Jews and
non-Jews diametrically opposed each other on this issue. As can
be seen in Table 3, the same pattern existed in 1979. Following
the onset of the Palestinian riots, the ratio of Jews who opposed
U.S.-PLO negotiations grew substantially, from 54-46 percent to
60-29 percent, and support among non-Jews decreased from 62-31
percent to 52-34 percent. In just a few months, however, these
attitudes changed again.
Following Arafat's statement and the U.S. decision to begin talks
with the PLO, 38 percent of a national Jewish sample agreed that
"it is good that the United States decided to talk with the PLO."
Twenty-eight percent disagreed, while a substantial group, 34
percent, was not sure. Non-Jews approved of the talks by clear
majorities: 64 to 23 percent in a CBS-New York Times poll and 67
to 17 percent in an Associated Press-Media General poll.
While American Jews were divided on the American dialogue with
the PLO, they justified Israel's refusal to negotiate with this
organization. In February 1981, they backed Israel's refusal by a
62 to 28 percent majority. In a January-February 1989 poll,
they disagreed with this statement: "Israel should talk to the
PLO without further preconditions" by an even larger ratio of 69
to 14 percent. The necessary preconditions were revealed in
responses to another question, when a 58 to 18 percent majority
agreed that "if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces
terrorism, Israel should be willing to talk with the PLO." As
can be seen in Table 4, a similar result was found in an April
1988 poll. Yet, few American Jews believed this had already
happened. Section 2 in Table 4 indicates that in January-February
1989, even after the Arafat statement, 62 percent of a Jewish
sample said the PLO still wanted to destroy Israel. Only 8
percent of the same sample thought the PLO wanted to coexist with
Israel.
TABLE 4
Israel-PLO Negotiations
1. Israel - PLO Negotiations |
|
| Jews | Non-Jews | |
Date | Yes | No | DK | Yes | No | DK | Poll |
|
Feb. 1981 | 28% | 62% | 10% | 25% | 31% | 34% | [YE] |
Conditional Negotiations |
Apr. 1988 | 67 | 16 | 17 | | | | [MF] |
Apr. 1988 | | | | 63 | 12 | 25 | [CT] |
Unconditional Negotiations
After Arafat Statement and U.S. Decision to talk with PLO |
Jan. 1989 | 14 | 69 | 17 | | | | [MF] |
Jan. 1989 | | | | 62 | 15 | 24 | [AP] |
|
|
2. PLO Goals towards Israel
(After Arafat Statement and U.S. Decision to talk with PLO) |
|
| Jews | Non-Jews | |
Date | Destroy | Coexist | DK | Destroy | Coexist | DK | Poll |
|
Jan. 1989 | 62% | 8% | 31% | | | | [MF] |
Conditional Negotiations |
Jan. 1989 | | | | 33% | 36% | 32% | [AP] |
|
Table 4 reveals that in February 1981, non-Jews agreed with the
Israeli refusal to talk to the PLO by a close 31 to 25 percent
plurality, and that the largest group, 44 percent, did not have
an opinion. In April 1988, non-Jews, like their Jewish
counterparts, approved of conditional Israel-PLO negotiations.
Unlike the Jewish sample, however, in January 1989, after
Arafat's statement, they were in favor of unconditional talks
between Israel and the PLO. Yet, non-Jews were also suspicious of
the PLO intentions. Only 36 percent thought the PLO wanted to
coexist with Israel, while 33 percent said they believed the PLO
wanted to destroy Israel.
The riots increased both Jewish and non-Jewish opposition to
U.S.-PLO talks. However, Arafat's statement and the U.S. decision
to lift the ban on negotiations with the PLO again altered the
attitudes of the two groups. Jews moved from opposition to
indecision and equally divided opinions, while non-Jews gave much
stronger support to the talks. It is possible that the move from
a hypothetical situation to an actual one, authorized and
endorsed by President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George
Shultz, affected American attitudes on this issue. However,
Jewish opinions on Israel-PLO negotiations, unlike the opinions
of their compatriots, were not affected. They continued to
support the long-standing Israeli refusal to negotiate with the
PLO.
Possible Solutions
The 1978 Camp David Accords called for autonomy to be negotiated
by the relevant parties as a temporary solution in Judea, Samaria
and Gaza. The 1988 Shultz initiative and also the 1989 Shamir
peace proposals included such a provision for an interim
agreement and autonomy.
As can be seen in Table 5, the public had no faith in this
solution. Both Jews and non-Jews had reservations about the
autonomy idea. In January 1988, 40 to 37 percent of the Jewish
sample favored this solution. By March-April 1988 only a slightly
larger plurality, 44 to 30 percent supported the idea. Non-Jews
favored autonomy even less. In January 1988, 35 percent favored
the idea, 33 percent opposed it and 33 percent were not sure. A
similar distribution of responses among non-Jews was recorded in
March-April: 33 percent favored the autonomy, 26 percent opposed
it and 41 percent were not sure.
TABLE 5
Solutions
1. Autonomy |
|
| Jews | Non-Jews | |
Date | For | Against | DK | For | Against | DK | Poll |
|
Jan. 1988 | 40% | 37% | 23% | 35% | 33% | 33% | [YT] |
Apr. 1988 | 44 | 30 | 26 | 33 | 26 | 41 | [LA] |
|
|
2. Palestinian State |
|
Date | For | Against | DK | For | Against | DK | Poll |
|
Jan. 1988 | 39% | 42% | 19% | 56% | 17% | 26% | [YT] |
Apr. 1988 | 26 | 46 | 28 | 50 | 18 | 19 | [LA] |
May 1988 | 41 | 59 | - | 59 | 41 | - | [JS] |
|
|
3. Conditional Palestinian State |
|
Date | For | Against | DK | For | Against | DK | Poll |
|
July 1980 | 39% | 41% | 20% | 56% | 16% | 28% | [HS] |
Jan. 1989 | 47 | 23 | 30 | | | | [MF] |
Jan. 1989 | | | | 44 | 25 | 31 | [AP] |
|
|
4. Threat to Israel |
|
Date | For | Against | DK | For | Against | DK | Poll |
|
July 1980 | 73% | 11% | 16% | 40% | 26% | 34% | [HS] |
Jan. 1988 | 82 | 9 | 9 | 54 | 25 | 21 | [YT] |
|
The Palestinians and the PLO have always demanded the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state, to begin with,
at least, in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Traditionally, Israel and
the U.S. opposed this solution. Both the Reagan peace proposal of
September 1982 and the Shultz initiative of March 1988 rejected
an independent Palestinian state under the PLO, and instead
favored a solution within a Jordanian context. During the
U.S.-PLO dialogue the United States repeated this position. While
the principal political parties in Israel differed over the
future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza and over the solution to the
Palestinian problem, they all opposed an independent Palestinian
state. How did Americans feel about this solution?
American Jews had reservations about a Palestinian state. In
January 1988 they opposed even a much softer definition -- "a
Palestinian homeland" -- by a close 42 to 39 percent plurality.
In April 1988, the Jewish sample opposed the Palestinian homeland
solution by a ratio of 46 to 26 percent. In contrast, non-Jews
favored a homeland by a ratio of 56 to 17 percent in January
1988, and by 50 to 19 percent in March-April.
Table 5.3 reveals that in 1980 the Jewish sample opposed even a
Palestinian state that would not threaten the security of Israel.
Conversely non-Jews supported such a state by a 56 to 16 percent
majority. In 1989, similar pluralities of both groups supported a
conditional Palestinian state. However, as can be seen in Table
5.4, the majority of Jews and non-Jews alike accepted the Israeli
reasoning for rejection of the independent state solution by
agreeing that a Palestinian homeland would threaten Israel's
security. The Jews agreed with this statement by an overwhelming
majority of 82 to 9 percent; non-Jews held the same opinion by a
54 to 25 percent majority. In January-February 1989, after
Arafat's Geneva statement, a sizeable plurality of a national
Jewish sample, 46 to 17 percent, agreed that "even with
international guarantees and an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty,
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would be used to
threaten the very existence of Israel."
As was the case with opinions toward the actors in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process, differences between
Jewish and non-Jewish opinions were found in the complex field of
possible solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both groups were
divided on the autonomy solution, but a greater percentage of
Jews favored this remedy. Jews clearly opposed the creation of an
independent Palestinian state, while non-Jews clearly supported
this solution. Jews, like their compatriots, supported a
Palestinian state that would not threaten Israel. However, both
groups, the Jews much more than the non-Jews, felt that such a
state would in fact threaten Israel.
Attitudes of American Jews and non-Jews toward Israel and many
central Arab-Israeli issues have moved in similar directions.
This was evident particularly in the basic perception of the
uprising, impressions of the actors, including the PLO, and in
attitudes toward the international peace conference idea and the
autonomy solution. However, Jewish opinions on these issues were
much more supportive of Israel and the Israeli positions than
those of non-Jews. On certain issues such as Israel's use of
force, talks with the PLO, and the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state, the two groups held opposing
views.
Jewish Attachment to Israel
For most American Jews, Israel's existence is seen as crucial for
their own ethnic survival and expression of Jewishness. For many
secular Jews, Israel is in essence a "civil religion." In
January-February 1989, a national Jewish sample agreed by a
considerable margin of 73 to 15 percent that "caring about Israel
is a very important part of my being a Jew." The distribution of
responses to the same question in 1986, prior to the uprising,
was 63 to 24 percent. Another substantial majority, 65 to 17
percent, said in January-February 1989 that "if Israel were
destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest
personal tragedies in my life." The distribution of responses to
this question in 1986 was 61 to 21 percent.
When asked in April 1988 how close they felt to Israel, 75
percent of the Jewish sample said they felt "very" or "fairly"
close. In a different poll taken in January-February 1989, 62
percent of the Jewish sample felt close to Israel while 31
percent felt distant. When the same question had been asked in
1986, the distribution of the responses was identical to the 1989
score: 62 percent close and 33 percent distant. This indicates
considerable stability in levels of attachment to Israel.
Even more enlightening were the responses to the following
question: "Compared to three or four years ago, do you feel
closer or more distant from Israel, or about the same?" In
March-April 1988, 65 percent of the Jewish sample said they felt
the same, 19 percent felt closer and 14 percent felt more
distant. In another April 1988 poll, the Jewish sample
disagreed by a considerable margin of 72 to 13 percent that
"because of the violence, I feel less warmly about Israel." In
a January-February 1989 poll, 75 percent said they felt the same
about Israel, 14 percent felt closer, and only 8 percent felt
more distant from Israel. The preceding data suggest that,
despite the uprising, a considerable majority of respondents to
several Jewish polls did not change their feelings toward
Israel. Of those who did change their views, more felt "closer"
than "more distant."
The attachment of American Jews to Israel creates an interest in
many more sources of information on Israel, compared to those
employed by non-Jews, such as national Jewish periodicals, Jewish
newspapers, lectures, visits to Israel, and correspondence and
talks with Israelis. About a third of American Jewish adults have
been to Israel and about one in eight have visited at least
twice. In a 1986 survey, 40 percent of the national Jewish sample
said they have friends or family members living in Israel. In a
1989 survey, 60 percent of the Jewish sample said they "often
talk about Israel with friends and relatives." Therefore, they do
not depend solely on the American media for information about
Israel and the Middle East.
Jews pay much more attention to events in Israel and the Middle
East than non-Jews. This was clearly evident in the level of
awareness and interest in the uprising. Both Jews and non-Jews
were aware of the events in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. However,
Jews followed the riots much more closely than non-Jews.
Sixty-six percent of the Jewish sample in a January 1988 poll,
compared to only 27 percent of the non-Jewish sample, said they
"paid close attention" to the riots. A similar gap was found in a
March-April 1988 poll, where 67 percent of the Jewish sample,
compared to 28 percent of the non-Jewish sample, said they heard
or read "a great deal" about the clashes. Because of their
special interest in the issue, Jews are more knowledgeable about
the Arab-Israeli conflict than non-Jews and therefore tend to
place current events within a historical context. They probably
viewed the uprising, as Israel did, within the general historical
context of Arab-Israeli violence and thus came up with a more
favorable evaluation of Israeli conduct.
Both American Jews and non-Jews have certainly been disturbed by
the Palestinian uprising. However, despite the harsh criticism of
Israel by certain prominent Jews published and aired by the
American media, a detailed analysis of the public opinion data
clearly shows that the overwhelming majority of American Jews
continues their strong support of Israel.
* * *
Note: The following polls were used in the preparation of this
study: Media General-Associated Press (AP): January 4-12, 1989;
CBS-New York Times (CN): January 12-15, 1989; Gallup (GP):
January 27-30, 1989; Harris: (HS): July 11-August 3, 1980;
Chicago Tribune (CT): April 21-23, 1988; Los Angeles Times (LA):
March 26-April 7, 1988; Market Facts (MF): 1. October 1986, 2.
April 1988, 3. January-February 1989; Penn and Schoen (PS):
January 20-24, 1988; Yankelovich, Skelly, White (YE): February
1981; Yankelovich, Clancy, Shulman-TIME Magazine (YT): January
27-28, 1988.
* * *
Dr. Eytan Gilboa has written numerous works on American-Israeli
relations, including American Public Opinion toward Israel and
the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987).
He is currently Visiting Professor of Political Science at the
University of California, Los Angeles. This Jerusalem
Letter/Viewpoints is based on his study, "American Jews and
Non-Jews: Comparative Opinions on the Palestinian Uprising,"
which appeared in the Jewish Political Studies Review Vol. 2,
Nos. 1-2 (Spring 1990).
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