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Jerusalem Issue Briefs

The Jerusalem Center's Institute for Contemporary Affairs, founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation and directed by Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, provides high-level analyses and perspectives on key issues relating to Israel and the Middle East through presentations by leading government officials, military experts, and academics to the diplomatic corps and the foreign press in Israel. These presentations are summarized in the Institute's Jerusalem Issue Briefs series.

Israeli Security Peace Process The Palestinians Terrorism
International Law Europe and Israel The Middle East Chronological List

Chronological List


Volume 6:

No. 6-15: The Iraq Study Group: Implications for Israel
      Dore Gold

No. 6-14: Christians Flee Growing Islamic Fundamentalism in the Holy Land
      Justus Reid Weiner

No. 6-13: How Should Israel Respond to War Crimes Accusations from the War in Lebanon?
      Avi Bell

No. 6-12: North Korea and Iran: Will Any Lessons Be Learned?
      Gerald M. Steinberg

No. 6-11: The Rising Popularity of Hizballah Leader Nasrallah: Does it Matter?
      Lee Smith

No. 6-10: Hizballah's Rocket Campaign Against Northern Israel: A Preliminary Report
      Uzi Rubin

No. 6-9: The Critical Importance of Israeli Public Diplomacy in the War Against the Iran-Hizballah Axis of Terror
      Dr. Raanan Gissin

No. 6-8: Countdown to Conflict: Hizballah's Military Buildup and the Need for Effective Disarmament
      Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Shimon Shapira

No. 6-7: Europe and the War in Lebanon
      Freddy Eytan

No. 6-6: The U.S.-French Draft UN Resolution on Lebanon: Strengths and Weaknesses
      Dore Gold

No. 6-5: Is a Sustainable Cease-Fire in Lebanon Realistic? If Not, What is the Alternative?
      Gerald M. Steinberg

No. 6-4: An International Force in Lebanon: Advantages and Disadvantages
      Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon and Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

No. 6-3: Survey: Israeli Public Opposed Further Disengagement Even Before the War with Hizballah
      Yechiel Leiter

No. 6-2: A Strategic Assessment of the Hizballah War: Defeating the Iranian-Syrian Axis in Lebanon
      Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and Dan Diker

No. 6-1: The Opening Round of Iran's War Against the West
      Dore Gold


Volume 5:

No. 5-27: Will There Be a Palestinian Civil War?
      Pinhas Inbari

No. 5-26: The Global Range of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program
      Uzi Rubin

No. 5-25: The Islamist Threat to Jordan
      Nibras Kazimi

No. 5-24: The Popular Resistance Committees: Hamas' New Partners?
      Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 5-23: Europe's Response to the Threat of Global Terror
      Jose Maria Aznar

No. 5-22: Understanding the Direction of the New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and Al-Qaeda Jihadism
      Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 5-21: Dilemmas of Israeli Policy After the Hamas Victory: From Disengagement to Consolidation?
      Chuck Freilich

No. 5-20: The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance: An Israeli Response to the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault
      Dore Gold

No. 5-19: Global Oil Supply Security and Al-Qaeda's Abortive Attack on Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia
      Mordechai Abir

No. 5-18: The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier
      Col. (Res.) Danny Tirza

No. 5-17: After the Hamas Victory: The Increasing Importance of Israel's Strategic Barrier in the Jordan Valley
      Dore Gold

No. 5-16: The Palestinian Authority and the Challenge of Palestinian Elections
      Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland

No. 5-15: Sharon's Strategic Legacy for Israel: Competing Perspectives
      Dan Diker

No. 5-14: The Continuing Struggle of Palestinian Journalists for Freedom of the Press in the Palestinian Authority
      Khaled Abu Toameh

No. 5-13: Towards Palestinian Elections: The Democracy of the Rifles
      Brig. Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari

No. 5-12: Zarqawi and Israel: Is There a New Jihadi Threat Destabilizing the Eastern Front?
      Dore Gold and Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 5-11: Can Diplomacy Still Prevent Iran from Going Nuclear?
      Gerald M. Steinberg

No. 5-10: Iran's New Revolutionary Guards Regime: Anti-Americanism, Oil, and Rising International Tension
      Mordechai Abir

No. 5-9: Domestic Threats to Iranian Stability: Khuzistan and Baluchistan
      Michael Rubin

No. 5-8: America's Hamas Dilemma: Spreading Democracy or Combating Terrorism?
      Dore Gold

No. 5-7: The World Oil Crisis: Implications for Global Security and the Middle East
      Gal Luft

No. 5-6: The Murder of Musa Arafat and the Battle for the Spoils of Gaza
      Pinhas Inbari and Dan Diker

No. 5-5: What If Iran Gets the Bomb? The Iranian Challenge to the West
      Ephraim Kam

No. 5-4: U.S.-Saudi Relations After Hurricane Katrina: Increased Oil Dependency and the Vulnerability of Saudi Oil Installations
      Mordechai Abir

No. 5-3: Legal Acrobatics: The Palestinian Claim that Gaza is Still Occupied Even After Israel Withdraws
      Dore Gold

No. 5-2: The Succession of Saudi King Abdallah, the Oil Market, and Regional Politics
      Mordechai Abir

No. 5-1: Are There Signs of a Jordanian-Palestinian Reengagement?
      Dan Diker and Pinchas Inbari


Volume 4:

No. 4-27: European Misreading of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
      Efraim Karsh

No. 4-26: The Relationship Between International and Localized Terrorism
      Boaz Ganor

No. 4-25: The EU Constitutional Crisis, the Middle East, and Israel
      Manfred Gerstenfeld

No. 4-24: Democracy as a Component of Security
      Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom

No. 4-23: The U.S. Versus Syria and Iran: Winning the War on Terror
      Maj. Gen. Paul E. Vallely (ret.)

No. 4-22: Putin Leads Russia's Return to the Middle East and the Arab Embrace
      Michael Widlanski

No. 4-21: Undermining Mahmud Abbas: The "Green Revolution" and the Hamas Strategy to Take Over the Palestinian Authority
      Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 4-20: Israel's Defense Industry as a Key Component of Israel's Qualitative Military Edge
      Giora Shalgi

No. 4-19: What is the True Demographic Picture in the West Bank and Gaza?
      Bennett Zimmerman and Prof. Sergio DellaPergola

No. 4-18: How Egypt Molded Modern Radical Islam
      Zvi Mazel

No. 4-17: Will Washington Support Democracy in Iran?
      Michael Rubin

No. 4-16: The Palestinian "Temporary Cease-Fire": Israel's Political Risks and Opportunities with the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit
      Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 4-15: After the Palestinian Elections
      Ehud Yaari

No. 4-14: Radical Islam in The Netherlands: A Case Study of a Failed European Policy
      Manfred Gerstenfeld

No. 4-13: The Al-Qaeda Threat to Saudi Arabia's Oil Sector
      Mordechai Abir

No. 4-12: Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank
      Maj. Gen. (res.) Doron Almog

No. 4-11: How is Israel's Economy Affected by the Security Situation?
      Ezra Sadan

No. 4-10: The New Iraqi Government: An Interim Appraisal
      Amazia Baram

No. 4-9: Palestinian Priorities After Arafat: Palestinian Unity or Peace?
      Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 4-8: Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism
      Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin

No. 4-7: Will a Gaza "Hamas-stan" Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?
      Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and David Keyes

No. 4-6: Instability in the Gulf and the Threat to Oil Stability
      Antoine Halff

No. 4-5: Israel's Commitment to Domestic and International Law in Times of War
      Judge Amnon Straschnov, former IDF Military Advocate General

No. 4-4: Empirical Hubris: How "Anonymous" Disguises the Real Threat to the West and Damages the CIA
      Jeff Helmreich

No. 4-3: Israeli Responses to the FBI's Espionage Investigation Leak - A Compendium

No. 4-2: Syrian Foreign Policy Under Bashar al-Assad
      Eyal Zisser

No. 4-1: How Europe's Drive for Independence from America Hurts Israel
      Jeffrey Gedmin


Volume 3:

No. 3-32: Understanding Arafat Before His Attempted Rehabilitation
      Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 3-31: The Expulsion of the Palestinian Authority from Jerusalem and the Temple Mount
      Dan Diker

No. 3-30: The Palestinian Rebellion in Fatah: Foreshadowing the Politics of the Post-Arafat Era
      Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 3-29: Who's Right on the War on Terrorism? The 9/11 Commission, the U.S. Senate Assessment of Prewar Intelligence, and the British Butler Committee
      Dore Gold

No. 3-28: Pride and Dissent in the Israeli Military
      Brig.-Gen. Gershon HaCohen

No. 3-27: The International Atomic Energy Agency and Israel: A Realistic Agenda
      Gerald M. Steinberg

No. 3-26: How Successful is Al-Qaeda's Strategy of Depriving the West of Essential Oil?
      Mordechai Abir

No. 3-25: Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War
      Dore Gold

No. 3-24: The Struggle of Palestinian Journalists for Freedom of the Press
      Dan Diker

No. 3-23: Why the Likud Voted No to Sharon's Disengagement Plan
      Ron Dermer

No. 3-22: The Vanunu Myths and Israeli Deterrence Policy
      Gerald M. Steinberg

No. 3-21: Bush Erases the Clinton Parameters
      Dore Gold

No. 3-20: What Happened to Reform of the Palestinian Authority?
      Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Toameh

No. 3-19: Polling the Importance of Israel's Rights to a United Jerusalem and Defensible Borders for Likely American Voters: A Nationwide U.S. Survey
      John McLaughlin

No. 3-18: Should the International Court of Justice Give an Advisory Opinion on Israel's Separation Fence?
      Prof. Ruth Lapidoth

No. 3-17: Israel's Redeployment and Economic Relations with Its Arab Neighbors
      Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert

No. 3-16: 21st Century Threats Facing Israel
      Maj. Gen. Dan Haloutz

No. 3-15: The Security Fence: An Imperative for Israel
      Minister Uzi Landau

No. 3-14: Is Hamas Preparing to Inherit the Palestinian Authority?
      Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 3-13: Is There an Alternative to Arafat's Leadership?
      Barry Rubin

No. 3-12: After Ghadafi's Declaration: The Impact of Changes in Libyan and Iranian WMD Policies on Israel and the Region
      Gerald M. Steinberg

No. 3-11: Lethal Gestures
      Dan Diker

No. 3-10: The Growing Threat to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge
      MK Dr. Yuval Steinitz

No. 3-9: The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment
      Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

No. 3-8: Balancing IDF Checkpoints and International Law: Teaching the IDF Code of Conduct
      Lt. Col. Amos Guiora

No. 3-7: Undermining the War on Terrorism: The Role of Yasser Arafat and the Syrian Regime
      Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad

No. 3-6: What Exactly Does Israel Have on Yasser Arafat?
      Eli Kazhdan

No. 3-5: The Inevitable Disintegration of the Hudna
      Eli Kazhdan and David Keyes

No. 3-4: Combating Terrorist Financing: Where the War on Terror Intersects the "Roadmap"
      Matthew Levitt

No. 3-3: Who is Taking Credit for Attacks on the U.S. Army in Western Iraq? Al-Jama'a al-Salafiya al-Mujahida
      Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi

No. 3-2: Iran after the Iraq War
      Ephraim Sneh

No. 3-1: U.S. Middle East Policy and Iran's Politico-Economic Development
      Mordechai Abir



Volume 2:

No. 2-31: Prisoner Release - Veering Off the Roadmap
      Eli Kazhdan

No. 2-30: Iraq - A Source of Oil or a Quagmire for the U.S.?
      Mordechai Abir

No. 2-29: Towards Aqaba: Challenges Facing Israel after the Iraq War
      Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland

No. 2-28: The Suicide Bombing Attacks in Saudi Arabia: A Preliminary Assessment
      Dore Gold

No. 2-27: What Can We Learn from the Palestine Investment Fund Report?
      Mark Sloman

No. 2-26: Russia and Iran's Nuclear Program
      Uzi Arad

No. 2-25: The New Arafat-Abu Mazen Cabinet: A Roadblock to Middle East Peace
      Dore Gold

No. 2-24: Israel's Strategy after the Iraq War
      Maj. Gen. Ya'akov Amidror

No. 2-23: The Influence of Palestinian Organizations on Foreign News Reporting
      Dan Diker

No. 2-22: Beyond Iraq: Missile Proliferation in the Middle East
      Uzi Rubin

No. 2-21: The Palestinian Boycott of Jerusalem's Municipal Political Process: Consequences for the Level of Public Services and Infrastructure
      Justus Reid Weiner

No. 2-20: Hizballah's Threat to Regional Security
      Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman

No. 2-19: Meeting the "Depth Threat" from Iraq: The Origins of Israel's Arrow System
      Uzi Rubin

No. 2-18: Mubarak Changes His Tune
      Victor Nahmias

No. 2-17: Deterrence in the Era of Terrorism and Non-Conventional Weaponry
      Dan Meridor

No. 2-16: Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue
      Jeffrey Helmreich

No. 2-15: Turkey's Elections and Israel
      Efraim Inbar

No. 2-14: The Evolution of International Law and the War on Terrorism
      Alan Baker and Col. Daniel Reisner

No. 2-13: Sunni and Shiite Terrorist Networks: Competition or Collusion?
      Lenny Ben-David

No. 2-12: The Assad Visit to London: Background and Implications
      Mark Ami-El

No. 2-11: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the War on Terrorism
      Mordechai Abir

No. 2-10: A New Palestinian Agenda After Iraq?
      Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad

No. 2-9: Israel, Iraq, and the Palestinians - As the U.S. Moves Toward War
      Ze'ev Schiff

No. 2-8: The Recruitment of Children in Current Palestinian Strategy
      Justus Weiner

No. 2-7: Baseless Comparisons: UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq and Israel
      Dore Gold

No. 2-6: Starting Over After Oslo
      Gerald M. Steinberg

No. 2-5: Durban's Troubling Legacy One Year Later: Twisting the Cause of International Human Rights Against the Jewish People
      Irwin Cotler

No. 2-4: Missile Proliferation in the Middle East
      Moshe Arens

No. 2-3: Iran, Syria, and Hizballah - Threatening Israel's North
      Lenny Ben-David

No. 2-2: The Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation: Toward a Divorce
      Ehud Ya'ari

No. 2-1: Why Arafat Went to War: The Wrong Lessons from Lebanon and Kosovo
      Brig. Gen. Eival Gilady



Volume 1:

No. 1-23: Washington Misled: Saudi Arabia's Financial Backing of Terrorism

No. 1-22: What Really Happened in Jenin?

No. 1-21: A Primer for the Arab Summit in Beirut

No. 1-20: Saudi Arabia's Op-Ed Diplomacy: A Public Relations Ploy or a Serious Initiative?

No. 1-19: Was There a Missed Opportunity for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?

No. 1-18: Arafat's Iraqi Connection

No. 1-17: Elie Hobeika's Assassination: Covering Up the Secrets of Sabra and Shatilla

No. 1-16: Marwan Barghouti, Fatah-Tanzim, and the Escalation of the Intifada

No. 1-15: The PLO Weapons Ship from Iran

No. 1-14: Destabilizing Implications of Iranian-U.S. Rapprochement for Israeli and Global Security

No. 1-13: Yasser Arafat, Christmas, and the PFLP

No. 1-12: Maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military Edge: Dilemmas for the Bush Administration

No. 1-11: How Arafat's Palestinian Authority Became an "Entity Supporting Terrorism"

No. 1-10: Powell's Middle East Speech: A Scorecard

No. 1-9: Why Syria is Becoming the Coalition's Spoiler

No. 1-8: Iraq's Biological Weapons Program - Could it be the Source of America's Anthrax Attack?

No. 1-7: Israeli Operations in Area A: The State Department vs. the Oslo Accords

No. 1-6: Draining the Swamp of Terror: One Corner at a Time, or All at Once?

No. 1-5: Palestinian Cease-Fire Compliance: Dilemmas for American Policy

No. 1-4: One Year of Yasser Arafat's Intifada: How It Started and How It Might End

No. 1-3: Militant Islam's Fury at America: The Israel Canard

No. 1-2: Have the Palestinians Abandoned a Negotiated Settlement?

No. 1-1: Occupied Territories or Disputed Territories?


Israeli Security


The Global Range of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program
Uzi Rubin
In 1998 Iran announced a space program. A space launcher that can orbit a satellite weighing 300 kg can be altered into an ICBM that could drop more than 300 kg on Washington. Iran's political leadership is now aiming toward global power projection in the name of Islam, demanding recognition that Islam comprises 25 percent of humanity and should occupy its rightful place in decision-making in world affairs. Statements like this are not about self-defense.

The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance: An Israeli Response to the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault
Dore Gold
Several memoranda of understanding between the U.S. and Israel on strategic cooperation were followed by regular joint military exercises, where U.S. forces were given access to Israel's own combat techniques and vice versa, though much of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship is classified.

After the Hamas Victory: The Increasing Importance of Israel's Strategic Barrier in the Jordan Valley
Dore Gold
Should Israel face a new round of armed Palestinian violence, its ability to isolate the Hamas regime from external reinforcement will be a key security requirement. Should Israel withdraw from the Jordan Valley to the line of the security fence, it would not be able to stop the flow of insurgents and equipment into the West Bank to the terrain dominating Ben-Gurion Airport and other vital parts of Israel's national infrastructure along its coastal plain.

Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Doron Almog
As part of Oslo, Israel gave up 80% of Gaza on May 18, 1994. Disengagement from Gaza means withdrawal from the remaining 20%. A key security element in Gaza was the creation of a one-kilometer security buffer zone monitored by soldiers in high-tech observation posts. In addition to the fence, we must continue to gather intelligence throughout the territories in order to be able to intercept Palestinian terrorists.

21st Century Threats Facing Israel
Maj.-Gen. Dan Halutz
The challenge of full-scale war is not behind us. Many countries in the region do not accept the presence of Israel as a natural fact. If the time comes that someone in the region thinks we have lost our strength, we can expect to be challenged.

The Growing Threat to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge
MK Dr. Yuval Steinitz
Israel has no strategic depth and could face a situation in which its air superiority was jeopardized by guerrilla forces coming from neighboring countries just a short distance away, or even from the Palestinian Authority. Since a number of hostile countries now possess long-range missiles, Israel must take into consideration the fact that all of its air bases are within range of enemy weapons. The last decade has seen a very sharp rise in military expenditures in Egypt, though that country faces no challenges or threats to its territory from its neighbors.

More publications on this topic:
Europe's Response to the Threat of Global Terror - Jose Maria Aznar
Dilemmas of Israeli Policy After the Hamas Victory: From Disengagement to Consolidation? - Chuck Freilich
The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier - Col. (Res.) Danny Tirza
Sharon's Strategic Legacy for Israel: Competing Perspectives - Dan Diker
Israel's Defense Industry as a Key Component of Israel's Qualitative Military Edge - Giora Shalgi
How is Israel's Economy Affected by the Security Situation? - Ezra Sadan
The International Atomic Energy Agency and Israel: A Realistic Agenda - Gerald M. Steinberg
The Vanunu Myths and Israeli Deterrence Policy - Gerald M. Steinberg
Polling the Importance of Israel's Rights to a United Jerusalem and Defensible Borders for Likely American Voters: A Nationwide U.S. Survey - John McLaughlin
The Security Fence: An Imperative for Israel - Minister Uzi Landau
Israel's Strategy after the Iraq War - Maj.-Gen. Ya'akov Amidror
Beyond Iraq: Missile Proliferation in the Middle East - Uzi Rubin
Hizballah's Threat to Regional Security - Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman


Peace Process


The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror
The Geneva Accord conceded almost all the security arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza Strip sought by past Israeli governments and leaves Israel with no safety net in the event that the agreement is violated by the Palestinian side.

Bush Erases the Clinton Parameters
Dore Gold
President Bush's April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister Sharon represents a significant shift in U.S. policy. Bush does not insist on any land swaps involving Israeli territory, and states that Palestinian refugees should be settled in a future Palestinian state "rather than Israel." Bush refers to "defensible borders" in the context of preserving and strengthening "Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself." Under Bush, security must be achieved first, as a prerequisite for peace.

Was There a Missed Opportunity for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?
During the Taba talks in January 2001, with the most conciliatory Israeli positions ever presented at the peace table, the diplomatic gaps between Israel and the Palestinians were still totally unbridgeable. Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic gaps have widened even further since Taba. Given attempts to revive the Clinton parameters for a final peace settlement, a sober understanding of the true diplomatic gaps between the parties on the issues of territory and borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and security is critical.



The Palestinians


Understanding the Direction of the New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and Al-Qaeda Jihadism
Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi
Hamas views its political mission as the vanguard of the worldwide Islamic revolution led by its parent-movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas' rise to power has inspired Islamic movements all over the world and motivated them to emulate Hamas' approach (tactical participation in a democratic process) in order to win similar successes in their own countries, especially in Jordan.

Undermining Mahmud Abbas: The "Green Revolution" and the Hamas Strategy to Take Over the Palestinian Authority
Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi
From Hamas's standpoint, gaining political power will actually strengthen its ability to preserve its military forces (Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and resort to terrorism when circumstances are appropriate. Abbas is exploiting the Bush effort to spread democracy by opening the door to radical Islamic elements. The unwanted possible outcome may be the strengthening of Hamas and furthering the preconditions for eventual militant Islamic rule over the West Bank and Gaza.

Will a Gaza "Hamas-stan" Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and David Keyes
Would a security vacuum in a post-withdrawal Gaza facilitate al-Qaeda's entry there? In the past, al-Qaeda sought to establish itself wherever there was a security vacuum - in economically weak, failed states. To prevent a safe haven for terrorism from emerging in Gaza, Israel must maintain control over the strategic envelope around Gaza even after its disengagement, particularly air, land, and sea access to the territory.

Are There Signs of a Jordanian-Palestinian Reengagement?
Dan Diker and Pinchas Inbari
For the first time in Arab diplomatic history, the Jordanians drafted a peace proposal in March 2005 calling for normalization of relations with Israel before the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Arab League delegates reported that at least 13 of the 22 Arab countries expressed initial support for the Jordanian proposal. A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation of some variety seems to be the most natural political alternative from historical, cultural and ethnic standpoints.

More publications on this topic:
Will There Be a Palestinian Civil War? - Pinhas Inbari
The Popular Resistance Committees: Hamas' New Partners? - Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi
The Palestinian Authority and the Challenge of Palestinian Elections - Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland
The Continuing Struggle of Palestinian Journalists for Freedom of the Press in the Palestinian Authority - Khaled Abu Toameh
Towards Palestinian Elections: The Democracy of the Rifles - Brig. Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari
America's Hamas Dilemma: Spreading Democracy or Combating Terrorism? - Dore Gold
The Murder of Musa Arafat and the Battle for the Spoils of Gaza - Pinhas Inbari and Dan Diker
Democracy as a Component of Security - Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom
What is the True Demographic Picture in the West Bank and Gaza? - Bennett Zimmerman and Prof. Sergio DellaPergola
After the Palestinian Elections - Ehud Yaari
Palestinian Priorities After Arafat: Palestinian Unity or Peace? - Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi
The Expulsion of the Palestinian Authority from Jerusalem and the Temple Mount - Dan Diker
The Palestinian Rebellion in Fatah: Foreshadowing the Politics of the Post-Arafat Era - Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi
The Struggle of Palestinian Journalists for Freedom of the Press - Dan Diker
What Happened to Reform of the Palestinian Authority? - Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Toameh
Is Hamas Preparing to Inherit the Palestinian Authority? - Jonathan D. Halevi
What Can We Learn from the Palestine Investment Fund Report? - Mark Sloman
The Influence of Palestinian Organizations on Foreign News Reporting - Dan Diker
The Palestinian Boycott of Jerusalem's Municipal Political Process: Consequences for the Level of Public Services and Infrastructure - Justus Reid Weiner
The Recruitment of Children in Current Palestinian Strategy - Justus Weiner
What Really Happened in Jenin?



Terrorism


Is There a New Jihadi Threat Destabilizing the Eastern Front?
Dore Gold and Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi
For the first time, Israeli defense experts are noting that groups identifying with al-Qaeda - or the global jihad - are determined to acquire operational footholds close to Israel's borders. Al-Qaeda operations around Israel are becoming more prominent in Jordan and Sinai. Were Israel to withdraw from the strategic barrier it controls in the Jordan Valley, then Israeli vulnerability could very well attract more global jihadi elements to Jordan, who would seek to use the kingdom as a platform to reach the West Bank and then Israel.

The Relationship Between International and Localized Terrorism
Boaz Ganor
There is no connection between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the motivations of al-Qaeda and the global jihad to attack Western society. Only after 9/11 did Islamic radical groups find that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could serve as a propaganda tool. If Israel would disappear tomorrow, does anybody really believe that Islamic radicalism would disappear?

Who's Right on the War on Terrorism? The 9/11 Commission, the U.S. Senate Assessment of Prewar Intelligence, and the British Butler Committee
Dore Gold
What emerges from the intelligence presented in the 9/11 report is that Iraq had an ongoing and cooperative relationship with al-Qaeda that intensified after 2001. There were grounds for concern that if Iraq continued along the same path, expertise in weapons of mass destruction might have been provided to al-Qaeda. Indeed, British intelligence raised the possibility in March 2003 that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "sleeper cells" in Baghdad, on the eve of the Iraq War, might use biological and chemical agents in a future insurgency against U.S. troops.

Combating Terrorist Financing: Where the War on Terror Intersects the "Roadmap"
Matthew Levitt
Since there is significant overlap between terrorist groups in the area of financing, failure to deal with the financing of groups like Hamas undermines efforts to stem the flow of funds to al-Qaeda.

More publications on this topic:
The Islamist Threat to Jordan - Nibras Kazimi
Global Oil Supply Security and Al-Qaeda's Abortive Attack on Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia - Mordechai Abir
Empirical Hubris: How "Anonymous" Disguises the Real Threat to the West and Damages the CIA - Jeff Helmreich
Washington Misled: Saudi Arabia's Financial Backing of Terrorism



International Law


Legal Acrobatics: The Palestinian Claim that Gaza is Still Occupied Even After Israel Withdraws
Dore Gold
If no Israeli military government is exercising its authority or any of "the functions of government" in the Gaza Strip, as stated in Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, then there is no occupation. Thus, the charge of continued "occupation" even though the Palestinians exercise self-government and the Israeli civilian and military presence have been removed, is less a rigorous legal definition and more a blunt political instrument to serve the PLO's diplomatic and military agenda against Israel.

Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism
Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin
An ethics committee crafted principles on how to make moral and ethical decisions in Israel's operational campaign against terror. Everyone who is directly involved in terror is a legitimate target. Because of the level of incitement, collateral damage only raised Palestinian public support for terror from 95 to 96%. In the current war Israel has lost over 1,000 people - equivalent to the U.S. suffering 45,000 dead and 300,000 wounded.

Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue
Jeffrey Helmreich
One may legitimately support or challenge Israeli settlements in the disputed territories, but they are not illegal, and they have neither the size, the population, nor the placement to seriously impact upon the future status of the disputed territories and their Palestinian population centers.

More publications on this topic:
Israel's Commitment to Domestic and International Law in Times of War - Judge Amnon Straschnov
Should the International Court of Justice Give an Advisory Opinion on Israel's Separation Fence? - Prof. Ruth Lapidoth
The Evolution of International Law and the War on Terrorism - Alan Baker and Col. Daniel Reisner
Baseless Comparisons: UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq and Israel - Dore Gold



Europe and Israel


European Misreading of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Efraim Karsh
The analogy between Zionism and Nazism has never stood the most basic historical test. How many Germans were murdered by Jewish suicide bombers in Berlin's cafes during the 1940s? How many Palestinians were herded like cattle into trains and transported into death camps where they were systematically exterminated in gas chambers? None.

Radical Islam in The Netherlands: A Case Study of a Failed European Policy
Manfred Gerstenfeld
On December 23, 2004, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior published a report entitled From Dawa to Jihad. Prepared by the Dutch general intelligence service (AIVD), it describes radical Islam and examines how to meet its threat to Dutch society. The Dutch report places the blame for the origins of the problem squarely on the deeply-rooted ideology of fierce opposition to the Western way of life among certain Muslim groups. It does not claim that the problem of radical Muslims would disappear if there were peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

How Europe's Drive for Independence from America Hurts Israel
Jeffrey Gedmin
In the changed relationship between Europe and the U.S., with increased competition and touches of rivalry, Israel is seen as a partner or an outpost of the United States. As some European thinking seeks to cut America down to size, some European thinking also believes it is good to cut Israel down to size, too.

More publications on this topic:
The EU Constitutional Crisis, the Middle East, and Israel - Manfred Gerstenfeld
Putin Leads Russia's Return to the Middle East and the Arab Embrace - Michael Widlanski


The Middle East


What If Iran Gets the Bomb? The Iranian Challenge to the West
Ephraim Kam
From the Israeli viewpoint, an Iranian bomb will mean that for the first time an enemy country - and Iran is an enemy country by all definitions - will acquire the capability to inflict a very heavy blow on Israel. The more so since the formal Iranian position is that Israel should disappear from the map, that the solution of the Palestinian problem should be the establishment of a Palestinian state not alongside Israel but instead of Israel. No Arab government today holds such a position.

U.S.-Saudi Relations After Hurricane Katrina: Increased Oil Dependency and the Vulnerability of Saudi Oil Installations
Mordechai Abir
While the Saudis are cracking down on al-Qaeda inside Saudi Arabia, they continue to provide the ideological and even financial support for jihadi groups outside the Saudi kingdom. In mid-July 2005, Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey told a U.S. Senate committee, "Even today, we believe that Saudi donors may still be a significant source of terrorist financing, including for the insurgency in Iraq."

How Egypt Molded Modern Radical Islam
Zvi Mazel
The basic ideology of political Islam - which was adopted later by all radical groups - finds its origin within Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. President Sadat released the members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1971 and let them widen their influence over Egyptian society. He believed at the time that he needed them to fight his opponents, the remnants of the Nasser era that he wanted to obliterate. Yet an Egyptian jihad group that had declared war against what it called a non-Muslim government of Egypt assassinated Sadat in October 1981.

Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War
Dore Gold
While some have charged that the primary interest of the Bush administration in going to war against Saddam Hussein was to defend Israeli security interests, by 2003 Iraq was clearly not Israel's primary concern. With Israeli leaders at the time calling Iran "the main existential threat to Israel," the American war against Iraq may have had an unintended side-effect of removing a secondary or tertiary threat to Israel, but not a primary threat.

More publications on this topic:
Can Diplomacy Still Prevent Iran from Going Nuclear? - Gerald M. Steinberg
Iran's New Revolutionary Guards Regime: Anti-Americanism, Oil, and Rising International Tension - Mordechai Abir
Domestic Threats to Iranian Stability: Khuzistan and Baluchistan - Michael Rubin
The World Oil Crisis: Implications for Global Security and the Middle East - Gal Luft
The Succession of Saudi King Abdallah, the Oil Market, and Regional Politics - Mordechai Abir
The U.S. Versus Syria and Iran: Winning the War on Terror - Maj.-Gen. Paul E. Vallely (ret.)
Will Washington Support Democracy in Iran? - Michael Rubin
The Al-Qaeda Threat to Saudi Arabia's Oil Sector - Mordechai Abir
Instability in the Gulf and the Threat to Oil Stability - Antoine Halff
Syrian Foreign Policy Under Bashar al-Assad - Eyal Zisser
How Successful is Al-Qaeda's Strategy of Depriving the West of Essential Oil? - Mordechai Abir
After Ghadafi's Declaration: The Impact of Changes in Libyan and Iranian WMD Policies on Israel and the Region - Gerald M. Steinberg
Russia and Iran's Nuclear Program - Uzi Arad