Enhancing Jewish Population Studies
Daniel J. Elazar
Since 1980, at least 33 Jewish communities, including the largest
ones, have conducted population surveys, so that about 73 percent
of the total American Jewish population has been surveyed within
the last five years. A growing number of the 1980 surveys
represents the second or even the third round of studies for
their communities, attesting to the value of the first rounds and
pointing to the increasing prevalence of regular collection of
population data on the local plane. Judged, therefore, by the
number of studies, by the percentage of total Jewish population
covered and by the growing number of repeat surveys, the
demographic study of America's Jews has advanced remarkably.
Ironically, despite the proliferation of these surveys and some
advances in their level of sophistication, their quality and
usefulness for research purposes still varies considerably.
Problems of comparability and generalizability persist. However,
despite these shortcomings, the literature on the demography of
American Jews (Goldstein, 1981; Goldscheider, 1982; Cohen, 1983a)
clearly documents that in this last quarter of the 20th century
the Jews of America are characterized by the following facts:
low fertility and decreasing household size.
- high levels of intermarriage,
- considerable population movement and redistribution,
- a substantial aging of the population, and
- high levels of education and occupational achievement
concurrent with shifts in the types of work and levels of
self-employment.
Striking as these underlying similarities are, considerable
intercommunity variations still exist in the specific levels of
demographic processes and in demographic and socioeconomic
composition.
These variations suggest that a community's size, its age, and
its regional location may all have important effects on its
population structure and dynamics. This is a key reason why
individual community studies are needed in addition to reliable
national data. All too often, evaluations of the viability and
the vitality of the American Jewish community as a whole, based
on the demographic features and indicators of Jewish identity for
individual communities, have led to very different conclusions
about future prospects. In part, these differences reflect real
variations among the particular communities; in part, however,
they may also result from variations in the quality of data and
the sophistication of the analysis. They may even reflect
differences in the proclivities and perspectives of individual
researchers that affect their optimism or pessimism in
interpreting the future of the Jewish community. Isolating those
effects that emanate from the research design and data from those
reflecting real differences is one of the major challenges
researchers face. Eliminating the problems associated with the
former rates the highest priority.
Identifying the Universe and Choosing a Sample
Defining who is to be regarded as a Jew is a basic research task,
regardless of data source and who is to be included in the
sample. Identification and/or inclusion should be based on the
Jewish identity of the parents or even of grandparents at the
time of the birth of the respondent? Is it to be based on the
religion in which the respondent was raised or in which his or
her children are being raised? Is it to be the Jewish identity
of the head of the household, regardless of the respondent's
identity? Will it follow halachic standards, or is it to be
based on self-identification or on selected behavioral tests?
As we know, a definition based on household criteria can make a
vast difference in the number enumerated as Jews; in National
Jewish Population Survey of 1970-71 the differential amounted to
430,000 persons (Massarik and Chenkin, 1973). The inclusion of
non-Jewish spouses or children of a Jewish parent considerably
distorts selected characteristics of the population being
studied. Yet, given the situation in the United States, is it
possible from a research perspective to completely exclude all
household members who do not either identify themselves as Jews
or qualify halachically as Jews at the time of the study; many
play an important role in influencing the intensity of Jewish
identification of other members of the household (Mayer, 1978,
1983).
It is necessary to develop a standardized classificatory scheme
with information collected on individuals from all the
categories. For some purposes certain persons may be included in
the analysis while for other purposes, they may be excluded. A
standard set of criteria and availability of data on all
categories would also enhance comparability across communities
and allow aggregation of results from various studies.
Selecting the sample is another delicate task. Here again, a
host of alternative methods have been developed. The literature
is replete with examples of reliance upon federation lists,
distinctive Jewish names, language spoken, residential
clustering, and even friendship networks as mechanisms for
identifying and/or screening Jewish households and Jewish
individuals (Himmelfarb, Loar, and Mott, 1983; Kobrin, 1983;
Lazerwitz, 1983; see also Cohen, Woocher, and Phillips, 1984).
Serious questions remain about the representativeness of samples
that result from reliance upon these methods for identifying
Jewish respondents. A particular method that seems to work well
in one community may be far less appropriate in another because
of differences in the generational and ethnic composition of the
Jewish population, the levels of intermarriage, and the rates of
affiliation. All too often, one or another of these approaches
has been used almost indiscriminately in choosing samples and at
least partially determining who is Jewish, despite the obvious
biases such approaches may have.
Comparability and Standardization
It is clear that more careful attention needs to be paid to
standardizing the procedures used in identifying our universe,
designing samples and questionnaires, tabulating data and
analyzing and reporting the results. The goal should be to
ensure maximum comparability among community studies while still
meeting the unique needs of individual communities.
Gary Tobin and Julie Lipsam (1983; see also Tobin and Chenkin,
1985) undertook a most ambitious effort to assemble and, where
possible, to compute comparable data collected since 1979 from
population surveys in 13 American cities. Their task was not a
simple one; their efforts and frustrations in interpreting some
of the differences among communities make clear the problems of
comparability that arise because different communities use
different sampling techniques and interviewing methods, define
the same variables in different ways, ask the same basic
questions in varied forms, and tabulate and report the findings
in different formats or not at all. A few examples will
illustrate the problem.
Why does Cleveland's 1981 survey show an average household size
of 2.8 and Minneapolis 2.6, compared to only 2.3 for St. Paul and
2.2 for Denver in the same year? Why are Cleveland and
Minneapolis characterized by the same high level that
characterized the 2.8 average of NJPS ten years earlier, while
Los Angeles, St. Paul, and San Diego households averaged almost
half a person less in 1981? Have the latter declined? Was their
situation already different from the national average, or are the
changes due to differences in coverage and/or definition? Did
some surveys include college students living away from home,
often in other locations, while others, like the census, did not
count such absent students as members of their parental
households? Did some count Jewish college students living
off-campus in their own units, thereby inflating the percent of
small household units, while others missed college students
altogether? Did some include institutional populations, such as
students and residents of homes for the aged, as household
members or perhaps even count them as individual households,
while others overlooked them entirely? Why were 30 percent of
the households in Denver and 33 percent in Los Angeles one-person
units, whereas Cleveland had only 19 percent and Chicago 21
percent in the same period? Is it a function of differences in
the general community, in age composition, in living style, or is
it a definition/measurement problem? We rarely are given enough
information either on study design or in the interpretation of
the results to gain insights on such issues.
Do we know why in Denver, Seattle, and Rochester 20 percent of
the Jewish population was under age 20, while in San Diego, Los
Angeles, and Nashville it was about 30 percent? Footnotes in a
few studies suggest that problems of categorization may account
for some of the difference. For others, researchers can only
speculate whether differentials in enumeration procedure or
differentials in migration, fertility, or mortality account for
the variations. Unfortunately, the general absence of direct
data on fertility, and inadequate information on migration, with
proper controls for age composition, preclude gaining further
insights on the roles of these factors.
Similar comparative assessment can be made for marital status.
Not surprisingly, 23 percent of Miami's relatively aged Jewish
population is widowed, but it is not at all clear why in St.
Louis 17 percent are widowed since only 22 percent of the
population is aged 60 and over while in Minneapolis, with about
the same percentage aged 60 and over, only 7 percent are widowed.
Comparable questions could be raised about the percentage single,
which ranges from lows of 7 percent in Miami and 9 percent in St.
Louis to a medium level of 15 in New York and highs of 22 percent
for Minneapolis and 23 percent in Chicago and Denver. Chicago's
may be explained, in part, by inclusion of all persons 18 years
old and over in the statistics on marital status, but what
accounts for the highs in Denver and Minneapolis? Are there
differences because some refer to all adults (Chicago), some to
household heads only (New York), and others to respondents only
(St. Louis), or do the patterns vary because the communities
actually differ in the marital status of their populations?
Other socio-economic indicators show similar high degrees of
variation. The percentage with college education varies from a
low of 57 percent in St. Paul to a high of 78 percent in Chicago;
the percentage of professionals ranges between a low of 23 in
Minneapolis and a high of 45 in Rochester; and
managers/proprietors vary between Los Angeles' low of 16 and
Minneapolis' high of 42. Even blue collar workers show a ratio
of almost 3:1 between Los Angeles' high of 11 percent and
Nashville's low of 4 percent. Yet, despite the low percentage of
professionals/managers (49 percent) in St. Louis in 1982, the
city was reported to have 40 percent of its households with
incomes of $40,000 and over, compared to only 25 percent with
such incomes in Rochester in 1980, where 64 percent of the work
force were professionals/managers. The mysteries of
intercommunal variation thus persist.
This comparative evaluation is, of course, oversimplified, and
the stress on differences is perhaps exaggerated. What needs to
be emphasized is that all too often, despite our generalization
about such characteristics as family status, socio-economic
status and age structure (many of which may be generally
correct), individual community variations seem to be substantial.
In the absence of standardized definitions, coverage, and
tabluations, however, the inconsistencies may be spurious and
lead to erroneous conclusions about the nature of the specific
community, about differences between communities, and about
change over time. Even more serious, using data based on one or
two communities to generalize about the total American community
or to test national data derived from alternative sources, as was
done for the AJC studies, can be dangerous.
The foregoing discussion clearly indicates that standardization
of procedures in all phases of research is the key to enhancing
the quality and the usefulness of future Jewish population
studies. All studies have in common a large number of variables
that are recognized as crucial to understanding the community and
to planning for its future. The difference lies in how they are
identified and how to sample the population to be studied, and
how to define these variables and handle them in the data
gathering, tabulation, measurement and analysis stages.
Recognizing the need for standardization and for comparability
does not deny the importance of tailoring studies to the needs of
individual communities. With proper attention to defining
concepts, choosing samples, asking questions, measuring
variables, and tabulating data, inconsistencies due to varying
procedures and definitions can be eliminated, and higher levels
of comparability can be achieved at the same time that
information is obtained to meet the needs of individual
communities. Both the larger community and the local community
can then be better served, and both the resulting studies and
community planning based on them will be greatly enriched.
Interpretation of Data: The Fertility Debate
Even more frustrating than the unexplained inconsistencies found
in results obtained from different community studies are the
inconsistencies obtained in a single community even in the same
data set when different authors interpret the data, especially
when the same author does so at different times. The current
debate raging over whether the Jewish population is in danger of
seriously shrinking and whether ferrtility is at replacement or
non-replacement levels is a case in point (cf., Schmelz and Della
Pergola, 1983, and Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1985). As
before, the problem of inconsistency is illustrated by citing
some of the literature, especially those papers authored by
Steven Cohen and Calvin Goldscheider. Both scholars have come to
assess the demographic situation of American Jews quite
differently both from their own earlier evaluations and from
those offered recently by other researchers working in the field.
The inconsistencies among these assessments lend added weight to
the need to overcome the limitations inherent in our current
research designs and data sets and to achieve greater
standardization and comparability in our research efforts. Only
by doing so, can we hope to assure a full and correct evaluation
of the dynamics of demographic change in the Jewish community and
the implications of these changes for the future.
In his comprehensive, insightful analysis of American Modernity
and Jewish Identity, which relies heavily on data from the 1965
and 1975 Boston Jewish Community Surveys, Steven Cohen
(1983a:118) concluded that
"On the basis of past experience, it does seem safe to say that
the completed Jewish birthrate for today's Jewish parents may
remain well below the number needed for replacement....Barring a
significant rise in national fertility, Jewish birthrates--if
they follow historic patterns--should continue to reside in the
region of NGP (Negative Population Growth)."
Following review of a number of factors to explain this
situation, Cohen concluded further,
"Undoubtedly, these several aspects of Jewish distinctiveness
aside, so long as middle-class, urbanized Americans experience
low birthrates, so will comparable Jews. Jewish birth patterns
will generally follow those of the larger society, as they have
in the past. If anything, advancing assimilation may well bring
Jewish fertility behavior into even closer alignment with that of
their non-Jewish contemporaries." (Cohen, 1983a:120)
The data cited by Cohen seem firmly to support this conclusion.
Boston's ever married Jewish women aged 25-34 averaged only 1.5
children in 1965; in 1975, this age group had an average of only
0.7 children. The national data cited for Jews, although
somewhat higher at 2.1 and 1.2 in the 1960s and 1970s,
respectively, pointed in the same direction.
Yet, only two years after writing this, in a September 1984
interview in Moment, Cohen and Calvin Goldscheider argued to the
contrary, claiming that the data of the 1960s and 1970s were a
fluke of the particular cultural moment in American history and
that the issue was one of time--reflecting late marriage rather
than reduction in total fertility. Cohen suggests that "even if
we assume that the women of the late '60s and early '70s were
indeed less family oriented, less prone to have large
families--which is very doubtful if you look at the data (a
reference to New York data which appeared to show an average of
2.1 children for women 35-44) - there is no reason to assume that
the same predilections are carrying over into the early and
mid-eighties" (Cohen and Goldscheider 1984:41).
Goldscheider, in the same interview, questioned the validity of
any reduced fertility conclusions, suggesting that this issue
hinges largely on the proportion of Jewish women marrying and on
the timing of their fertility in relation to age at marriage. He
acknowledged, however, that it is not really known whether
marriage patterns have changed, and whether, as a result, overall
fertility levels have changed or whether they are below
replacement, if one takes into account the non-married. As
Goldscheider himself stated so well in an earlier interview with
William Novak:
"What has changed? As I said, most Jewish couples tend to have
two children; relatively few have none, or only one child, or
more than two. But what is changing is the proportion of people
who are getting married - it has declined significantly in the
past 10 years. If everybody gets married, and has about two
children, then we have replacement, and possibly even a little
growth; certainly we have stability. But if suddenly 20 percent
of the Jewish population doesn't get married--and that's a
hypothetical figure--then you can see how that changes things.
In the past, universal marriage has been a mainstay of Jewish
life; suddenly, we can't take it for granted." (quoted in Novak,
1981:51)
Clearly then, the situation is very complex. All agree that in
the United States, Jews have averaged lower fertility than
non-Jews for a century or more. It is also true that at a time
when most Jewish women married, Jewish fertility hovered at about
2 children per women and, therefore, met natural replacement
levels. Few would dispute Goldscheider's (1985:12) strong belief
that "projections about the drastic numerical decline of the
American Jewish population in the next generation is demographic
nonsense." I have criticized this overly pessimistic view, too
(Goldstein, 1981). However, in the absence of a sharp reversal
in trends, some decline still seems likely to me; the extent
remains open to question until inconsistencies in evidence, in
interpretation, and in ways of measurement are resolved. The
argument (Goldscheider, 1985:12) that "neither the educational
attainment nor the career orientation of younger American Jewish
women poses a threat to the demographic continuity of the
American Jewish population" also remains to be tested
definitively to ascertain its generality. If Cohen's earlier
claim that Jewish fertility will likely follow or align with that
of the larger society proves correct, there is added reason to
question the validity of Cohen's and Goldscheider's more recent
optimism about the level of Jewish fertility and its adequacy for
replacement.
In view of past patterns of lower Jewish fertility, why should
the future situation be characterized by averages equal to or
higher than that of the general population--which would be the
case if the revised Goldscheider-Cohen view holds and if U.S.
Census Bureau projections prove correct.
The Bureau of the Census (Das Gupta, 1985) has estimated that the
average completed number of children born by the end of
childbearing age to white women, who had no children at age 20
and who reproduced at 1980 rates during their reproductive years,
would be only 1.48, and for women childless at age 24 (probably
closer to the current Jewish age at marriage), the average would
decline still lower to only 1.08, about 50 percent below
replacement level. If, as data suggest, a high percentage of
Jewish women marry late, and if they should follow such fertility
patterns, these projections raise serious doubts about the
persistence of replacement level fertility. Goldscheider is
correct in stressing that marriage is a key factor, but his
arguments are often misread by wishful thingers when they
overlook that an average of 2.0 children on the part of the
married is not sufficient to replace both themselves and the
unmarried who have no children, especially if the latter
constitutes a substantial group; an average below 2.0 compounds
the problem.
The complex situation is further illustrated by data from the
latest Bureau of the Census (1983) fertility report on births
completed and birth expectations. It was found that for wives of
all races who had married at ages 22-24 and who were already aged
25-29 in 1983, average expected completed fertility was 2.07; for
those aged 30-34, the average was 2.08. Even if Jews follow
these patterns exactly, the fertility of married women would be
just at replacement level. The question remains: how many will
not marry and how much higher would Jewish marital fertility have
to be to compensate for the non-married? Furthermore, will
Jewish women in fact follow these marital fertility patterns?
This census survey also showed that among white women aged 18-34
with four or more years of college, the expected average
completed fertility, will be 1.93 children, with 14 percent being
childless. For those with five or more years of college, the
average will be 1.72 with 19 percent childless.1 Among women
aged 18-34 surveyed by the Census who were not married at the
time, the expected lifetime births averaged only 1.83 per woman,
almost half a child less than the average for currently married
women of similar age; for 25-29 year-old unmarried women the
average was only 1.56. The expectations of the unmarried,
therefore, provides no basis for believing that the averages will
rise above replacement for all women if these single women
eventually bear children.2 To the extent that Jewish women are
characterized by both late marriage and high levels of education,
it there any reason to believe that Jews in the future will
deviate substantially from these general patterns and in ways
different from the past?
When analyzing data on expectations, one should particularly keep
in mind the assessment of childbearing intentions offered by
Nathan Keyfitz's (1982) evaluation of the various efforts made
since 1940 to rely on surveys to elicit childbearing plans.
While recognizing that the Bureau of the Census relies on such
procedures, Keyfitz (1982:741) concludes that, "after 40 years of
effort, this instrument (survey) has come to seem uncertain, even
controversial." Moreover, he stresses that extension of the
questioning to women who are not yet married is not likely to add
much information; "a girl of 15 can hardly give a meaningful
answer to the question of how many children she intends to have"
(Keyfitz, 1982:741). Clearly, data on expectations for the total
population and for Jews need to be used with considerable
caution, especially when they are dependent on expectations with
respect to marriage behavior.
Although these data are obviously of very limited use in
assessing current and future Jewish fertility because they refer
to all whites and not just Jews and in a few instances to whites
and blacks combined, and because they include inadequate controls
for a host of factors, they do serve a purpose. To the extent
that Jewish fertility in the United States has rarely if ever
exceeded non-Jewish fertility and more often has been
substantially lower, the data for total whites provide an upper
limit - one which Jewish fertility would resemble if it came up
to the national average in future years (or if the national
average came down to Jewish levels). As such, it would seem more
reasonable to hypothesize that Jewish fertility will not likely
exceed replacement levels, and more likely will be below them.
This interpretation, like Cohen's and Goldscheider's views,
remains speculative. If we are to accept that Jewish fertility
behavior will rise above the national levels, then the evidence
and reasons for this very basic change in pattern has to be
presented much more clearly and convincingly than has been the
case to date.
Above all, these illustrations are intended to point out the
inconsistencies that characterize both our data and especially
our interpretation of them (cf., Schmelz and Della Pergola,
1983). Beyond this, they are intended to argue strongly for the
need to include appropriate questions on marriage and fertility
in Jewish population surveys and for appropriate measurement of
the resulting data.3 One outstanding defect of Jewish population
studies, both past and present, is the limited and often
misleading analysis, due to faulty measures or comparisons, of
fertility. It is ironic that the one demographic variable that
may be of greatest interest to those concerned with the future of
the Jewish community tends to be the most neglected of all. The
current debate, I believe, is a healthy one if it serves to
stimulate more careful research. It is dangerous only if the
findings on either side are accepted uncritically as the basis
for what may be false alarms or unjustified complacency. The
inconsistencies challenge all demographers to greater efforts at
resolution.
Conclusions
Given the limitations of both methods and available data, there
is evidence that the research done to date provides no firm basis
for resolving the debate about the current or future number of
Jews. The existing data sets raise and leave unanswered a number
of key questions about success in identifying and measuring the
total Jewish population and in assessing the interrelations
between population change and the current and future character
and strength of Judaism and Jews in the United States. What
these studies do suggest, despite their limitations, is that the
Jewish population has undergone dramatic changes and will
continue to do so; that these changes have significant
implications for the degree and character of Jewish identity and
Jewish practices; that the extent of Jewish integreation into the
larger American scene as well as the persistence of Jewish
exceptionalism in certain areas will jointly determine future
Jewish demographic behavior and patterns; and that while future
Jewish patterns will therefore probably more closely resemble
those of the American population as a whole with respect to many
variables. It will not necessarily do so for all
characteristics.
Both the changes occuring to both Jews and the national
population generally and those unique to the Jews make it most
important to continually monitor the demographics of American
Jewry. It must be possible to assess their implications for
individual localities and for the larger Jewish community, and to
accomplish this whenever possible within the comparative context
of the changes occurring in the larger community. Researchers
therefore continue to be challenged by the necessity of insuring
that their methods and the resulting data will allow the best
possible assessment of the present situation of the community and
where it is heading.
In-depth evaluation of studies already completed and of
alternative data sources should rate the highest priority if we
are to make our future studies more accurate and more useful.
Fortunately, we have begun to see some such critical assessments,
as, for example in the use of DJNs for sampling (Phillips, 1983;
Lazerwitz, 1983; Massarik, 1983). These mark only a small
beginning; they must be followed by concerted efforts to assess
alternative approaches to sampling, data collection, measurement,
data analysis and population estimates, and to resolve the
differences in conclusions about the levels of fertility,
intermarriage, converson, assimilation and overall growth.
Researchers must strive to agree on standardized definitions and
procedures and on a set of up-to-date procedural guidelines.
Results must be obtained that allow comparative analysis over
space and assessment of change over time, as well as cumulation
of comparable local studies to obtain regional and eventually
even national data sets.
One basic goal for such efforts is development of a good current
standard against which to judge the representativeness or even
the reasonableness of the results obtained. NJPS has provided
some clues, but it is far too outdated to constitute an
acceptable standard. Use of individual communities such as New
York, Boston, or Los Angeles is questionable. In the absence of
such a single standard, we must give much more thought to
appropriate alternatives. This includes consideration of how one
or more synthetic standards might be developed from existing,
available information, and of whether aggregation of weighted
data from individual community studies would better serve the
purpose.
Under ideal conditions, a new, well-designed national study would
provide such a standard. In its absence, achievement of a high
degree of standardization and comparability among community
studies might well provide a viable alternative, especially if a
large number of communities and a high percentage of the total
population continue to be covered by local sample surveys. It
is, however, highly unlikely that we can obtain national results
by aggregating indiscriminately the results of individual
community studies. But with proper planning and centralized
supervision, it may be possible to select a range of communities
which are judged by experts to be representative of the country
as a whole. By then using these particular communities as a kind
of national sample, and aggregating their individual survey
results, approximation of a national sample survey may be
achievable. Moreover, by properly staggering the times at which
communities of different size and type undertake their surveys, a
more continuous assessment of the changing Jewish-American scene
might also be possible.
In sum, we must continuously enhance and substantially modify our
thinking about the design, conduct, and utilization of Jewish
population studies (cf. Cohen, Woocher, and Phillips, 1984).
Reevaluation becomes especially necessary as we gain new
experience from ongoing studies and from analysis of data sets
collected earlier; as our colleagues in the social sciences
develop more sophisticated methods of analysis; and as we broaden
our reliance upon varied sources of information. Such constant
reassessment is especially critical because of constraints on
undertaking new studies. Demographers must also inventory,
evaluate and prescribe methods for exploiting every possible
data source that allows them to make relatively reliable
assessments of changes in the size, composition, and distribution
of the Jewish population, as well as in its components of change.
Only through such full and careful exploration of data will
answers be obtained to the vital questions of growth vs decline,
replacement vs non-replacement fertility, and the negative vs
positive effects of intermarriage and assimilation. Only in this
way will researchers enhance the likelihood of resolving the
inconsistencies that have come to characterize their findings and
assessments, and in so doing, provide the community with a firmer
basis on which to plan its future.
Notes
1. The effect of education is similarly indicated by the combined
data from recently analyzed 1973 and 1976 National Surveys of
Family Growth (Mosher and Hendershot, 1984). They showed the
total births expected by Jewish married women age 15-44 to be
only 2.16 for those with some college education, that is,
just at replacement leve, and lower than that of less
educated Jews and of college educated Protestants and
Catholics.
2. In the same set of sessions at which this paper was presented,
one presented by Calvin and Frances Goldscheider (1985)
assessed the birth expectations of a cohort of young men and
women, the High School Class of 1972. Using longitudinal
data from interviews with this group in 1973 and 1979, the
evidence lends support to the argument that American Jews
will achieve fertility levels in the next several decades
average close to two children per family, sufficient for
population replacement." In 1973, the 197 Jewish women
expected an average of 2.34 children. By 1979, the 167 who
were followed-up expected 1.96. These averages assume that
those who reported expecting to have 4 or more children will
average 5.0 For the total white population (exclusing Jews)
the corresponding averages were 2.40 and 2.06.
While these data in themselves suggest that this particular
Jewish cohort will, if their expectations are fully realized,
average close to 2 children per women, several questions must
be raised about the likelihood of such an outcome. Given
that between 1973 and 1979, the expected average declined by
0.4 children, or 16 percent, how can we assume there will be
no further reductions? Between 1973 and 1979, 23 percent of
the ever married and 31 percent of the never married had
already reduced their expectations, whereas only 13 and 18
percent of these respective groups had increased the number
of children expected. How many will, in fact, not marry at
all? How many will face fertility problems? How many will
experience divorce and how will this affect fertility?
Beyond this are even more basic questions related to the
nature of the sample itself. Religious identification was
based on the question "What religion were you brought up in?"
It does not tell us the religion at the time of the survey
nor anything about religious identification after marriage.
How this identification is or will be affected by marriage
and how many respondents are or will remain Jewishly
identified remains to be determined.
Assessment of the results of another survey of high school
seniors in 1980 showed only 5 percent of the Jewish males and
2 percent of the Jewish females expect not to marry, the
lowest percentages of any religious group, but a much larger
proportion planned to marry late. The authors themselves
recognize the limitations of their data. As they state, "as
in the case of birth expectations, we do not know the
predictive power of these marriage expectations"
(Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1985:19).
Taking all of these concerns into account, these data can
only be suggestive of future patterns. In themselves they
certainly do not point to above-replacement levels of
fertility and, given the concerns expressed, one could easily
build a case that they point to fertility levels below
replacement.
3. Among the questions that would be appropriate for inclusion in
surveys are the following: 1) What is your current marital
status? 2) Have you been married more than once? 3) What
was the date of your first marriage? 4) How was the first
marriage terminated? 5) How many babies has the woman ever
had, not counting stillbirths? 6) How many children in all
do you expect to have?
